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Abstract 
Human factors are becoming the predominate contributors to accidents in the 
maritime transportation sector. Therefore, a methodology based on Reason's Swiss 
Cheese Model to qualitatively and quantitatively analyse an accident is proposed. 
During the analysis, a proposed Human and Organisational Factors (HOFs) framework 
that is suitable for investigating and analysis maritime accidents can also be integrated 
with the analysis results for obtaining a more comprehensive insight into the causation 
of the accident. 
The proposed methodology comprises several well-defined Formal Safety 
Assessment techniques forming a systematic procedure in a series of processes. The 
methodology mainly applies Why-Because Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis for 
qualitative analysis, and Bayesian Network and Influence Diagrams for quantitative 
studies. In addition, Sensitivity Analysis is utilised for validating the analysis results 
and finding the critical factors of the accident. In the end of the analysis, a Bayesian 
Network representing the accident can be acquired revealing both the quantitative and 
qualitative results in a graphic presentation. Furthermore, an Influence Diagram which 
is extended from the established Bayesian Network of the accident is also achievable, 
for the decision makers, to evaluate the expected utilities based on the cost-benefit of 
the potential Risk Control Options against the (or similar) type of accident. Both the 
Bayesian Networks and Influence Diagrams of the accident are capable of proceeding a 
"what if' examination via the propagation function of the models to carry out a 
diagnosis and prediction process. This provides the analyst with a simulation 
functionality to examine the accident under all the possible conditions given. 
In summary, the proposed methodology implements the notion of Window of 
Opportunities of Reason's model for accident analysis with the following contributions 
to academic knowledge: (1) implementing Reason's Swiss Cheese Model with Venn 
diagram; (2) proposing a dedicated HOFs framework (HFACS-MA) for maritime 
accidents; (3) innovating a Backtracking process and its validation mechanism; 
(4) presenting a Conditional Probability Table of Bayesian Network in Karnaugh-map 
style (K-CPT); and (5) recommending a notation for List Statements to organise the 
information and evidence of an accident. 
The combined methodology is demonstrated with a case study based on the 1987 
Herald of Free Enterprise accident which capsized off Zeebrugge with large loss of life. 
Human factors were considered to be the main causes of accident with failings at senior 
ship and shore management level as well as at operational level. The resultant analysis 
shows how the relevant importance of different causal factors can be evaluated. 
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Ch. 1: Introduction 
Chapter One - 
Introduction 
Summary 
In this chapter, the overview of the present study is given, including the hypothesis 
of the study, the structure of the thesis and the general description of the proposed 
methodology. 
1.1 Introduction 
The ultimate purpose of analysing accidents is to understand the full range of 
conditions and factors that contributed to an occurrence, so that similar events can be 
prevented. Licu, Cioran, Hayward and Lowe (2005) have stated that every occurrence 
provides an opportunity to study how the deviation occurred and to identify ways of 
preventing it from happening again. Since humans only have a finite set of cognitive 
and physical resources and are not good at handling complex environments composed 
of multiple competing stimuli, humans can and will commit errors (Krokos and Baker, 
2007). According to a great number of studies devoted to this issue, it has been pointed 
out that around 20% to 90% of accidents in the maritime transportation sector are 
mainly caused by human errors (Trucco et al., 2008; Harati-Mokhtari et al., 2007; 
Wang and Trbojevic 2007; Hetherington et al., 2006; Darbra and Casal, 2004, to name 
but a few). The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has taken the conscious 
decision to concentrate its efforts much more strongly on the human element (O'Neil, 
2003). That is, despite the difference of the perspectives, human errors are gradually 
being recognised as the primary causal contributors to accidents. 
Nowadays the major aviation accident analysis methods, e. g. Systemic Occurrence 
Analysis Methodology (SOAM) (EUROCONTROL, 2005) and Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003b), are the 
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applications of Reason's Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1997), which have a significant 
influence on the ways that investigators conduct their investigations to find the overt 
and underlying causes of aviation accidents. In this sense, the Swiss Cheese Model is 
assumed to be beneficial to the maritime industry whilst applying it as the core concept 
of the proposed methodology incorporating with several risk assessment techniques. 
These techniques include Why-Because Analysis (WBA) (Ladkin, 2001; Paul-Stüve, 
2005), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Bayesian Network and Influence Diagrams, etc. 
However, none of these techniques is able to accomplish the analysis alone. This is 
because, for instance Why-Because Analysis can only produce qualitative analysis 
results; Fault Tree Analysis cannot solve the quantitative problems when the Basic 
Events are not mutually independent. Also the basic Bayesian Network lacks 
mechanisms to ensure that all the nodes in the model are actually necessary and 
sufficient. 
Before covering the scope of the present study, it is worthy to revisit the definition 
of the Swiss Cheese Model since it is the core concept of the methodology. The 
definition given by Reason is that "an accident can happen only when the holes in many 
layers momentarily line up to permit a trajectory of accident opportunity - bringing 
hazards into damaging contact with victims" (Reason, 2000). Reason further introduces 
this accident trajectory as a Window of Opportunity (WoO) giving the necessary 
condition of an organisational accident to be triggered. It is "the rare conjunction of a 
set of holes, which consist of a series of latent conditions and active failures, in 
successive defences, allowing hazards to come into damaging contact with people and 
assets". In the notion, "active failures are errors and violations committed by the 
personal at the sharp end of system, but they are now being seen more as consequence 
than as principal causes". Such unsafe acts are likely to have a "direct impact on the 
safety of a system and immediacy of their adverse effects" (Reason, 1997). In contrast, 
latent conditions are the inevitable "resident pathogens" within the system. They arise 
from decisions made by designers, builders, procedure writer and top level management 
(Reason, 2000). These latent conditions, such as poor design, undetected manufacturing 
defects, maintenance failures or unworkable procedures, etc., may have been present for 
many years before they are combined with local circumstances and active failures to 
penetrate the multi-layer of defence of any system (see Figure 1-1 for illustration). 
-2- 
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Figure 1-1 Reason's Swiss Cheese Model 
(from Reason, 2000) 
Therefore, in order to prevent the similar accidents from happening again, one has 
to find a way to shut the WoOs which can penetrate the defences of the system prior to 
the future accidents. Before shutting the WoO, the holes and the factors which cause the 
holes to exist have to be identified. Furthermore, not only the causal factors have to be 
identified, but also the significance, frequency and impact of the factors have to be 
clarified. Ultimately, the best countermeasure against the reoccurrence of the accident 
should as well be examined when the investigators carry out the analysis after the 
investigations and before compiling the accident report and recommendations for public 
enquiry and lesson learning. The tools which can assist the investigators to perform 
their work are of vital importance. Thus, the objective of the present study is to propose 
a methodology which can fulfil the need of analysing human, factors involved in 
maritime accidents qualitatively and quantitatively. 
1.2 Research objectives and the hypothesis 
The main goal of the present study is to propose a methodology which can 
qualitatively and quantitatively analyse the Human and Organisational Factors (HOFs) 
involved in a maritime accident in order to assist the decision makers to choose the best 
countermeasures for preventing similar accidents from happening again. There is no 
intention to point out who should be blamed for causing the accidents, but to highlight 
which parts of the system are vulnerable, according to the accident analysed via the 
proposed methodology. 
Since the IMO has followed the aviation industry in the adoption of Swiss Cheese 
and SHEL models and proposed guidelines for the investigation of human factors in 
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marine casualties and incidents (IMO A. 884,1999; IMO, 2008), a HOFs framework 
which based on the guidelines to clarify and classify the human factors involved should 
be considered and integrated into the analytical methodology as a whole. In addition, 
probabilistic figures which highlight the significance, frequency and impact of the factor 
involved are the key issues of the methodology. Furthermore, a systematic procedure of 
the methodology is also important for improving the objectivity of the analysis 
outcomes. 
The objectives of the present study are formed by considering the following three 
requirements: 
1. applying the Swiss Cheese Model as the core concept of the methodology; 
2. being capable of carrying out the accident analysis qualitatively and 
quantitatively; and 
3. a systematic procedure for avoiding unnecessary subjective speculations. 
In short, the hypothesis of the study is that the Swiss Cheese Model can be 
implemented by employing well-defined probabilistic assessment techniques to achieve 
the three requirements mentioned above for analysing maritime accidents. In the 
proposed methodology, the Swiss Cheese Model is adopted as the fundamental concept 
of the method and the HFACS is the basis of the HOFs framework applied. In addition, 
WBA, FTA, Bayesian Network and Influence Diagrams are the main techniques to be 
employed to deal with the qualitative and quantitative analyses. When required, an 
application of fuzzy set theory is applied to handle the problem of expert judgements. 
1.3 The features of the methodology 
The methodology is set up to surround the core concept of the hypothesis which is 
implementing the Swiss Cheese Model to compose an accident analysis tool by 
adopting Formal Safety Assessment techniques with HOFs framework to identify, 
clarify and classify the human factors involved in an accident. In this section, only the 
brief introduction regarding the features of the methodology and the techniques adopted 
are included, rather than an in-depth theoretical and mathematical explanation. The 
details of the techniques adopted are elucidated in the relevant chapters where they are 
applied. For example, WBA, FTA, Bayesian Networks and Influence Diagrams are 
covered in Chapters 4 and 5, and HFACS is described in Chapter 6. 
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Mainly, the qualitative analysis is achieved by WBA and FTA Whilst the Bayesian 
Network and Influence Diagram perform the quantitative part. The Bayesian Network 
and/or Influence Diagrams also provide the final presentations of the accidents analysis. 
A modified version of HFACS which can fulfil the needs of the maritime industry in 
investigating and analysing HOFs involved in an organisational accident is also 
proposed in the present study in order to fit the requirements of the IMO guidelines and 
can be utilised as a HOFs framework to integrate with the analysis results. This 
framework can not only assist the investigators to identified, clarify and classify the 
factors involved, but also have the advantage to provide a comprehensive illustration 
associated with the causation of the accident amongst those factors in each level of the 
system. That is acquired by integrating the qualitative and quantitative analysis results 
with the framework. 
In terms of subjective probability, when historical statistic data is insufficient or 
unavailable for the quantitative analysis, experts' judgements are the alternative, and an 
aggregation method based on fuzzy set theory is a solution to obtain the group 
consensus of the estimations. Both the randomness and fuzziness of the uncertainty are 
the key issues of the estimates that the methodology has to deal with. The present study 
therefore proposes a method, in Chapter 7, to address this issue making the proposed 
methodology more resilient. 
Having a systematic procedure is another advantage of the methodology. At each 
step of the analysis procedure, the analyst only has to concentrate on the inferring or 
reasoning of the present stage. At each stage, the questions are in a comparatively 
uncomplicated format, in which the scopes are limited and the questions are easy to 
answer. By following a systematic procedure, there is no need for the analyst to foresee 
the orientation of the analysis results in the middle of the analysis if they can carry out 
the analysis properly at each stage and step. The entire outcome of the analysis is hence 
obtained by accumulating and integrating the answers given by the analyst at each step 
and stage. 
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is compiled in eight chapters. Following the introduction of the present 
study in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 reviews the important literatures influencing this study. 
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The emphasis and kernel of the methodology start with Chapter 3 and end with Chapter 
7. They are presented as follows in an interrelated manner (see Figure 1-2). 
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Figure 1-2 The structure of the thesis 
In Chapter 3, the outline of the methodology is given, where the background 
information of the analysis method is shown. The notions of the methods in respect to 
the hypothesis, implementing the Swiss Cheese Model as a qualitative and quantitative 
analysis tool, are specified to provide an overview of the proposed methodology. The 
various techniques are briefly covered prior to the more detailed analysis in Chapters 4 
to 7. 
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Qualitative Quantitative 
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Figure 1-3 The data processing of the method 
The data progression of the qualitative and quantitative analysis method shown in 
Figure 1-3 is depicted in Chapter 4. The method starts with the qualitative analysis to 
elicit the events and factors involved in an accident and to clarify the causation amongst 
them. Subsequently, the quantified figures of the factors are added into the qualitative 
outcomes to form the quantitative results, in which the proposed aggregation method (in 
Chapter 7) may be utilised for subjective probability and/or group consensus. Finally, 
the qualitative and quantitative analysis results can be integrated with the proposed 
HOFs framework to present a more comprehensive insight into the causation of the 
factors distributed in different levels of the system. 
By following the methods depicted, a case study applying these methods to the 
Herald of Free Enterprise tragedy to carry out the analysis is demonstrated in Chapter 5. 
Furthermore, the qualitative and quantitative analysis results of the case are 
incorporated with the proposed HOFs framework, which is elucidated in Chapter 6, to 
illustrate the causation of the casual factors as well as the associations amongst each 
level of the system. This framework is important to the methodology to be used in 
maritime area since it follows the IMO regulations. It implies that this methodology can 
also be applied onto other realm provided that the dedicated field 1-IOFs framework is in 
place. 
Chapter 7 is the aggregation method, based on fuzzy set theory, to solve the group 
consensus problem when applying expert judgements due to lack of historical statistic 
data to perform the quantitative analysis. Finally, Chapter 8, the conclusion chapter of 
the thesis, summaries the arguments presented in the prior chapters as well as the further 
considerations and work. 
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1.5 Discussion 
In the proposed methodology, Reason's Swiss Cheese Model is the basis complied 
by all the methods employed. The qualitative outcomes represent the instances of the 
WoOs identified in an accident, and the quantitative results reveal the width or extent of 
the WoOs. From the analysis results shown in the form of Bayesian Networks, not only 
the causation of the factors involved is displayed, but also the significance, frequency 
and impact of the factors can be explored. 
The HFACS is another application of the Swiss Cheese Model in which the factors 
are classified into different levels and categories associated with a HOFs framework. A 
comprehensive insight into the causation of the accident analysed can be obtained by 
integrating the qualitative and quantitative analysis results with the HOFs framework. 
A systematic procedure of the methodology is another important feature to make it 
feasible and practical. During the procedure, the analysts can only concentrate on every 
limited scope of questions and infer their rational answers to the questions in each stage 
and step, without concerning the whole picture of the accident. This feature can reduce 
the unnecessary speculations and diminish the influences of individual bias. All analysis 
outcomes are therefore accumulated and integrated together to obtain the final results. 
The aggregation method based on fuzzy set theory dealing with the group 
consensus problem arisen when applying expert judgements due to lack of historical 
statistic data is one of the key features to make the methodology more resilient. Both the 
randomness and fuzziness of the uncertainty are considered in the aggregation method 
to handle the issue of subjective probability. 
In addition, this study has made the following contributions to academic 
knowledge: 
1. Implement Reason's Swiss Cheese Model with a Venn diagram (section 3.2). 
This implementation uses set theory and probability theory to qualitatively 
and quantitatively analyse the factors within the model. 
2. Proposes HFACS-MA for maritime industry (Chapter 6). This HOFs 
framework in this research is dedicated for investigating and analysing human 
factors involved in maritime organisational accidents. The framework is based 
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on the IMO guidelines (IMO A. 884,1999) and Casualty Investigation Code 
(IMO, 2008). 
3. The innovative Backtracking process and its validation mechanism (section 
4.5.2 - 4.5.4). This process can transform a fault tree into a Bayesian Network 
in a form of Minimal Cut Set, in which the Top Event is no longer represented 
by a single object, but several nodes as Minimal Cut Sets. This formulation 
can benefit the diagnosis and prediction of the network to be performed, 
offering more valuable information than the traditional Top Event format can 
provide. 
4. The K-CPT (section 4.3.3). This is a combination of Kamaugh-map and 
Conditional Probability Table of Bayesian Network. The K-CPT can help 
analysts to find the minimum sum-of-product Boolean expression depicting 
the deterministic correlation between a node and its parent nodes in a 
Bayesian Network. 
5. The notion of List Statement utilised in Fact Finding process (section 4.2.2). 
This data format and index mechanism can facilitate the logical organisation 
of the information and evidence of an accident as part of the proposed 
analysis procedure. . 
In summary, the present study assumes that the proposed methodology should be 
beneficial to the maritime industry to find the real causes of accidents. In the following 
chapters the details of the methodology and the ways to apply it are specified one by 
one according to the topics shown in Figure 1-2. 
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Chapter Two - 
Literature Review 
Summary 
A proper investigation and analysis to an accident is the key to the understanding 
of the occurrence and the prevention of reoccurrence. Accident analysis methods are 
therefore developed to sustain the successfulness of the accident investigation. In this 
chapter, the literature on this topic is reviewed and has been organised into several 
sections. These sections are: the development of accident analysis methods, the role 
human factors play in accidents, the method to identify human factors involved in an 
accident, the techniques which can be applied in accident analyses, and the fuzzy 
approach with which experts' judgements can be used to obtain rational information 
overcoming the problem of insufficient data. The chapter concludes with a proposed 
methodology, to be developed in this thesis, to provide a sufficiently thorough and 
comprehensive solution to the problem. 
2.1 Introduction . 
Whatever the types of accidents, the outcomes are always individual suffering, lost 
properties and/or damaged environment. In order to prevent the similar accidents from 
happening again, lessons must be learned and preventative measures must be made. It is 
of vital importance to know what the real causes are in order to formulate proper 
countermeasures that can effectively and efficiently keep the similar accidents from 
happening again. Therefore, a comprehensive and thorough accident analysis method to 
attain this requirement is a vital requirement. A broad introduction to this topic is 
covered in section 2.2. 
Since human factors (or elements) are now being recognised as the primary causes 
to cause the complex socio-technical system to fail, the method applied for accident 
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analysis must be able to elicit the human factors involved to present a clearer picture in 
relation to the causation of the accident. The background information with respect to 
those studies that have been done for this issue are described in section 2.3. 
Furthermore, not only qualitative analysis results are necessarily to be provided by 
the analytical methods, but quantitative information is also ideally needed. This is 
because the significance, frequency and impact of every contributing factor involved in 
an accident are different and can be crucial for determining the relative importance of 
the factors. Indeed, the quantitative information would therefore be preferred, if it can 
be reliably obtained. Previous methods proposed by other researches are described in 
section 2.4. 
Uncertainty and subjective probability are critical issues when expert judgements 
are the alternative due to lack of historical statistic data whilst carrying out the 
quantitative analysis of an accident. Solutions to this issue are varied as to which type of 
quantitative techniques the analysis applies. The overview and the proposed solution are 
discussed in section 2.5. 
2.2, The development of human factor analysis of accidents 
Gordon, Flin and Meares (2005) have reviewed and summarise the development of 
Human Factors Incident Investigation Tool (HFIT) between 1980 and 2002 listing a 
total of 18 major HFITs developed, in addition to their proposed HFIT. These HFITs 
are categorised into three categories: Reactive Incident Reporting Systems, Combined 
pro-active and reactive investigation systems and Confidential incident reporting 
systems. In the Reactive Incident Reporting Systems category, several renowned 
programs, e. g. the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000; Shappell and Wiegmann 2003b) and Technique for 
Retrospective Analysis of Cognitive Errors (TRACEr) (Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002), 
acknowledge that organisational and social factors should be included in the analyses. 
This has led to the development of different HFITs in order to cope with this complexity. 
In addition to these HFITs, other examples found in the literature are as follows. 
b The AcciMap (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002): a graphic presentation represents a 
particular accident scenario. It is based on the classic cause-consequence chart 
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representing the causal flow of events supplemented by representation of planning, 
management and regulating bodies contributed to creation of the scenario. 
b The Systemic Occurrence Analysis Methodology (SOAM) (EUROCONTROL, 
2005): guidelines to the investigation of Air Traffic Management (ATM) safety 
occurrences. The SOAM developed for EUROCONTROL is one of the accident 
investigation methodologies based on Reason's Swiss Cheese Model for 
organisational accidents. 
b The Wheel of Misfortune (O'Hare, 2000): an attempt to overcome the difficulties 
of Reason's Swiss Cheese Model which consists of a linear sequence of 'planes'. 
That can obscure a better thought that, in terms of intersecting influences, accident 
causation is spreading outward from various points. 
The Why-Because Analysis (WBA) (Paul- Stüve, 2005; RVS WBA homepage): a. 
technique for causally analysing the behaviour of complex technical and socio- 
technical systems. Its primary application is in the analysis of accidents, mainly to 
transportation systems (air, rail and sea). 
Common elements of all these HFITs are that the techniques are all based on the 
notion of a structured socio-technical system which indicates the preconditions, the 
functions on the different system levels involved and an analysis of how they have 
contributed to the developments of an accident causation in order to elicit the `real' 
human factors. A shortcoming is that they all lack quantified indicators to distinguish 
the magnitude (i. e. the quantification) of the identified human factors involved in an 
accident. 
Another field with a growing concern for human performance in a complex 
technical control system is Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) which focuses on the 
reliability of human operators (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). A great number of HRA 
techniques for quantifying human factors have been developed. Wu and the co-authors 
(2009) have categorised these techniques into two generations. The first generation is 
developed for probabilistic safety assessment of plant risk; the representatives are: 
  Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP). 
  Human Error and Reduction Technique (HEART) 
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  Success Likelihood Index Method (SLIM) using Multi-Attribute Utility 
Decomposition (MAUD) 
  Technica Empirica Stirne Errori Operati (TESEO) 
The second generation of the HRA techniques applied cognition analysis. The 
typical one is: 
 A Technique for human Error Analysis (ATHEANA) , 
By following a standard procedure in risk assessment and risk criteria that the 
techniques provide, the identification of human factors in a failure case provides the 
links between operations, critical failures and consequences of these failures and may be 
formulated in terms of overall system risk. However a current weakness of these 
techniques is in validation of the proposed models (Wang and Trbojevic 2007). 
In terms of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
and Bayesian Network are the techniques have been widely applied in variant 
professional fields, such as aviation and nuclear power industries. They are even utilised 
as the tool to analysis the human factors involved in an accident. For example, Johnson 
(1999) has applied FTA to analysis the relationship between human error and 
organisational failure'that occurred in a railway accident. Lee and Cha (2005) have 
proposed a technique based on FTA to qualitatively evaluate casual relationship 
between software faults and physical hazards. Celik, Lavasani and Wang (2010) have 
illustrated a Fuzzy extended Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA) methodology to clarify the 
probability of technical failures, operational misapplications and legislative shortages 
leading to shipping accidents. Martin and the co-authors (2009) have used a Bayesian 
Network model to analyse the human factors regarding workplace accidents caused by 
falls from a height. Another example using a Bayesian Network to identify human 
safety behaviour in construction industry in China by considering safety climate factors 
and personal experience factors has been shown by Zhou, Fang and Wang (2008). 
Meanwhile, Eleye-Datubo, Wall, Saajedi and Wang (2006) have adopted Bayesian 
Network and Influence Diagrams to formalise a methodology that makes a risk 
assessments model easier to be built for a marine and offshore evacuation scenario. 
A case study analysing organisational factors in maritime transportation has been 
carried out by combining FTA and Bayesian Network to form a model for risk 
assessment (Trucco et al., 2008). This study is derived from previous research which 
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mapped a Fault Tree model into a Bayesian Network model in order to improve the 
analysis amongst components dependence of a computer system (Bobbio et al., 2001). 
Anderson and Felici (2003) have made a study that reviewed the techniques in the 
analysis of safety, reliability and security of industrial computer systems. They found 
that using a Bayesian Network model can extend the Fault Tree model by capturing the 
probabilistic logical operators, multi-state variables and sequentially dependent failures. 
However, the Bayesian Network failed to model actions that happen to the system in a 
previous state, over time. In summary, translating a Fault Tree model into a Bayesian 
Network model may further enrich the safety analysis, but not having adopted a well- 
defined human error model or framework with FTA and/or Bayesian Network analysis 
techniques makes them somewhat deficient in practice. 
In the conjunction of human error and Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
methodologies, a groundbreaking Fuzzy Bayesian Network (FBN) method which 
integrates the human element into a probabilistic risk-based model in maritime safety 
assessment is proposed by Eleye-Datubo, Wall and Wang (2008) to demonstrate the 
human performance in maritime industry. Moreover, Celik and Cebi (2009) have 
proposed a methodology which is based on HFACS and Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (FAHP) to generate an analytical HFACS as the quantitative assessment tool in 
order to clearly identify the roles of human errors in shipping accidents. Despite the 
growing number and sophistication of the techniques, the challenges associated with 
understanding and organising human error and its causes are continuing. This is because 
in different fields each organisation tends to develop its own error classification system, 
which makes it difficult to compare the analysed data across techniques within an 
industry or across industries (Krokos and Baker, 2007). 
2.3 Human and Organisational Factors (HOFs) framework for 
accident analysis 
Before the end of the 1970s, the study of human error contributing to the 
occurrence of accidents never managed to achieve high priority in psychology realm 
until the occurrence of the first major modem industrial disasters caused by human error 
(ground collision between two large aircraft in Tenerife, 1977,587 casualties; and the 
well-know nuclear accident of Three Miles Island, 1979). Then, research was quickly 
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driven towards life science, psychology (i. e. enhancing psychological and psycho- 
sociological), typology and mechanism of human errors (Amalberti, 2001). These 
studies made their first emphasis on individual human failures, in which Rasmussen's 
(1982) Skill-Rule-Knowledge based error taxonomy and Reason's (1990) Generic Error 
Modelling System (GEMS) are representative. Subsequently, at the end of 1990s, the 
concept of the organisational accident linking individual, systemic and organisational 
failures came to the forefront of industrial research. Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1997) 
and SHEL model (i. e. the acronym of Software, Hardware, Environment and Liveware) 
(Hawkins, 1987) are renowned examples. In terms of human factors involved in 
aviation accidents, these two models are now widely applied as the fundamental of the 
analysis methodology (e. g. the SOAM and the HFACS) across North America and 
Europe 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has followed the aviation industry 
in the adoption of Swiss Cheese and SHEL models and proposed guidelines for the 
investigation of human factors in marine casualties and incidents (IMO A. 884,1999; 
IMO, 2008). Both of the methodologies and guidelines have realised that, when 
investigating an accident, the investigators should not only focus on the actions of the 
sharp end personnel at the time of the occurrence, but also have to consider the 
following two aspects in order to align with and support "Just Culture" principle (Licu 
et al., 2005). 
  Seeking explanation for the conditions that shapes the actions of sharp end 
personnel. V 
  Identifying latent organisational factors that allowed the unsafe conditions to 
exist, under which an occurrence can be triggered. 
In addition to Swiss Cheese and SHEL models, there are several other research 
studies which posture different viewpoints with respect to HOFs. Gordon et al. (2005) 
have proposed a HFIT model, which divides the human factor into four categories: 
`Threats', `Situation Awareness', `Action Errors' and `Error Recovery'. Another 
example is the `Wheel of Misfortune' model (see Figure 2-1), which consists of three 
concentric spheres: the actions of the front line (innermost), local precipitating (middle) 
and the global conditions generated by organisation (outermost) (O'Hare, 2000). 
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Figure 2-1 The Wheel of Misfortune (from O'Hare, 2000) 
Amongst those HOFs models that have been proposed, the Swiss Cheese Model 
and SHEL model have their unique merits and continue to influence the realms of 
organisational accident investigation and analysis. For example, the SOAM and the 
HFACS are derived from Reason's Swiss Cheese Model; the IMO guidelines and the 
SOAM are both influenced by the SHEL model forming the core concept of the 
methodology. Reason himself also keeps evolving the Swiss Cheese Model both on the 
applicability and functionality of the model. For instance, a practical guide on managing 
maintenance error (Reason and Hobbs, 2003) addresses the features of human 
performance, risks, error-provoking factors, principle of error management and safety 
culture, etc., for the application of aircraft maintenance. Aside from this, a latest 
extended Swiss Cheese Model is proposed from the perspective of safety, in which a 
slice of Cheddar is considered, as the system defences or barriers for safety, in order to 
increase the resilience of the system (Reason, 2008). 
Besides, some transformations of SHEL models are as well developed by different 
organisations or industries for their particular requirements. For example, a modified 
SHEL model which adds an additional Organisation (0) factor, as the fifth category, to 
form a SHELO model in order to denote the interaction between aircraft maintenance 
technician and the organisation (Chang and Wang, 2010). Another example is m-SHEL 
model, which introduces an additional Management (m) factor to specify the factors in 
association with corporate organisation, administration and system that influence the 
atmosphere at job site and safety culture (Kawano, 1997). In the same way, HFACS-RR 
(a modified HFACS to the railroad industry) is introduced to conduct investigations 
associated with train accident/incident in order to understand and manage the 
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contributing factors in all levels of the railroad industry (Reinach and Viale, 2006). 
Generally speaking, although some modifications of the category descriptions are 
required for different professions, the HFACS framework has been proven that it is 
effective in categorising errors from investigations reports and is useful in capturing the 
full range of relevant human factors (Baysari et al., 2008). 
Yet, these models and methodologies are continuing concentrating on qualitative 
side without considering a quantitative analysing mechanism in conjunction with the 
applied HOFs model or framework. 
2.4 Qualitative and quantitative analysis on human factors 
involved in an accident 
Since human error continues to be the predominant factor in maritime accidents, in 
which organisational factors are known playing a significant part in accident causation, 
a sufficiently thorough and comprehensive accident/incident investigation procedure to 
establish the significance, frequency and impact of the factors involved is needed 
(Barnett, 2005). From the viewpoint of engineering, analyses can be roughly divided 
into two categories: qualitative and quantitative. In the perspective of qualitative 
analysis of an accident, the answers to the questions of analysing outcomes are normally 
the factors involved in the occurrence and the causation amongst them. The main 
purpose of the quantitative analysis of the accident is to look for the significance and/or 
frequency of the causal factors identified. Therefore, it is of vital importance while 
performing the analysing task - not to only concentrate on the qualitative outcomes, but 
also to seek the quantitative results of the analysed factors. 
2.4.1 Qualitative analysis on human factors 
It is suggested that, when performing an analysis task, one thing should be kept in 
mind all the time is that - "not to become satisfied and stop questioning but to always 
try to establish whether the last answer might give rise to a new follow-up question" 
(Schager, 2008). Moreover, "it is critical to understand why people did what they did, 
rather than judging them for not doing what we now know they should have done" 
(Dekker, 2002). Dekker also urges investigators should keep mindsets on the "new view 
of human error", avoiding the perspective of hindsight and outside, when reconstructing 
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the human contributions to an accident. Despite the new view and notions, lacking of a 
systematic procedure to construct the human contribution to accidents is the 
shortcoming of the method that Dekker proposes. Svedung and Rasmussen (2002) have 
pointed out that graphic representation of the causal flow of accidents is very effective 
in creating an overview of complex occurrences, and hence they develop a tool named 
as AcciMap for the purpose. Other similar graphic methodologies, such as SOAM 
(EUROCONTROL, 2005), WBA (Paul-Stüve, 2005) and HFIT (Gordon et al., 2005), 
are also developed by following this principle. 
However, another trend also arises that analysis is carried out by applying or 
modifying well-defined Formal Safety Assessment techniques as the tools, instead of 
developing a dedicated method, for clarifying both the factors and causation of an 
accident. For example, Johnson (1999) has applied the FTA as the tool to visualise the 
relationship between human errors and organisational failures that occurred in a railway 
accident; Lee and Cha (2005) have proposed a technique - Causal Requirements Safety 
Analysis (CRSA) - by extending the FTA to qualitatively evaluate causal relationship 
between software faults and physical hazards; Celik et al. (2010) have integrated fuzzy 
feature into FTA in order to clarify the probability of technical failures, operational 
misapplications and legislative shortages leading to a shipping accident; and Trucco, 
Cagno, Ruggeri and Grande (2008) have combined FTA and Bayesian Network to 
model a Maritime Transport System (MTS), at the preliminary design stage of High 
Speed Craft (HSC), for analysing the HOFs in a collision scenario in open sea. 
In terms of qualitative analysis, FTA can really provide an effective graphic 
presentation to illustrate the causation of an accident. Nevertheless, it is insufficient in 
analysing accidents quantitatively. This is because it lacks probabilistic information for 
the intermediate events and the rigid restriction of dependencies between basic and 
intermediate events although FTA has the mechanism to perform the probabilistic 
inferring for the Top Event. In contrast, Bayesian Networks are models with clear 
advantage over fault tree because they allow the representation of network instead of 
trees. This is particularly useful for common cause analyses (Castillo et at, 1999). 
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2.4.2 Quantitative analysis on human factors 
Bobbio, Portinal, Minichino and Ciancamerla (2001) have shown that Bayesian 
Networks provide a robust probabilistic method of reasoning with uncertainty and are 
becoming widely used for dependability analysis of safety critical system such as the 
Programmable Electronic Systems. They state that Bayesian Networks are more suitable 
to represent complex dependencies amongst components and to include uncertainty in 
modelling. Mohaghegh, Kazemi and Mosleh (2009) have supported this argument and 
also claim that Bayesian Networks are a network-based framework for representing and 
analyzing models involving uncertainty. Yang, Bonsall and Wang (2009) have 
concluded that Bayesian Networks enable risk diagnosis and prediction to be made 
using uncertainty inference foundation. 
As well as modelling uncertainty, probabilistic inference is another advantage 
provided by Bayesian Networks technique, under which interventions (i. e. believe 
updating or evidence propagation) can be conducted with other network variables 
resulting in predictions and diagnoses (Anderson and Vastag, 2004). They recommend 
that if objectives included prediction and diagnosis of observed variables, then Bayesian 
Network approach should be selected. Zhou, Fang and Wang (2008) have demonstrated 
that human safety behaviour can be improved more efficiently and effectively by 
controlling `safety climate factors', rather than `personal experience factors' by using a 
Bayesian Network model to represent the construction industry in China. That is 
achieved by including local conditional dependencies into the model, by directly 
specifying the causes that influence a given effect (Bobbin et al., 2001). Martin et al 
(2009) have stated that the identification of the dependency relationships between 
different variables, and expressing these relationships in 
probabilistic 
terms, enables 
Bayesian Networks to offer a broad-based perspective on the circumstances surrounding 
work. Bayesian Networks thus represent a statistical tool of huge potential in 
investigating the causes of accidents falling from a high above two metres at workplaces 
in Spain. 
However, the Bayesian Network approach cannot solve all the problems, and there 
is a need for a systematic procedure to establish the model. Thus, a hybrid approach 
integrating deterministic and probabilistic perspectives may need to be considered. In 
the research by Mohaghegh et al. (2009), a Bayesian Network was integrated with 
System Dynamics, Event Sequence Diagrams and a Fault Tree in order to demonstrate 
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the effects of organisational factors as the deeper (or more fundamental) causes of 
accidents and incidents. This provided a flexible risk management tool for complex 
socio-technical system in the aviation safety domain, focusing on airline maintenance 
systems. 
2.5 Expert judgements and uncertainty 
Yang and Liu (1998) have stated that there are two different meanings of 
uncertainty; one is randomness, and the other is fuzziness. The randomness looks at the 
occurrence probability, which is normally described by a probability distribution 
function. In contrast, the fuzziness is the uncertainty of belongingness, which is 
normally described by a membership function. This is relevant to this research, because, 
in practice, the lack of historical statistic data is often a conundrum in applying PRA 
techniques to carry out accident analyses. Expert judgements are often the alternative to 
mitigate this difficulty in order to get rational data for the occurrence probability of the 
events. The data given according to experts' subjective opinions can be seen as 
subjective probability information. However, this alternative raises another two issues: 
(1) how to express the uncertainty (both randomness and fuzziness) of the data, and (2) 
how to attain the group consensus under a common ground. 
Celik et al. (2010) have suggested that fuzzy probability has the merits to flexibly 
express the vagueness of data and insufficient information associated with the 
occurrence of the Top Event regarding an accident, or a system in a safety case. Wang, 
Yang and Sen (1996; 1995) have shown an approach that provides a rational way of 
articulating and processing subjective safety and cost information to achieve a 
hierarchical system safety analysis by using fuzzy sets to express the subjective 
opinions and to synthesise the estimates. Furthermore, Yang, Wang, Xu, and Chin 
(2006) have proven that by using a fuzzy belief structure to accommodate numerical 
data and subjective judgements with probability and fuzzy uncertainties can provide a 
systematic yet strict procedure for aggregating both probabilistic and fuzzy information 
in an analytical fashion. That allows the incorporation of incomplete assessment 
information with fuzziness. 
When fuzzy belief structures are applied to deal with the uncertainties of subjective 
estimations with group of experts, an aggregation (or synthesis) method regarding the 
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type of the structures has to be introduced. This is because a group consensus of the 
estimates is always preferred, sometimes is even mandatory. Therefore, variant 
aggregation methods have been developed for different types of fuzzy PRA techniques. 
For example, Celik and Cebi (2009) have applied the Buckley solution algorithm to 
aggregate the experts' opinions in a form of triangular fuzzy numbers depicting 
linguistic terms, based on a FAHP, in order to identify the role of human error in 
shipping accidents. Other instances, such as Wang et al. (1996; 1995), have applied an 
Evidential Reasoning approach to synthesise the safety expressions which are described 
by linguistic variables characterised by fuzzy membership functions to evaluate the 
safety of a system. However, linguistic variables and fuzzy number cannot be directly 
applied as the conditional probability data in the used Bayesian Network software (i. e. 
Netica), only a numerical crisp value can be accepted. Thus, in Chapter 7, the Similarity 
Aggregation Method (SAM) (Hsu and Chen, 1996) aggregating individual fuzzy 
opinions in Positive Trapezoidal Fuzzy Number (PTFN) format to obtain a group 
consensus is applied and specified. Furthermore, the f-weighted valuation function, 
developed by Detyniecki and Yager (2000), to defuzzify fuzzy number is utilised in 
order to obtain the crisp value of the PTFN. 
2.6 Discussion 
In this chapter, the literature regarding the accident analysis methodologies has 
been reviewed. Several issues on this topic have been discussed. These issues include: 
the development of the analysis methods, the human factors involved, the qualitative 
and quantitative analysis techniques, and fizzy approach solving uncertainty and 
subjective probability for group consensus. The deficiencies and insufficiencies of the 
methods reviewed are also discussed in each section. 
The overall summary is that a thorough and comprehensive accident analysis 
methodology is desperately needed. This should include a systematic procedure to sort 
out the causation of the factors involved, a HOFs framework to clarify and classify the 
identified factors, a mechanism to perform the analysis qualitatively as well 
quantitatively and a solution to obtain the estimates from a group of experts. The 
proposed methodology for accident analysis (derived from the work described in this 
chapter) is therefore developed in Chapter 3 with the detailed description of the 
individual components of the methodology in the subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter Three - 
Outlines of the Methodology 
Summary 
The overview of the developed methodology which can assist investigators in 
analysing an accident qualitatively and quantitatively is given in this chapter. The 
methodology is based on the concept of Reason's Swiss Cheese Model. The accident is 
analysed in the form of Bayesian Network by implementing the Window of 
Opportunities (WoO) of the Swiss Cheese Model associated with the accident. This 
implementation is also combined with a Human and Organisational Factor (HOFs) 
framework which can be utilised to provide a comprehensive insight into the causation 
of the accident with a human and organisational factors hierarchy. This framework has 
the merit of assisting investigators to both classify the identified human factors and 
ascertain the more remote organisational factors. 
The ideal data for calibrating such models is historical statistic data. When this is 
not available, expert judgements should be used. An aggregation method based on fuzzy 
set theory is applied for handling the group consensus issue during the analysing 
procedure when experts do not agree with each other at first. The chapter concludes 
with a summary of the broad features of the methodology provided and the 
consideration of further research needed. 
3.1 Introduction 
Reason's (1997) Swiss Cheese Model (see Figure 1-1) provides a valuable abstract 
explanation regarding how an accident can happen, but the way to implement the model 
in analysing the accident qualitatively as well as quantitatively still remains uncertain. 
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According to the latest elucidation made by Reason (2008), the notion of the Swiss 
Cheese Model is as follows. 
The current model (1997) involves a succession of defensive layers separating 
potential losses from the local hazards. ... Each `slice' 
has holes in it like 
Emmenthale cheese; but unlike cheese the gaps are in continuous motion, moving 
from place to place, opening and shutting. Only when a series of holes `line up' can 
an accident trajectory pass through the defences to cause harm to people, asset and 
the environment. The holes arise from unsafe acts (usually short-lived windows of 
opportunity) and latent conditions. The latter occur because the designers, builders, 
managers and operators cannot foresee all possible accident scenarios. They are 
much more long-lasting than the gaps due to active failure and are present before an 
adverse event occurs. ... 
There were two important changes. First, the defensive 
layers were not specified. They included a variety of barriers and safeguards - 
physical protection, engineered safety features, administrative controls (regulations, 
rule and procedures), personal protective equipment and the frontline operators 
themselves: pilots, drivers, watchkeepers and the like. They often constituted the last 
line of defence. The second change was the use of the term `latent conditions'. 
Conditions are not causes, as such, but they are necessary for the causal agent to have 
their effect. 
Investigation 
-º Ifointation 
& evidence 
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(chapter 7) 
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Figure 3-1 The overview of the proposed methodology for accident analysis 
't'herefore the present study presumes that the WoO of Swiss Cheese Model may 
be able to be instantiated by the set theory and the probability theory, which is 
introduced in section 3.2 and specified in Chapter 4. Meanwhile, a Human and 
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Organisational Factor framework, which follows the notion of defensive layers in the 
Swiss Cheese Model, to categorise the factors identified in an accident has also been 
investigated (see section 3.3 and Chapter 6). Finally, a method associated with 
aggregating a group of experts' estimates and resulting in a group consensus is proposed 
in Chapter 7 and briefed in section 3.4. Figure 3-1 illustrates the overview of the 
procedure when it is applied for accident analysis. 
At the beginning, the information and evidence collected during the investigation 
period are handled qualitatively in order to find out the factors involved as well as the 
causation amongst them. By following a quantitative analysing procedure with a fuzzy 
set theory application, the qualitative analysis results are value-added with quantitative 
figures producing the Fault Tree - Bayesian Network (FT-BN) analysis results. Then a 
proposed HOFs framework is used, as a mask, to integrate the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis results (see Figure 6-10 as an example) for classifying the 
categories of the identified factors, demonstrating the association between them in 
different layers and seeking for the justification and insufficiency of the accident 
causation. Finally the most critical factor can be obtained, as well as the best cost- 
benefit countermeasures can be inferred, through the finalised analysis results over the 
proposed HOFs framework. The countermeasures referred in the proposed methodology 
are the Risk Control Options which can eliminate hazards from the system or mitigate 
the risks if accidents happen. More theoretical and applicative details regarding each 
part of the methodology can be found in the following sections and relevant chapters. 
- 3.2 Qualifying and quantifying the Window of Opportunity (WoO) 
It is assumed that the extent of a Woo can be determined by the illumination 
which is projected onto the other side of the Swiss Cheese Model through the lined up 
holes. The light source (e. g. lamp or torch) on the one end of the Swiss Cheese Model is 
deemed as the pathogens (or local circumstances) which may attack the system and 
cause an accident to happen. The other side of the Swiss Cheese Model may see the 
projected illumination if and only if the light source is on and there is at least one WoO 
existing in the Swiss Cheese Model at the time (see Figure 3-2(a)). Therefore, the 
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intensity of the light is considered as the severity of the damage, and the coverage area 
of the illumination is as the probability of the events occurrence. In addition, the 
coverage of the illumination on the projection area directly relates to the width, the 
number and the position of the WoOs in the model. Meanwhile, each WoO is decided 
by the factors that cause the holes existing in each layers of the model and lining up the 
WoO to penetrate the defences of the system. Hence the aims of the proposed 
qualitative and quantitative accident analysis method are to find: (1) the factors that 
cause these holes of the WoOs existing; and (2) the coverage of the illumination as the 
probability of the events occurrence. Therefore, the set theory is mainly applied to 
clarify the causation of the causal factors - the qualitative issue - according to the 
association of the holes regarding the WoOs, and the probability theory provides a tool 
to solve the probability of events occurrence - the quantitative issue. 
ABC 
Light 
Sourcc 
L) 
= 
n (X) 
(4) 
(1) 
7) ; 
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Ü 
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L`. 
(a) an example of Swiss Cheese Model (b) Venn Diagrams 
Figure 3-2 Illustrating the model with Venn Diagrams using illumination 
In the example of Figure 3-2, there are three layers comprising the Swiss Cheese 
Model and each layer has a hole. The name of the hole is the same as the label of the 
layer (e. g. the hole A is in layer A). It is evident that the illumination coverage projected 
on the projection area due to this WoO is the area labelled as "(1)" shown on the Venn 
Diagrams in Figure 3-2 (b). That is, the WoO is caused by inBnC and the 
occurrence probability of the WoO is P(A (l B (l C). Meanwhile, in this example, the 
sample space S can be seen as made up of eight pieces of areas which are denoted as 
areas (1) - (8). Additionally, since a subset of a sample space is called event, there are 
three events in this example; they are events A, B and C. That is, 
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S= {(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8)} 
A= ((1), (2), (3), (4)) 
B= {(1), (2), (5), (6)) 
C= {(1), (3), (5), (7)1 
Since the probability of aggregating areas in the sample space S is exactly one (i. e. 
P(S) =1) and an event A is true for an experiment if the outcome of the experiment is an 
element of the event, a probability P(A) is therefore assigned to each event AcS. 
Those probabilities must obey the following three axioms (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007) 
(Russell and Norvig, 2003): 
Axiom 1 P(S) =1 P(-, S) =0 
Any subset A must have a nonnegative probability. 
Axiom 2 for all AcS it holds that 1>_P(A)>_0 
If A and B are the subsets of the sample space, the combined event can be shown as 
follows. 
Axiom 3 If AcSand BcS then P(AUB)=P(A)+P(B)-P(Af B), 
or P(AUB)= P(A)+P(B) if A and B are disjoint (i. e. AFB = 0) 
where A (1 B is the intersection between A and B and it represents 
the event that both A and B occur. 
The brief introduction regarding the probability above is called joint probability 
(see Table 3-1(a) as an example). In contrast, conditional probability (see Table 3-1(b) 
as an example) depicts the probability from another viewpoint which is given condition 
on other known factors (see the Venn Diagrams example shown in Figure 3-2(b)). This 
type of probability is generally stated as the following kind: 
U "Given the event B, the probability of the event A is p", denoted as P(A I B) = p. 
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Table 3-1 The comparison between joint and conditional probability 
(a) joint probabilityP(A, B, C) I (b) conditional probability P(CIA, B) 
A=1 A=O 
B=1 B=0 B=1 B=O 
C=1 (1) (3) (5) (7) 
C=O (2) (4) (6) 8 
Note that the probability in the 
joint distribution sums to 1 (i. e. 
P(6w) = P((1))+... + P((8)) =1). 
A=1 A=O 
B=1 B=0 B=1 B=0 
C=1 (1) (3) (5) (7) 
(1)+(2) (3)+(4) (5)+(6) (7)+(8) 
C=0 (2) (4) (6) (8) 
(1) + (2) (3) + (4) (5) + (6) (7) + (8) 
Note that conditional probability of C sums up to 1 
for each column of the table. 
Moreover, since P(A I B) specifies a probability distribution for each event B= bj , 
the conditional probabilities over A should sum to 1 for each state of B, according to 
Axiom 1. That is Z P(A = a, IB=b j) =1 for each bj (see Table 3-1(b)). Therefore, the i-t 
probability of each area shown in Figure 3-2(b) (i. e. the Venn Diagrams) can be 
expressed as a joint probability (i. e. P(A, B, C)) or as a conditional probability (i. e. 
P(C I A, B)), and the equality between them is: 
P(A, B, C)= P(C I A, B)P(A, B) 
For example, the probability of An B (l C (i. e. the area (1) in the Venn Diagrams) 
should read: 
P(AnBnc)=P(CI AnB)P(AnB) 
The answer to the equation above is "P((1))" which can be directly derived from 
the joint probability in Table 3-1(a) or computed from the conditional probability shown 
in Table 3-1(b). For the latter, P 
(1) 
(+ ý2) 
P((1) + (2)) = P((1)) is the answer, according 
to the data shown in the table. The example stated above shows that the set theory and 
the probability theory can be utilised to implement the Woo with qualitative and 
quantitative figures. In the next two sections, the basic qualitative and quantitative 
patterns of WoOs are discussed respectively. For more details and explanations of these 
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two issues, Chapter 4 covers the essential theoretical information, and Chapter 5 
provides a case study. 
3.2.1 Qualifying the WoO with the set theory 
In the preceding section, the example WoO consists of three holes, one in each 
layer, resulting in the AND relationship amongst these holes. Each hole represents one 
of the direct causal events of an accident. The factors identified in the accident are 
associated with each hole, and cause them to happen at the same time, but only one 
WoO is formed in this case. The holes and the factors are connected to one another in 
terms of why-because or cause-consequence relationship. This relationship is similar to 
the type of family tree; because of the existence of the grandparents, there is the 
possibility of having the parents, and then the child. For the purpose of contrast, Figure 
3-3(a) is a single WoO example showing holes A and B in a two layers model. The 
projected area labelled as AB in the third layer (i. e. the projection area) is the only WoO 
of the model. Thus, the association of AnB is the qualification of the WoO and the 
coverage of the projected area AB represents the accident occurrence probability. Once 
the holes (or events) are certain, factors behind these holes have to be found out in the 
next step. It is highly likely that one factor may associate with more than one event, as 
well as a particular event may associate with more than one factor. 
ýý. 
B 
{O 
ý, t 
(a) a single WoO through two layers (b) two disjointed WoOs through two 
layers 
Figure 3-3 Two basic types of WoO qualification 
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In a multi-WoO instance, each WoO should be considered individually. For 
example, in Figure 3-3(b) there are two WoOs which consist of holes Al. A2 and 11 
where holes Al and A2 are in the same layer whilst hole B is in another layer. This 
combination results in two projected areas A1B and A2B representing two disjointed 
WoOs. In this example, they can be qualified as Al nB and A2 fB individually. 
However, if the context of the WoOs is further complicated, for instance, the example 
looks like the one shown in Figure 3-4, which consists of several joint WoOs. A 
simplification method proposed in Chapter 4 can assist in finding the association of the 
holes involved for each WoO. Nevertheless, this may not be always the case if the 
combination of the WoOs is too complicated to simplify. At least, the aggregated WoOs 
can be acquired following the proposed method. This means that the total influence of 
the WoOs will still be available even though individual WoO cannot be clarified. That 
is, there are two options to demonstrate these WoOs. The first option is the aggregation 
of these WoOs which are treated as the Top Event of a fault tree (see Figure 3-4(a) as an 
example); the second one is the individual WoO, deemed as a Minimal Cut Set of a 
fault tree (see Figure 3-4(b)), if they are available. 
Wool 
Wo02 
Top 
Event 
Wo03 Wo04 
(a) the aggregated outcome of the WoOs 
Wool 
Wo02 
Wo03 Wo04 
(h) the identifiable individual WoO 
Figure 3-4 A complicated combination of' WoOs 
3.2.2 Quantifying the WoO with the probability theory 
As stated earlier, the occurrence probability of a WoO is represented by the 
illumination coverage reflected on the projection area resulting from the holes lining up 
together in the model. For a single WoO example, the intersection area of the associated 
holes located in each layer is the answer to the probability of the WoO. Thus, the 
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probability of the WoO shown in Figure 3-3(a) can be acquired by Equation (3.1) since 
A is independent of B in the model. 
P(A (1 B) = P(A)P(B) (3.1) 
It can also be expressed in terms of conditional probability, which is the major 
format to be applied in the proposed method. Thus, the expression is rewritten as 
follows. 
P(A (1 B) = P(A I B)P(B) = P(B I A)P(A) (3.2) 
When one of the terms in the equation moves to the other side of the equal sign, it 
becomes the well-known Bayes' rule (Bernardo and Smith, 2002; Jensen and Nielson, 
2007). 
P(A I B) _ 
P(B I A) 
BP(A) 
"Bayes'rule provides a method for updating the beliefs about an event A given that 
information about another event B is known. For this reason P(A) is usually called the 
prior probability of A, whereas P(A I B) is called the posterior probability of A given B; 
the probability P(B ( A) is called the likelihood of A given B" (Jensen and Nielsen, 
2007). For an extension of the rule in a context C, it can be stated as follows: 
P(A I B, C) - P(B 
1A, C)P(AI C) 
P(BI C) 
In a multi-WoO example, the quantification of individual Woo can only be 
obtained if the qualification of each Woo is achievable in the first place. If this is not 
the case, only the entire aggregated influence outcome of these WoOs (i. e. Top Event 
case shown in Figure 3-4(a)) is available for the subsequent quantitative analysis in the 
methodology without respective WoO details. This is because, in the proposed method, 
the corresponding Top Event model of an accident can be constructed without detailed 
WoOs involved being figured out in advance. In other words, each WoO is extracted 
from the Top Event outcome through an approximate simplified process resulting in an 
approximate outcome associated with these WoOs. It is preferred to have the Minimal 
Cut Set than the Top Event outcome representing the WoOs of the accident. An analogy 
is that a compound object without knowing the constitution of the materials can only be 
utilised in a limited way. For example, knowing nothing about the constitution of iron 
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can only shape the iron, but not be able to produce steel or stainless. Thus, having 
clarified an individual WoO, there are advantages to analyse each WoO respectively, 
and then to find the best countermeasure for each of them. The reason why it is better 
for the WoOs to be handled individually is that each WoO can damage the system alone, 
only the probabilities of them are different. If an individual WoO is not able to be 
obtained, at least the aggregated lighted projection area (i. e. Top Event) can be 
alternatively found. The influence of the Top Event can be computed by following 
Equation (3.3) with the conditional probabilities data of these factors. For more details, 
see the relative sections in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Z P(PA = light I A, B, C)P(A, B, C) (3.3) 
where "PA = light" is the lighted coverage of the Projection Area 
If a respective WoO is acquirable, Axiom 3 can be applied to deal with the total 
probability computation. Hence the aggregated probability of the projected areas AIB 
and A2B in Figure 3-3(b) can be computed via Equation (3.4). 
P(A1B U A2B) = P(. 41 n B) + P(A2 n B)- P(A1 fB (l A2) (3.4) 
= P(A1 I B) + P(, 421 B)- P(A1 n A2 B) 
In addition to the identification of individual WoOs, dependency is also an 
important issue between events. If information changing on event B does not change the 
belief about the occurrence on event A, A and B are independent. In other words, the 
events A and B are independent if 
P(AI B)=P(A) 
Given that the notion of independence is symmetric, if A is independent of B, then 
B is independent of A. It can be proven by applying Bayes' rule. 
P(B I A) = 
P(A n B) 
= 
P(A I B)P(B) 
= 
P(A)P(B) 
= P(B) P(A) P(A) P(A) 
Therefore, since two events are independent, Equation (3.2) (i. e. the fundamental 
rule) can be rewritten as Equation (3.5). That is also the case shown in Figure 3-3(a). 
P(A (1 B) = P(A I B)P(B) = P(A)P(B) (3.5) 
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3.3 Implementing Reason's Swiss Cheese Model with a Human and 
Organisational Factors (HOFs) Framework 
Although Reason's Swiss Cheese Model (see Figure 3-5) has articulated four 
layers (i. e. unsafe acts, precursors for unsafe acts, line management deficiencies and 
fallible decisions) as the levels of the model and the contextual association between 
them (Reason, 1990), no exact nature of the `holes' which comprise WoOs has been 
identified, which is a limitation of the model (Shappell and Wiegmann 2003b). 
Therefore a HOFs framework, based on the Swiss Cheese Model, named Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (see Figure 3-6) for the U. S. 
aviation industry is proposed by Shappell and Wiegmann (2003b) and has been used in 
analysing the U. S. civil and military airborne accidents since year 2000 (Wiegmann and 
Rantanen 2003; Wiegmann et al., 2005; Scarborough et al. 2005; Shappell and 
Wiegmann 2003a; Shappell et al., 2007). In addition, it has been shown that a 
transformation of the framework can also be utilised in the railway industry (Baysari et 
al., 2008; Reinach and Viale, 2006). 
Figure 3-5 The Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation Source: adapted from Reason (1990) modified by Shappell and Wiegmann (2003b) 
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Figure 3-6 The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
(from Shappell and Wiegmann (2003b)) 
The present study assumes that it would be beneficial for the maritime industry to 
investigate and analyse maritime accidents if a dedicated human factors classification is 
in place. For that reason, a HOFs framework is proposed and named as Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System -for Maritime Accidents (HFACS-MA), which is 
analogous to the HFACS and is the implementation of the notion. The distinction which 
is different from the original HFACS is that the proposed framework considers and 
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adheres to the requirements of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
guidelines for the investigation of human factors in marine casualties and incidents 
(IMO A. 884,1999). In Chapter 6, the details regarding the framework and the 
applications are specified. The proposed HOFs framework (i. e. the HFACS-MA) 
comprises four levels (see Figure 6-1); they are: 
b Unsafe Acts (i. e. the bottom level); 
b Preconditions; 
b Unsafe Supervision; 
b Organisational Influences (i. e. the top level). 
0 
Each level consists of several categories, in which numerous items such as the 
human factors of the type are defined. It is intended that the specific items of each level 
can be varied according to the requirements of the applied fields or realm. Having 
established a framework of the kind, it will be beneficial for the maritime industry from 
two aspects. 
1. It can provide a clear classification and definition of HOFs that helps the 
investigators to identify the human factors involved in an accident as well as to 
classify the categories of the factors. 
2. It can also offer a clearer causality hierarchy associated with HOFs for the 
investigators to track the causal sequence among the identified factors as well 
as to avoid overlooking the organisational predisposing factors. 
Barnett (2005) has pointed out that how to establish the significance, frequency and 
impact of organisational factors is still a research conundrum. The present study 
proposes one solution to the problem by establishing the dedicated HOFs framework 
(i. e. HFACS-MA) and combining with the qualitative and quantitative analysis method 
mentioned in section 3.2. It is the combination of the framework and the method which 
can provide a comprehensive insight into: 
1. The causation and the probability of WoOs which are identified in an accident. 
The combination of the proposed framework and the method can illustrate the 
causation of the identified factors, located in different levels of the HOFs 
framework, making up of the WoOs as well as the probability information 
regarding the WoOs and the factors as a whole. 
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2. The influences of the factors from the top level to the lower level of the 
framework. This portrays the principle of Reason's Swiss Cheese Model that 
the causal sequence moves from fallible decisions, through the intervening 
planes, to an accident. 
3. The deficiency of information or evidence. The framework can prompt the 
investigators to pay attention on the factors that are identified in the lower 
levels without further explanation or underlying factors connected from the 
higher levels. It will facilitate the investigators to ensure if any factor in the 
higher level is overlooked and warrants further investigation. 
4. The vulnerable parts of the maritime industry. The numerical or statistical data 
associated with the analysed accidents can easily be exchanged if they are all 
performed under the same HOFs framework. That is, the framework becomes a 
platform to bear a broadened analysis by overlapping the data collected from 
the entire maritime industry in order to highlight the significant defects of the 
system. 
3.4 Solving uncertainty and consensus problem with fuzzy set theory 
When historical statistic data is not available, it is a common practise to use 
experts' judgements evaluating the probabilities of the factors identified in an accident 
in order to carry on the analysis procedure. It is highly likely that a group of experts will 
be invited to perform this functionality. However, a question is frequently encountered 
as to how to obtain a group consensus when their estimates do not coincide with one 
another in the beginning. From the viewpoint of decision makers, it is preferred that a 
group consensus, rather than several individual figures, is provided depicting the 
analysis results. The proposed accident analysis methodology has also recognised this 
conundrum. Hence, an aggregation method in considering the systematisation, 
objectivity and the contentment of the experts is proposed. 
The proposed method (covered in Chapter 7) applies the form of Positive 
Trapezoidal Fuzzy Number (PTFN) to handle the uncertainty of estimation and the 
Similarity Aggregation Method (SAM), which is proposed by Hsu and Chen (1996), to 
deal with the estimates aggregation. In addition, the f-weighted valuation function is the 
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measure to obtain the crisp value of the PTFN. Occasionally, the Delphi method, which 
is a communication tool developed by Dalkey (1969), is used as a last resort to reach a 
common ground associated with those PTFNs given by the experts when their estimates 
are apparently apart. Eventually, the group consensus can be reached, through the 
proposed aggregation method, and the outcome of the consensus can be accepted by 
most of the experts involved. 
It will be shown in Chapter 7 that the proposed aggregation method can assist the 
proposed methodology in fulfilling the requirements of obtaining a group consensus 
with the following features: 
b The form of PTFN has the advantages to intuitively express an expert's 
estimate as well as the uncertainty of the estimate. Moreover, this form can 
not only fulfil the aggregation of the estimates in the SAM process, but also 
facilitate the common intersection of the estimates to be reached within the 
Delphi process. 
The consensus PTFN can only be attained provided that the common 
intersection amongst the estimates exists. Since the common intersection is 
always under the coverage of the consensus PTFN, it can be deemed as that 
the consensus PTFN is constructed based on the common ground of the group 
opinion. 
b The SAM aggregation function considers the "importance of the experts" 
when deciding the "degree of influence (or contribution)" of each estimate for 
the group consensus. Moreover, this method can also regulate the overall 
consensus outcomes bias to the "degree of importance of the experts" or the 
"agreement degree (or similarity) of the estimates". 
The outcome of the f-weighted valuation function can be regulated as to bias 
to the average of the core, or the average of the support, of the PTFN when 
defuzzifying it into a crisp value. 
The Delphi method can ensure a common intersection of the estimates to be 
reached and the crisp value of the consensus PTFN to be accepted by all the 
experts involved. 
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The form of PTFN and f-weighted valuation function can still be utilised even 
though only one expert's estimate is applied. This is because the form of 
PTFN has the advantage to deal with the uncertainty. 
3.5 Discussion 
Reason's Swiss Cheese Model has been widely utilised as the core concept to 
develop a number of guidelines, frameworks or methods, e. g. IMO guidelines and 
HFACS, in analysing accidents causation regarding human and organisational factors. It 
recognises both the active failures, at the sharp end of the system, and the latent 
conditions, in design, procedures and management that may lain dormant within the 
system for years, have the same significant contributions to the safety of a system, or 
organisation (Barnett, 2005). However, those applications mainly concentrate on a 
subjective interpretation regarding the occurrence of the identified factors to carry out 
accidents analysis qualitatively, without a quantitative probability figures to distinguish 
the significance of the factors objectively. 
Hence, by implementing the WoO of Reason's Swiss Cheese Model, this study 
presumes that a qualitative as well as quantitative accident analysis method based on the 
notion of the model can be achieved, in which the set theory and the probability theory 
are applied as the theoretical fundamentals. The method ends with a Bayesian Network 
to illustrate the analysed accident to deal with not only the causation of the factors 
identified qualitatively, but also the probability (or significance) of each factor 
quantitatively. By combining with the proposed HFACS-MA, which is a HOFs 
framework analogising to the HFACS, a comprehensive insight into the causation of the 
factors involved, from the sharp end personnel level to the organisational management 
level, is demonstrated. 
The proposed methodology has also considered the group consensus issue. Expert 
judgements can be applied when there is a lack of historical statistical data. Fuzzy set 
theory is the means to mitigate the dispute which may arise during the analysis 
procedure when consensus estimation is required from a group of experts. 
Predictably, the proposed methodology has the merit to be utilised in analysing the 
real causes of accidents. It can also be used in a "safety case" scenario to assess the 
safety of a system before a real accident happens. 
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In summary, the significant features of the proposed methodology are briefly listed 
as follows. 
>A systematic procedure to find out the causation of the factors involved in an 
accident, as the qualitative analysis results, is in line with the notion of WoOs of 
Reason's Swiss Cheese Model. Meanwhile, the probabilities of the Woo and the 
factors are the quantitative figures to depict their significance in the occurrences. 
> The Bayesian Network model established according to the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis results can be seen as a dedicated simulator of the accident to 
perform a series of what if examinations in order to identify the significance of the 
critical factors and to clarify the effectiveness of the countermeasures. 
> An Influence Diagrams model based on the established Bayesian Network model 
of the accident is a useful tool for decision makers to evaluate the best Risk 
Control Option, whilst considering the cost-benefit issue, among variant available 
countermeasures. 
> Both the qualitative and quantitative analysis results of the accident can 
simultaneously be shown in a Bayesian Network model to provide a 
comprehensive insight into the causation of the accident by integrating the 
HFACS-MA framework, as well as in an Influence Diagrams model to evaluate 
the cost-benefit outcome of the countermeasures. 
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Chapter Four - 
The method for qualitative and quantitative analysis 
Summary 
In this chapter, a method of obtaining the qualitative as well as the quantitative 
analysis results of a maritime accident in conjunction with experts' judgements is 
proposed. The method mainly applies Why Because Analysis (WBA) and Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) techniques for qualitative analysis, and Bayesian Network techniques 
for quantitative analysis. In addition, Sensitivity Analysis (SA) and Influence Diagrams 
are also applied as parts of the method. Every technique applied in the method follows 
the concept of Reason's Swiss Cheese Model to implement a relay-like procedure. The 
analysed results are presented in a form of Bayesian Network, in which the qualitative 
and quantitative analytic outcomes of the accident are shown in a graph with probability 
figures. An Influence Diagram which is derived from the Bayesian Network model of 
an accident can also be established for decision maker as a tool to select the best Risk 
Control Option (RCO) based on cost-benefit consideration through the Maximal 
Expected Utility (MEU) functionality. The proposed method also has merit in that an 
objective analysis results are still achievable even though the historical statistic data 
may not be available and experts' judgements have to be employed. This is because the 
systematic procedure and the validation process of the proposed method can effectively 
reduce the subjective speculations during the analysis. 
4.1 Introduction 
From the view of Fault Tree Analysis, the Window of Opportunity (WoO) of 
Reason's (1997) Swiss Cheese Model is similar to the Minimal Cut Sets (MCS) of Fault 
Tree Analysis. This is because a Minimal Cut Set is a Cut Set that if any Basic Event is 
removed from the set, the Top Event will not occur; where Cut Set is a collection of 
Basic Events such that if they all occur the Top Event must also occur (Andrews and 
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Moss, 2002). In Fault Tree Analysis, the Basic Events indicate the limit of resolution oC 
the fault tree and are mutually independent. For a quantitative analysis, it is those events 
for which data are required in FTA. Thus, the similarity of the definitions between Woo 
and Minimal Cut Set inspires the proposed method due to their concept are almost the 
same. In other words, the WoO should be able to be implemented by the Minimal ('111 
Set of FTA if the holes in each layer of the Swiss Cheese Model are treated as the events 
in the fault tree. In this sense, it seems that Reason's Swiss Cheese Model can be 
materialised by the Minimal Cut Sest under which the Top Event (i. e. the accident) is 
triggered by the combination of those events (i. e. the holes). Hence, this study assume" 
that if the Minimal Cut Sets of FTA can implement the WoOs of an accident, it would 
be possible to analyse an accident qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Then the 
Causal Factors and the countermeasures of the analysed accident may be identified 
objectively through a systematic procedure in order to prevent the similar occurrences 
from happening again. 
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In order to obtain the Minimal Cut Sets (or WoOs) of the accident, the Cut Sets 
involved in the accident have to be identified first. The difference between Minimal Cut 
Set and Cut Set is that a Minimal Cut Set consists of "necessary and sufficient" Causal 
Factors Whilst a Cut Set merely consists of "sufficient" Causal Factors. These Causal 
Factors are the factors that cause the consequence event (i. e. the holes) to happen. In 
Fault Tree Analysis, this consequence event is represented by the Intermediate Event of 
a Cut Set (or Minimal Cut Set). For identifying these Cut Sets, the Causal Factors 
derived from the information or evidence gathered during the investigation stage have to 
be clarified in advance. The proposed Human and Organisational Factors (HOFs) 
framework - HFACS-MA - which is specified in Chapter 6 can benefit investigators to 
identify the factors during the investigation. 
Therefore, during the analysis procedure of the proposed method (see Figure 4-1), 
the first process is to extract the relevant facts from the information or evidence 
gathered during the investigation (section 4.2.2). Further, as stated in section 4.2.3, the 
Causal Factors are then identified from the extracted facts. Hence, the Why-Because (or 
Cause-Consequence) relationship amongst these Causal Factors can be clarified and 
depicted in a Why Because Graph (WBG) by following the Why-Because Analysis 
process. These processes are described in sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5. In the final stage of 
the Why-Because Analysis, a graphical presentation (i. e. the WBG) and a list of Causal 
Factors can be produced to depict the causation amongst these factors for every Why- 
Because subset. However, this is not necessarily the final result of the qualitative 
analysis because the Cut Sets might contain some insignificant or irrelevant Causal 
Factors. Thus, Karnaugh map (section 4.3.2) and K-style Conditional Probability Table 
(section 4.3.3) are applied in order to determine the necessary and sufficient Causal 
Factors (i. e. the Minimal Cut Sets) for each Why-Because subset. Eventually, the 
Minimal Cut Sets of an accident can be obtained via FTA (section 4.4) to achieve the 
goal of qualitative analysis of the accident. 
For quantitative analysis, the Bayesian Network technique is employed to 
overcome the difficulties of dependency over Basic Events within Fault Tree Analysis 
(section 4.4.1). To construct the corresponding Bayesian Network model, which is 
based on the prior qualitative analysis results, the proposed backtracking process 
(section 4.5.2) is utilised in order to establish the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) of the 
Bayesian Network model for the Minimal Cut Set(s) of an accident. For the Bayesian 
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Network model of Top Event (TE), the corresponding WBG and K-style Conditional 
Probability Tables (K-CPT) are the blueprint (section 4.3.5). Having coded the 
appropriate data to the Conditional Probability Tables (sections 4.3.4 and 4.5.5) for each 
node in the Directed Acyclic Graph, the preliminary Bayesian Network model of an 
accident is established. However this is not yet the outcome of the quantitative analysis. 
It has to pass the Sensitivity Analysis as the validation process (section 4.6.1) before the 
final quantitative analysis results of the accident can be acquired. By employing 
sensitivity finding process, the critical Causal Factors of the accident can also be found 
(section 4.6.2). Furthermore, the selection of the possible countermeasures, as Risk 
Control Options (RCOs), against the accidents can be fulfilled by expanding the 
Bayesian Network model to become an Influence Diagrams model (section 4.7) for the 
decision makers. The entire procedure of the proposed method is briefly illustrated in 
Figure 4-1 and the details for each process are described in the associated sections of the 
chapter. 
4.2 Why-Because Analysis (WBA) for Causal Factors 
In general, at least two questions arise when an accident has occurred; they are 
"what happened? " and "how did it happen? " In most cases the first question is easier to 
specify, for example the Estonian-flagged RO-RO passenger ferry `Estonia', carrying 
989 people, departed from Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, at 19: 15 hours on 27 
September 1994 for a voyage to Stockholm, Sweden. She sank in the northern Baltic 
Sea in the early hours of 28 September 1994. But it would be difficult to point out 
which Causal Factors (or causes) are involved immediately. In order to clarify which 
Causal Factors were really present at the time of the occurrence and the causalities 
between them, WBA is applied as the first part of the method to ensure the queries can 
be solved objectively, thoroughly and systematically. However, only parts of the WBA 
are utilised in the proposed analysis procedure due to the requirements of the method. 
The main work handled by WBA is merely fording out the sufficient Causal Factors 
involved in the accident and the causation amongst them. These results will then be 
passed to another process which is the probability distribution reasoning for further 
Bayesian Network model construction. 
WBA is a method for accident analysis and has been used to analyse many aviation, 
railway, marine and computer related accidents and incidents (RVS WBA homepage). It 
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is primarily used as a reactive analysis method. The major result developed in WBA is a 
Why-Because Graph which depicts the cause-consequence relationships (or causations) 
between Causal Factors and the Top Event (i. e. the accident). The Why-Because Graph 
consists of nodes and directed edges as a non-cyclic graph. The nodes represent the 
identified Causal Factors whilst the directed edges denote the causations between the 
Top Event and the Causal Factors. There are two reasons to apply WBA as the 
technique for identifying these Causal Factors within the analysis procedure. Firstly, the 
concept of the Why-Because Graph is in line with the implication of Cut Sets of FTA. 
This means that each event involved in the fault tree can be illustrated as the 
consequence of a set of Causal Factors in the Why-Because Graph to implement the 
idea of Cut Set. This is crucial to the analysis method because these Cut Sets are the 
foundation for acquiring the Minimal Cut Sets of FTA, which are the instances for 
implementing the Window of Opportunities of the accident. Secondly, the non-cyclic 
feature of the Why-Because Graph coincides with the characteristic of the Directed 
Acyclic Graph of Bayesian Network. The Bayesian Network model of the accident is 
the cornerstone to deal with the quantitative analysis of the accident and the subsequent 
selection of countermeasures for the decision makers within the proposed method. 
Before specifying the proposed method further, it is worth clarifying some 
terminologies used in the analysis procedure. These clarifications are not intended to 
override their original definitions which have been well-defined in the derived 
techniques, e. g. FTA or WBA. Rather, they seek to provide readers with a clearer aspect 
about the roles they play and how they will be dealt with within the proposed method. 
In other words, they are still consistent in their original definitions but just with 
different interpretations. 
º CF (Causal Factor): the factor causes its direct consequence event (i. e. 
Intermediate Event or Top Event) to occur. It can be deemed as a Basic Event or 
an Intermediate Event but is definitely not the Top Event. 
º BE (Basic Event): it is the primary form of Causal Factor and the analysis 
boundary of the procedure. That is, the leaf of a causation branch without any 
factor connected as its Causal Factor. 
º IE (Intermediate Event): it is the other form of Causal Factor which locates 
between the Top Event and the Basic Event of the Fault Tree, the Why-Because 
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Graph of WBA and/or the Directed Acyclic Graph of Bayesian Network. It can 
not only be the Causal Factor of an event, but can also be the consequence of its 
Causal Factors. 
/ CS (Cut Set): it consists of a set of sufficient Causal Factors to cause its direct 
consequence event (i. e Intermediate Event or Top Event) to occur. However, it 
may contain some insignificant or irrelevant factors. 
º MCS (Minimal Cut Set): it is a Cut Set that contains only necessary and 
sufficient Causal Factors to cause its direct consequence event to occur. This 
means no Causal Factor existed in the MCS is insignificant or irrelevant. 
As noted previously, the aim of these processes is to ascertain the Cut Set (or 
Causal Factors) for the Top Event and each Intermediate Event involved in the accident. 
This is achieved by inspecting the information and evidence collected during the 
investigation stage with the help of WBA technique. Therefore the WBA starts at 
organising the investigation information and ends in forming a Why-Because Graph and 
the Cut Sets of the accident. It can be divided into five steps; they are (1) information 
and evidence gathering, (2) facts finding, (3) Causal Factors identifying for each 
Intermediate/Top Event, (4) Why-Because Graph forming and (5) Causal Factors listing. 
A variation of WBA used in the present study is that although the WBA consists of 
eights subroutines to obtain the analysis results (i. e. the Why-Because Graph), neither 
the execution order nor the subroutines applied in the proposed procedure are the same 
as the original WBA. Only two of the subroutines are employed. They are the Causal 
Sufficiency Criterion (CSC) at the causal factors identification stage and Why-Because 
Graph in the process, results forming stage. The details of each process and application 
are described in the following sections. 
4.2.1 Information gathering according to the IMO guidelines 
Once an accident occurs, normally the administrative authorities will immediately 
launch an investigation into the occurrence so that lessons can be learned. There are 
several field guides (IMO, 2008; EUROCONTROL, 2005; Shappell and Wiegmann, 
2000; Dekker, 2002b; Stoop, 2003) specifies how to carry out the investigation 
objectively, thoroughly and effectively. Since this study considers the human factors 
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involved in the maritime accidents, the resolutions, codes and circulars adopted by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) are the primary guidelines to be followed. 
In May 2008, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of IMO adopted a dedicated 
casualty investigation code (IMO, 2008) when the committee met in London for its 84th 
session. The following announcement, which is introduced on the IMO website 
(http: //www. imo. org), briefly describes the latest innovation of the code. 
New casualty investigation Code adopted 
The MSC adopted a new Code of International Standards and Recommended 
Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident 
(Casualty Investigation Code). Relevant amendments to SOLAS Chapter XI 1 were 
also adopted, to make parts I and II of the Code mandatory. Part III of the Code 
contains related guidance and explanatory material. 
The Code will require a marine safety investigation to be conducted into every "very 
serious marine casualty", defined as a marine casualty involving the total loss of the 
ship or a death or severe damage to the environment. 
The Code will also recommend an investigation into other marine casualties and 
incidents, by the flag State of a ship involved, if it is considered likely that it would 
provide information that could be used to prevent future accidents. 
The new regulations expand on SOLAS Regulation 1/21, which requires 
Administrations to undertake to conduct an investigation of any casualty occurring to 
any of its ships "when it judges that such an investigation may assist in determining 
what changes in the present regulations might be desirable". 
Table 4-1 shown below are the Resolutions adopted by the organization with 
regard to the casualty investigation code. According to Resolution A. 849(20), there are 
two types of information that should be gathered during the investigation; they are 
"information generally required in all cases" and "additional information required in 
specific cases". It further subdivides the information generally required in all cases, into 
ten categories; they are: 
1. Particulars of the ship 
2. Document to be produced 
3. Particulars of voyage 
4. Particulars of personnel involved in incident 
5. Particulars of sea state, weather and tide 
6. Particulars of the incident 
7. Assistance after the incident 
8. Authentication of documents 
9. Engine-room orders 
10. External sources of information 
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In the same way, the additional information required in specific cases is also 
subdivided into five categories listed as follows. 
1. Fire/Explosion 
2. Collision 
3. Grounding 
4. Foundering 
5. Pollution resulting from an incident 
In each category, the guidelines enumerate a series of recommendations about 
which type of data should be collected as well as which kind of information is referred 
to. 
Table 4-1 The IMO resolutions/circulars regarding the Casualty Investigation Code 
Resolution 
A. 173 S. IV Participation in official inquiries into marine casualties. 
Resolution Recommendation on the conclusion of agreements and 
A. 203(VII) arrangements between States on the question of access and 
employment of foreign seaborne salvage equipment in territorial 
waters. 
Resolution The conduct of investigations into casualties. A. 322 
Resolution 
A. 440(XI) Exchange of information for investigations into marine casualties. 
Resolution Personnel and material resource needs of Administrations for the 
A. 442(XI) investigation 'of casualties and contraventions of conventions. 
Resolution Co-operation in maritime casualty investigations. 
. 637(16) 
Resolution Code for the investigation of marine casualties and incidents, as 
A. 849 20 amended by resolution A. 884(21). 
Resolution Amendment to A. 849(20) 
A. 884(21) (Appendix 2 Guidelines for the investigation of human factors in 
marine casualties and incidents) 
MSC/Circ. 539/ Reports on casualty statistics concerning fishing vessels and 
Add. 2 fishermen at sea. 
MSC/Circ. 827 (updated by MSC/Circ. 953/MEPC/Circ. 372): Reports on marine 
casualties and incidents. Harmonized reporting procedures - Reports 
required under SOLAS regulation 1/21 and MARPOL 73/78 articles 
8 and 12. 
MSC- Revised harmonized reporting procedures - Reports required under MEPC. 3/Circ. 1 SOLAS regulation 1/21 and MARPOL 73/78, articles 8 and 12 
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Furthermore, the Code also remarks on the signification of the human factors 
involved and suggests twenty-five areas of inquiry, from which a series of example 
questions have been designed. These inquires are roughly subdivided into two 
categories as "Shipboard Issues" and "Shore-Side Management Issues". This can assist 
the investigator in searching for human factors involved in an accident. The public can 
now access a dedicated database (i. e. Global Integrated Shipping Information System 
(GISIS) http: //gisis. imo. org) which has been set up by IMO secretariat with regard to 
ship casualties and other shipping information. The Casualty Module of GISIS contains 
two kinds of information collected on ship casualties. The first category of the 
information comprises factual data collected from various sources. The second category 
of data is made up of more elaborated information based on the reports of investigations 
into casualties received at the IMO. This may consist of the analysis of full investigation 
reports by the organization or reporting forms annexed to MSC-MEPC. 3/Circ. l. It is 
recommended to gather the information by following the domain guidelines since they 
can help the investigations to ensure that the data collected is comprehensive and 
sufficient. For maritime accidents and casualty investigation, the IMO guidelines should 
be the fundamental basis to be followed. 
4.2.2 Fact finding with a proper format 
Fact Finding 
Information 
Facts-ir 
or evidence 
The main purpose of this fact finding process is to organise the information 
obtained during the investigation into a proper format. This format has to consider three 
essential requirements for carrying out the rest of the analysis within the procedure. 
They are: 
1. The facts specified should only focus on a single action, condition, event, etc., 
at the same time it has to be clear and explicit for the analyst to understand. 
2. It should contain a means of index to link up the source information as well as 
the subsequent analysis outcomes. 
3. The maintainability of the data pool which collects and organises the sieved 
facts should be easy to add in or take out any factual data. 
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Therefore, the formation of listed statements is proposed as the solution to fulfil 
the requirements. Each listed statement consists of three parts; they are "(#): sequential 
identifier with a hierarchy feature (e. g. 1.1 or 1.2.1)", "the statement body for one single 
fact" and "(source index)". The proposed format is shown below and some examples are 
illustrated in section 5.2.1: 
(#) [the statement body for one single fact] (source index) 
e. g. (3) [The master ordered a ship speed of 18 knots] (DoT 9.2; pp. 7). 
The first part of the format, the sequential identifier "(#)", can have various types 
of notation. The only constraint on the format is that it has to be short and a pure 
numerical style is preferred. This is because the letter-number (e. g. A-1) notation style 
will be intensively applied within the following processes. In order not to mix up the 
notation of listed statements with the others, it is recommended to use a different type of 
notation style in different analysis processes. The second part of the format is the 
statement body that contains sentence(s) to depict one particular fact which is extracted 
from the gathered information. Each statement should only focus on one single fact and 
describe it as briefly as possible without compromising the clarity. For convenience, for 
the next process to handle the described fact, it is preferred that the statement matches 
with an event or a Causal Factor. If this is not the case, `disorder' may be introduced 
whilst transferring the statements from facts, to Causal Factors in the next process. 
Although this `disorder' will not halt the process, it will produce some undesired 
outcomes such as several statements leading to one Causal Factor or, vice versa, several 
Causal Factors referring to one statement. The last part of the format. is the "(source 
index)" located at the end of the statement. This is a short notation which links the 
statement and the source information from which the fact is derived. No particular style 
of the index needs to be followed but it should be as simple as possible. These indices 
will be very useful for locating the origin of the information if any doubt arises when 
reviewing the statements. 
Once all the facts have been elicited and organised, according to the proposed 
format, to create a data pool of listed statements, the next process of identifying the 
Causal Factors can be proceeded. 
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4.2.3 Identifying the Cut Sets using Causal Sufficiency Criterion (CSC) 
Fact Finding 
Information 
-ý or evidenceýý 
Facts 
A 
Factors 
WBA',: z 
------------ 
The identification of the direct Causal Factors for each Intermediate/Top Event 
through the listed statements organised within the previous process is now considered. 
The CSC is proposed in the WBA guideline (Paul-Stüve, 2005). It is specified such 
as "between a set of causal factors A, """ AN and a consequence event B, it is impossible 
for B not to have happened if all of Ak; ke [1, N] have happened". In contrast, the 
definition of Cut Set of FTA is that "a Cut Set is a collection of Basic Events such that 
if they all occur the Top Event must also occur" (Andrews and Moss, 2002). Since the 
similarity of these two definitions, the study assumes that the CSC of WBA can be 
utilised to sort out a set of direct Causal Factors for each Intermediate/Top Event of an 
accident from the listed statements to represent the Cut Set of the Event in FTA. In 
other words, the CSC is treated as a filter to sieve out the Causal Factors from the data 
pool of listed statements in order to constitute a Cut Set that is sufficient to trigger a 
particular event. It is fitting to treat every Causal Factor in WBA as an Intermediate 
Event in FTA, but it might sometimes be improper to treat it as a Basic Event in FTA. 
This is because it is very unlikely that the Causal Factors involved in an accident are 
mutually independent. This feature will result in a problem if the Causal Factors are 
treated as Basic Events to carry out the quantitative analysis in FTA without clarifying 
the dependencies amongst them. Fortunately, FTA is only applied to handle the 
qualitative analysis within the proposed method so that this issue does not halt the 
process, and the only differentiation between Intermediate Event and Basic Event is 
whether they are "the limit of resolution of the fault tree" (Andrews and Moss, 2002), 
i. e. the boundary of the analysis. It implies that, in the proposed application, an event 
becomes a Basic Event if it is on the boundary of the fault tree, otherwise it is an 
Intermediate Event. In addition, each Intermediate Event and the set of its direct Causal 
Factors (i. e. Cut Set) can also be seen as a Why-Because subset. The entire Why- 
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Because Graph of the accident can then be acquired by assembling every Why-Because 
subsets into one union, with other subsets subsequently included. 
As described in section 4.1, the aim of this process is to clarify which direct Causal 
Factors triggered an Intermediate Event to occur. Thus, two considerations must be 
made when transforming the listed statements into the direct Causal Factors of 
Intermediate/Top Events for further analysis. 
Firstly, each listed statement should be depicted as a single fact as possible, but 
this is not always the case. In other words, there will not always be a one-to-one relation 
between the listed statements and those Causal Factors. It might be a relationship of 
many listed statements regarding one Causal Factor, or vice versa, one listed statement 
refers to many Causal Factors. However, if the index system of the listed statements is 
well defined, this phenomenon does not cause a serious problem but introduces some 
`disorder' only. Secondly, in a practical application, if a dedicated domain/field causal 
taxonomy is available, it would be helpful for analysts to identify the Causal Factors 
from the listed statements. This means that, as long as an action, condition or event 
conforms to one particular definition of the taxonomy, it can easily be identified as a 
Causal Factor. For example, in section 5.2.1, the listed statement (2) of the case study - 
"The assistant bosun failed to carry out his duty to close the bow doors at the time" is 
identified as a Causal Factor because it conforms to one of the definitions of the 
proposed HFACS-MA framework, which is "Violations: factors in a mishap when the 
actions of the operator represent wilful disregard for rules and instructions, and lead to 
an unsafe situation" described in section 6.2.1.2. 
As soon as all the gathered information and evidence with respect to the accident 
are listed and organised as listed statements in the previous process, the causality 
amongst them becomes the top priority issue of the analysis procedure in order to 
ascertain the answers of how and why the accident happened. The purpose of this 
process is similar to piecing together a jigsaw puzzle; all the pieces of the puzzle (i. e. 
listed statements) are now in place, but the whole picture of the puzzle (i. e. the Why- 
Because Graph or the Cut Set of each Intermediate Event) is as yet unknown. Therefore, 
a systematic procedure to transform the listed statements into the Causal Factors and 
specify the causalities amongst them is proposed as follows. 
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(1) The Causal Factor identifying process starts from the Top Event of the accident. 
It is similar to starting piecing together a jigsaw puzzle from the first identified piece, 
and then the adjacent pieces to the first identified piece one after another. That is, the 
analyst scans all the listed statements searching for the possible direct Causal Factors 
which could result in the Top Event, one by one, from the top to the bottom of the 
statements in turn, using Causal Sufficient Criterion as the sufficiency examiner. The 
purpose of the criterion is to ensure the Cut Set (i. e. set of identified direct Causal 
Factors) of a particular Intermediate/Top Event is both sufficient and valid to the event. 
This means that a factor will become one of the identified Causal Factors of a particular 
Intermediate/Top Event if it is rationally believed that it is responsible for the 
occurrence of the event. 
(2) The factor is subsequently added into the Cut Set of the Intermediate/Top Event. 
If the direct Causal Factors in the Cut Set are still not enough to support the 
Intermediate/Top Event to occur, then the Causal Factor identifying process has to 
iterate for that particular Intermediate/Top Event until the Cut Set satisfies the CSC. An 
example of transforming those listed statements into the Causal Factors is demonstrated 
in the case study in section 5.2.2. Once the Cut Set of a particular Intermediate/Top 
Event passes the CSC, the Causal Factor identifying process for that Event is 
accomplished. 
(3) The Intermediate/Top Event and its Causal Factors are hence grouped as one 
of the Why-Because subset, which is going to be used to construct the Why-Because 
Graph in the next stage. This is, the Intermediate/Top Event is deemed as the "why (or 
consequence)" and its Cut Set as the "because (or causes)" in the graph, in which the 
direct Causal Factors of a particular Intermediate/Top Event comprise the Cut Set of 
that event in FTA. 
Soon after the Cut Set of Top Event is finalised, each Causal Factor in that Cut Set 
becomes an Intermediate Event and launches another Causal Factor identifying process 
for each new Intermediate Event. This process operates iteratively on all new identified 
Causal Factors until reaching the boundary of the analysis (e. g. beyond the investigation 
scope) from the information collected. If every Cut Set for each Intermediate/Top Event 
is satisfied with CSC, it would be confident to say that the entire Why-Because Graph, 
which consists of these Intermediate/Top Events with their Cut Set, is also satisfied with 
CSC. After accomplishing this process, there are two groups of intermediate analysis 
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data eventually created; they are the identified Causal Factors and the Cut Set for each 
Intermediate/Top Event. They are not only the essential material to construct the Why- 
Because Graph and to make a List of Factors, but also the foundation for the rest of 
analysis processes. It is important to note that the Causal Factors contained in the Cut 
Set only represent the sufficient Causal Factors of the Intermediate/Top Event and not 
the necessary and sufficient Causal Factors. The difference between them will be 
explained in section 4.3. 
4.2.4 Constructing the Why-Because Graph (WBG) 
Fact Finding WBG Constructing 
Information 
or evidence 
Do- Facts-º Factors- . 
W BA 
The goal of constructing the Why-Because Graph is to assemble those Why- 
Because subsets (i. e. the Intermediate/Top Event and its Cut Sets identified in the 
preceding process) into a singular graph (see Figure 4-2 for the illustration). Each 
Intermediate/Top Event and its Cut Set have been seen as a subset of the Why-Because 
Graph, in which Intermediate/Top Event is the "why (or consequence)" and its Cut Set 
is the "because (or causes)". The complete Why-Because Graph should be able to 
construct via assembling these Why-Because subsets together providing none of the 
Intermediate Events has been overlooked. 
The identified subset (i. e. IE and its CS) The WBG assembled by those subsets 
: 
TE 
5 
, 
L_J I_ 
Il 
_J ....... aya AB 
Figure 4-2 The identified subsets and the Why-Because Graph 
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The construction of the Why-Because Graph is fairly straight forward. As each 
Intermediate/Top Event and its Cut Set are a subset of Why-Because Graph, the main 
purpose of the process is to collect and assemble these Why-Because subsets form the 
top (i. e. Top Event) to the bottom in turn. Therefore, the process starts with the first 
identified event - Top Event to assemble the Why-Because Graph. Each 
Causal Factors 
of the Top Event will becomes one of the first layer's Intermediate Events, if any one of 
them has a Cut Set (CS) identified in the preceding process. The Cut Set belongs to that 
Intermediate Event will be concatenated to the tail of the Intermediate Event in the 
Why-Because Graph, and hence the graph grows. The entire Why-Because Graph is 
completed when all the Why-Because subsets of each Intermediate Event have been 
placed in the right location of the graph. It is also possible to construct the Why- 
Because Graph and identify the Causal Factors of the Intermediate/Top Event 
simultaneously provided that this is not detrimental to the analyst work. Figure 4-2 
illustrates the notion of assembling the Why-Because Graph with the identified subsets 
and the notion of layers with the horizontal lines. 
4.2.5 Create the List of Factors (LoF) 
Fact Finding WBG Constructing 
Information 
or evidence 
W BA 
The goal of this process is to organise the identified Causal Factors, which are 
contained in the Why-Because Graph, with an index mechanism referring to the derived 
listed statements. The LoF is the key for the Causal Factors and/or the Why-Because 
Graph to refer to the origin of the listed statements. It also provides a useful auxiliary 
reference to perform the Boolean algebra operation for clarifying the Minimal Cut Sets 
of the accident in the following processes. After accomplishing the construction of the 
Why-Because Graph of the accident, a comprehensive overview is given with regard to 
"how did the accident occur" and "which Causal Factors were involved in the accident". 
However, this overview is not yet able to answer the question of "why did the accident 
happen". This is similar to the whole jigsaw puzzle having now been pieced together, 
but the story behind the picture is as yet unknown. Before carrying out the analysis 
further for the answer to "why did it happen", those identified Causal Factors, which are 
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shown in the Why-Because Graph, have to be organised and labelled as a data pool for 
the following analysis. The principle of the labelling system of the Causal Factors is to 
assign a symbol or label to each Causal Factor as short and clear as possible. This is 
because these symbols or labels will be utilised in the Boolean algebra operation for 
clarifying the Minimal Cut Sets of the accident. The assigned symbol or label has to be 
simple as well as ordered. Meanwhile it also has to differentiate from the enumerating 
system of the listed statements. Therefore, this study proposes a letter-number (e. g. 
"Al" or "A" only) format to deal with the notation of the Causal Factors. It is 
recommended to initiate the label assigning process after the Why-Because Graph has 
been accomplished rather than during the Causal Factor identifying process. Without 
the entire overview of the Why-Because Graph, it is highly likely that the label assigned 
to a Causal Factor will be changed due to another new Causal Factor being identified. 
Therefore, it is recommended to assign the symbols or labels to each Causal Factor after 
accomplishing the Why-Because Graph of the accident to gain the benefit of a coherent 
symbol outcome. 
Having assigned the symbol or label to each Causal Factor in the Why-Because 
Graph, it is worth making a list of Causal Factor as a quick reference. Since these 
Causal Factors are derived from the listed statements, it is also worth setting up an 
index for each Causal Factor to rapidly refer to the related statements. The proposed 
format of the LoF is shown as follows. 
Label: [factor description] (index) 
e. g. A: [a large quantity of water entered G deck] (4) 
From the example shown above, "A" is the symbol or label of the Causal Factor; 
and "(4)" in the tail of the sentence is the index which links the Causal Factor "A" to the 
listed statements No. 4. The "[factor description]" depicts the identified Causal Factor in 
a short sentence emphasising on one single factor. A domain or field error taxonomy 
will be helpful to identify the factor and to clarify the category of it. As noted 
previously, a Causal Factor might be derived from more than one listed statement as 
well as one statement may be referred by more than one Causal Factors. An example of 
the LoF for the case study is illustrated in section 5.2.3. The index notion between the 
LoF and listed statements together with the listed statements and source information is 
demonstrated in Figure 4-3 below. 
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Index System 
° Source Source s 
MAM 
E 
(1) [statement body] (source to index 
( statement body] (source data in x) 
(N statemen ] (source data index) 
" A: [factor Lion] (statemeli is index) 
i d n ex) B: [factor descriptilý statements 
Z: [factor description] (stateme is index) 
U 
Figure 4-3 The index mechanism amongst LoF, listed statements and source 
information 
4.3 Determining the approximate Minimal Cut Set(s) (MCS) for 
Intermediate/Top Event and constructing the Bayesian Network 
model of Top Event 
Up to this stage, the analysis results acquired are the Why-Because Graph, Cut Set 
for each Intermediate/Top Event and the List of Factors. However, in order to perform 
the best qualitative analysis, Minimal Cut Sets, rather than the Cut Sets, for each 
Intermediate/Top Event are preferred. Hence, the main purposes of this process are to 
form a Bayesian Network model of Top Event and to clarify the approximate Minimal 
Cut Set(s) for each Intermediate/Top Event by ruling out the trivial Causal Factors from 
the Cut Set. As noted previously, the difference between Minimal Cut Set and Cut Set is 
that a Minimal Cut Set consists of "necessary and sufficient" Causal Factors whilst a 
Cut Set merely consists of "sufficient" Causal Factors. That is, a Cut Set might still 
contain some insignificant or irrelevant Causal Factors. However, the notion of Minimal 
Cut Sets applied in the proposed methodology is not the same as the type used in FTA; 
they are in an approximate style. This is because an approximate simplification law is 
applied to obtain the Minimal Cut Sets in situations where all the traditional "AND", 
"OR" and "Equal" are defined as "noisy-AND", "noisy-OR" and "noisy-Equal". They 
are defined as follows: 
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C=AA. B means C occurs if A and B happen simultaneously. 
C A" B means C occurs with a high probability (not necessarily equal to 1) 
if A and B happen simultaneously. 
C=A+B means C occurs if A or B happens. 
C; zts A+B means C occurs with a high probability (not necessarily equal to 
1) if A or B happens. 
C=A means C occurs if A happens. 
C, ts A means C occurs with a high probability (not necessarily equal to 1) if 
A happens 
Therefore the Minimal Cut Sets applied, hereafter, in the following processes are 
used in an approximate style without further specification. In order to rule out these 
trivial Causal Factors from the Cut Set, two instruments are applied as the filter to 
achieve this goal; they are Karnaugh map (or K -map in short) and K-style Conditional 
Probability Table (or K-CPT in short). Before specifying the details of the transforming 
process, it is necessary to understand how these two techniques handle the intermediate 
analysis results obtained so far. 
4.3.1 The properties of Boolean algebra 
Before specifying the Minimal Cut Set(s) transforming process, it is worth 
reviewing the properties of Boolean algebra. Table 4 -2 summa rises some of these 
properties which will be utilised in the proposed process. The symbols for the two 
primary binary operations are defined as ""/n "(logical AND/set intersection) and 
"+ /U" (logical OR/set union), and for the single unary operation is as "A/-, " (logical 
NOT/set complement). The value of "0" represents logical FALSE, and "1" for logical 
TRUE. The frequently applied algebraic manipulation of Boolean expressions or the 
axiom laws of Boolean algebra are tabulated in Table 4-2, and the engineering style (e. g. 
A A. B for "AND" and A+B for "OR") is the notation to be followed hereafter. 
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Table 4-2 Summary of Boolean algebra properties 
A+(B+C)=(A+B)+C A"(B"C)=(A"B)"C associativity 
A+B=B+A A"B=B"A commutativity 
A+(A"B)=A A. (A+B)=A absorption 
A+(B"C)=(A+B)"(A+C) A"(B+C)=(A"B)+(A"C) distributivity 
A+ A =1 A" A= 0 complement 
A+ A= A A. A= A idempotency 
A+ 0= A A" 1= A boundedness 
A+1=1 A"0=0 
A+B =A"B A"B =A+B DeMorgan'slaws 
A=A involution 
4.3.2 The Karnaugh map (K-map) 
The K-map is a pictorial form of a truth table and provides a simple 
straightforward procedure for minimising Boolean algebra expressions (Mano, 2002). It 
can reduce the need of Boolean algebra calculations by taking the advantage of humans' 
pattern-recognition capability. The capability facilitates the rapid identification and 
elimination of redundant items in the expression. A K-map is a table which consists of 
numbers of cell. The dimension of a map is decided by the number of Boolean variables 
shown in the expression and is power of two; i. e. 2", neN (n: the number of variable). 
Each cell of the map has a unique binary value representing the corresponding 
combination of the variables, called terms or minterm. With reference to the forms and 
definitions of Boolean expressions, it is obvious that each binary value can be converted 
to an equivalent decimal value. Besides, the cells of the terms in the map are arranged in 
the way of "Gray code" in which only one variable changes its value between two 
adjacent cells. For illustration, a four variable K-map which contains Boolean variables 
A, B, C and D having sixteen cells in the map is shown in Figure 4-4 as an example. In 
the map, at the top side of the grid, the value of the variables is expressed in binary form. 
Therefore, "AB=00" means that neither A nor B appear in the expression, "AB=11" 
represents A and B appear in the terms of the expression, and so forth. 
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CD=00 
CD=01 
CD=11 
CD=10 
AB=00 AB=01 AB=11 AB=10 
ABCD (0) ABCD (4) ABCD (12) ABCD (8) 
AB CD (1) BCD (5) ABCD(13) ABCD(9) 
ABCD(3) ; BCD(7) ABCD(15) ABCD(11) 
ABCD (2) ABCD (6) ABCD (14) ABCD (10) 
Figure 4-4 A K-map of four Boolean variables 
Once the variables have been defined, the values of the cells are transcribed 
according to the location of the cells and the Boolean expression. Thus, for every 
possible combination of Boolean variables, the one-to-one relationship between cell and 
the combination of variables is defined. For example, if ABCD appears in the 
expression, the value of cell "(0)" must be "True" or '1°', otherwise "False" or "0". The 
K-map may theoretically be applied for the simplification of any Boolean expression 
regardless of the number of variables contained, but it is normally used when there are 
fewer than six variables. This is because a K-map comprising more than six variables is 
complex and tedious to simplify (Mano, 2002). 
Having completed a K-map with value assigned to each cell, a minimised Boolean 
expression can be acquired by grouping together adjacent cells containing "True" or "1". 
Each group provides a "product" to create a sum-of-products in the Boolean expression, 
e. g. A"B+C"D. A minimum sum-of-products expression is defined as "a sum of 
product terms which (a) has a minimum number of terms, and (b) of all those 
expressions which have the same minimum number of terms, has a minimum number of 
literals" (Roth, 1992). A K-map can use the following rules for simplifying the 
expressions (Belton, 1998). 
1. Groups do not include any cell containing "False" or "0" 
2. Groups may be horizontal or vertical, but not diagonal. 
3. Groups must be the cell number of 1,2,4,8, or in general 2", n r= N. 
4. Each group should be as large as possible. 
5. Each cell containing "True" or "1" must be in at least one group. 
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6. Groups may overlap. 
7. Groups may wrap around the table. The leftmost cell in a row may be grouped 
with the rightmost cell and the top cell in a column may be grouped with the 
bottom cell. 
8. There should be as few groups as possible, as long as this does not contradict 
any of the previous rules. 
Eventually, a corresponding minimised sum-of-products Boolean expression can 
be obtained through the K-map if the simplification procedure is carried out correctly. 
The K-map is mainly applied to clarify the Minimal Cut Set(s) (i. e. the minimised 
Boolean expressions) for each Intermediate/Top Event, and the result should be the 
same as the outcome acquired by the algebraic manipulation of Boolean expressions or 
the axiom laws of Boolean algebra. 
4.3.3 The K-style Conditional Probability Table (K-CPT) 
The K-CPT is an integration of Karnaugh map and Conditional Probability Table 
of Bayesian Network. The new K-style Conditional Probability Table is only introduced 
and used in the next stage for finalising the Minimal Cut Set(s) of Intermediate/Top 
Events. The layout or arrangement of the K-CPT is similar to a K-map. However, the 
value assigned into each cell of the table is the probability distribution of the condition 
that the corresponding combination of Boolean variables represents, instead of "1" or 
"0" in a K-map. In addition, the K-CPT only displays the probability value that the 
influenced node occurred, since the occurrence of an influenced node is the only 
concern and there is always a complementary relationship between each half part of the 
tables. For instance, in Figure 4-5, an example shows the difference between the 
original Conditional Probability Table of a Bayesian Network and the K-CPT where 
only the data under the condition that event C occurred is shown in the corresponding 
K-CPT. It provides the same advantage that K-map has in order to perform the 
simplification of the Minimal Cut Set(s) from the Cut Set regarding an 
Intermediate/Top Event in the next stage. 
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DAG of BN Original CPT of BN K-CPT 
C=0 C=1 
A=O B=O 0.9 0.1 
B=1 0.1 0.9 
A=1 B=0 0.8 0.2 
B=1 0.7 0.3 
A=0 A=l 
B=O 0.1 0.2 
B= l 0.9 0.3 
(P. S. only the data for 
"C=1 " is shown) 
Figure 4-5 An example of DAG, CPT and corresponding K-CPT 
4.3.4 Determining the approximate Minimal Cut Set(s) (MCS) for each 
Intermediate/Top Event with the K-CPT and the K-map instruments 
Fact Finding WBG Constructing 
Information Fach-* F-actors-ý ('ul Sets-ý 
or evidence 
I R'ßA K-CI'i' K K-map 
Having specified the functionalities of K-CP"I' and K-map, this section describes 
how to carry out the transforming process which sorts out the Minimal Cut Set(s) for 
each Intermediate/Top Event via these two instruments working together. The K-CPT 
and the K-map are applied to every Why-Because (or cause-consequence) subset, one at 
a time. Each subset consists of an Intermediate/Top Event and its Cut Set (i. e. the set of 
direct Causal Factors). The K-CPT illustrates the conditional probability distribution 
relationship between an Intermediate/Top Event and its Casual Factors whilst the K- 
map can transform the Cut Set of the event into Minimal Cut Set(s). Having linalised 
the process, the Cut Set of the event is replaced by at least one Minimal Cut Set of the 
direct Causal Factors to represent the cause-consequence relationship between the event 
and the factors. All the factors left in the Minimal Cut Set can therefore be ensured as 
the Necessary Causal Factors. After this process, it might be found that the 
Intermediate/Top Event consists of more than one Minimal Cut Set instead of only one 
Cut Set as before. This is because the proposed methodology has considered the 
possibility of different combinations of these Necessary Causal Factors could also lead 
to the same consequence (i. e. the Intermediate/Top Event). 
Later in section 5.3, an example detailing the K-CPT establishing and K-map 
simplification regarding a tragic case are demonstrated in the case study. Finally a list of 
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Boolean algebra equations depicting the Minimal Cut Set(s) for each Intermediate/Top 
Event is provided as the outcome of this simplification process. These equations arc 
essential to clarify the Bayesian Network of Minimal Cut Sets of an accident in the 
following processes. Figure 4-6 shows three basic types of approximate simplification 
outcomes as examples. They are similar to the notion of "noisy-AND with leak" and 
"noisy-OR with leak" relationships which is proposed by Bobbio et al. (2001), and as 
well as the "noisy-Equal". 
WBG (or DAG) 
u 
ARC 
0 b 
Iý 
,1ßC 
K-CPT 
(for D=1) 
C=0 C=l 
AB=00 0.01 0.01 
AB=01 0.1 0.1 
AB=11 0.1 0.95 
AB=10 0.01 0.01 
(for C=1) 
[A_o 0.01 
A-1 0.8 
(for D=1) 
C=0 c=1 
AB=00 0.05 0.9 
AB=01 0.85 0.95 
AB=11 0.8 0.85 
; 1B=10 0.95 0.9 
K-map 
C=0 C=1 
AB=00 O O 
AB=01 -z0 O 
AB=11 '0 Z1 
AB=10 ý: --0 'z0 
A=O 
A-1 ý1 
c=o C--- l 
AB=00 O z1 
AB=oI zzl Z1 
AB=11 ': r1 Z1 
AB=10 21 zt 1 
AB=00 O z1 
AB=OI zzl Z1 
AB=11 z1 Z1 
AB=10 zzl zt 1 
(P. S. the data shown in K-CPT is examples f or 
demonstration only) 
Approximate 
MCS 
I) ii"13"C 
(noisy-AND) 
CA 
(noisy-Equal) 
D 2zA+B+(' 
(noisy-OR) 
Figure 4-6 The three basic forms of approximate Minimal Cut Set 
In the beginning of the transformation process, an empty K-CP'l' and K-map, 
whose size and layout are set according to the number of Causal Factors in the Cut Set, 
are in place for each Why-Because subset. Subsequently, a probability distribution 
value is assigned into each cell of the K-CPT (i. e. tables shown in the second column of 
Figure 4-6) according to historical statistic data or experts' judgement. Once the K-CPT 
has been completed, the corresponding K-map is also obtained by determining the data 
in each cell of the K-CP'F either becoming to "1" or "0", and then transcribing it into the 
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corresponding cells of the K-map (i. e. tables shown in the third column of Figure 4-6). 
Having completed the K-map, a Boolean expression representing the approximate 
Minimal Cut Set(s) of an Intermediate/Top Event can be obtained via a simplification 
process. By sorting out all of the Why-Because subsets concluded in the preceding 
processes with the simplification process, both the approximate Minimal Cut Sets of 
Intermediate/Top Events and the Bayesian Network of Top Event of an accident can be 
acquired by one further step. 
4.3.5 Forming the Bayesian Network of Top Event 
After the Why Because Graph (WBG) and K-CPT of an accident are set up, one of 
quantitative analysis results can be obtained. By applying WBG as the blueprint of the 
Directed Acyclic Graph of Bayesian Network and K-CPT as the data sources of CPT of 
Bayesian Network, the Bayesian Network model of Top Event of an accident can be 
constructed accordingly. There will be two Bayesian Network models as the 
quantitative analysis results yielded in the proposed methodology. One depicts the Top 
Event of an accident, and the other specifies the approximate Minimal Cut Set(s) (for 
short, it is only named Minimal Cut Set hereafter) of the accident if the preceding 
simplification process is achievable. The difference between these two models is the 
way they interpret the Window of Opportunities (WoOs) of an accident. The Top Event 
model concentrates the entire influence of WoOs whilst the Minimal Cut Set model 
discusses the effect of each WoO individually. In section 5.3, more details in regard to 
the distinctions between these two models will be shown with a real case applied. 
Nonetheless, the Minimal Cut set model of an accident may not be available all the 
time, or the outcome of the model may not be acceptable. This is because the Minimal 
Cut Set model has to compromise the precision of the analysis results in order to gain 
the possibility of simplification. The Minimal Cut Set model is based on the assumption 
that an Intermediate/Top Event is highly likely to happen if its Minimal Cut set(s) occur 
(i. e. the approximate simplification law). However, this is not always the case in reality. 
For example, if the value assigned in K-CPT is less than 0.6 (i. e. an event has 60% of 
probability to happen if its Minimal Cut set(s) stand), it would be difficult to determine 
it as "1" in the corresponding K-map (i. e. the event is 100% to happen). The larger the 
difference in K-CPT, the more the distortion of the Minimal Cut Set(s). Therefore, the 
outcomes of the Minimal Cut Set model may not be acceptable if the simplification 
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result has been over-distorted. The degree of the distortion can be checked by 
comparing the quantitative analysis results of FTA and the Bayesian Network model 
with respect to there Minimal Cut Sets as a validation mechanism. It can be expressed 
as follows. 
F7A(MCS)- BN(MCSI 
Distortion = BN(MCS) 
4.4 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to finalise the qualitative analysis 
results 
Eventually, having clarified all the Minimal Cut Set(s) (i. e. the set contains 
Necessary Causal Factors) for each Intermediate/Top Event (i. e. the consequence event 
of the Why-Because subset), the Minimal Cut Sets of the accident can now he obtained. 
Again, Boolean algebra manipulation is utilised to determine the Minimal Cut Sets of 
an accident. At the end of this process, all the possible Minimal Cut Sets of the accident 
will be revealed as the qualitative analysis results of the accident. Fach Minimal Cut Set 
depicts the possible combinations of these Basic Events that caused the accident to 
happen. However these Basic Events are not the only factors to cause the accident to 
happen but the representative only. In other words, they are not necessarily the entire 
Causal Factors but the deepest latent conditions that reside in every causation branch. 
These Basic Events are the latent conditions of those Intermediate Events whilst the 
same Intermediate Events are the latent conditions of the 'hop Event (i. e. the accident). 
Those Intermediate Events are located in the middle of the causation branch and should 
not be overlooked even though they are not present in the Minimal Cut Sct(s) of 'Fop 
Event. 
4.4.1 Determining the Minimal Cut Set(s) of a Fault Tree 
Fact Finding IWBG Constructing 
Information 
Fac4} Minimal 
or evidence-f 
-i i Cut Sets-01. Cut Sets-f 
1%R, t K-CPT& K-map 
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This process is similar to the mathematic factorisation operation, but the equation 
of the operation is associated with a list of Boolean algebra expression regarding the 
Intermediate/Top Events acquired in section 4.3.4. It starts from the Top Event again. 
The Top Event is substituted by its Minimal Cut Sets, which are represented by sets of 
its Necessary Causal Factors and are displayed on the right hand side of the equal sign 
in the equation. Then, each Necessary Causal Factors in the Minimal Cut Sets of the 
Top Event becomes an Intermediate Event and is replaced by their Minimal Cut Sets, 
which are shown in column "approximate MCS", for example in Figure 4-6, until 
reaching the end of the tree (see Figure 4-7 as an example). This also means that the 
factorisation operation is stopped at the bottom of the Why-Because Graph or the 
boundary of the analysis (i. e. the Basic Events). The axiom laws of Boolean algebra arc 
applied, from time to time, during the operation in order to obtain the most simplilied 
form of the equation. After reaching the final stage of the factorisation operation, 
several groups of Necessary Causal Factors (i. e. the Basic Events) in the form of suln- 
of-products are revealed as the results. Each group of Basic Events represents one of the 
Minimal Cut Sets of the Top Event. For example, in Figure 4-7, a fault tree is shown 
such that the Fop Event is caused by two Intermediate Events (i. e. events A and 13) 
whilst event A is caused by event C or D (as the Basic Events) and event B is triggered 
by event E respectively. Subsequently, after the factorisation process, the simplified 
outcome of the equation turns out to be " (C " F) + (I) " F) ". I fence two groups of 
Necessary Causal Factors emerge as the Minimal Cut Sets of the l'op Fvent; they are 
"(C " E)" and "(D " E)". Later, in section 5.4.1, Equation (5.2) which demonstrates the 
factorisation process for the case of Herald of Free Enterprise (IIoFI; ) will provide a 
more comprehensive picture about how it works. 
TN . -A"I3 
TE = (C + n). F, 
Tr: =(C-r-. )+(1)-l. ) 
I; = MCSI + MCS2 
here 
MCSI =(C 1: ) 
MCS2 = (D " t; 
) 
A=C+f) 
B=E 
Figure 4-7 An example of finalising the Minimal Cut Sets of a Fault Tree 
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However, in the Minimal Cut set(s) of Top Event, there is no any symbol 
representing events A and B (i. e. the Intermediate Events). From the example above, it 
has been shown that these Basic Events contained in the Minimal Cut Sets are not the 
only Causal Factors to trigger the Top Event to happen. Instead, every Intermediate 
Event with regard to these Basic Events is also the factors to make those holes existing 
in the WoOs of the accident and should not be overlooked as well. Those Intermediate 
Events lying on the middle of the causation breaches are the consequences of these 
Basic Event as well as the causes of the Top Event. 
The qualitative analysis results of the accident are now finalised. They can not only 
be presented in the form of Top Event, but also the form of Minimal Cut Sets to 
materialise the WoOs of an accident reflecting the Reason's Swiss Cheese Model. This 
means that the half way of the hypothesis is achieved but the nature of FTA obstructs 
the second half of the hypothesis (i. e. the quantitative analysis of an accident) to fulfil. 
In the following sections, the difficulties and the solutions for the quantitative analysis 
of an accident will be discussed. 
4.4.2 The difficulties for FTA to perform the quantitative analysis of the accident 
It has been demonstrated that FTA is a well-defined technique for qualitative 
analysis of accidents (Johnson, 1999). Theoretically, the quantitative analysis of the 
accident (i. e. the Top Event) can be achieved by treating the identified Necessary 
Causal Factors of the accident as Basic Events and assigning each of them a probability 
figure. Then, the overall probability of the occurrence of the accident can be calculated 
via Equation (4.1). In the equation, the first term is numerically more significant than 
the second term and the second term is more significant than the third term, and so on. 
Therefore truncating the series at an odd-numbered term will provide an upper bound 
and truncating the series after an even-numbered term provides a lower bound for the 
exact probability (Andrews and Moss, 2002). 
P(TE)=EP(Kj)- P(KI nKj)+... +(-1)"-'P(K1 nK2 n... nK. ) 
i=i i=2 j-1 (4.1) 
where 'n' is the number of minimal cut set and'Ki' is minimal cut set i, i =1, ..., n 
This approach is appropriate in all circumstances whether or not Basic Events are 
repeated providing the assumption that the Basic Events are independent is true 
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(Andrews and Moss, 2002). However, this assumption (or condition) is almost 
impossible to apply on the quantitative analysis of an accident. This is because all the 
events or factors identified in the accident are normally interrelated to each other. In 
other words, there are at least two difficulties in applying Equation (4.1) to achieve the 
quantitative analysis of the accident. Firstly, it would be difficult to identify all the 
Necessary Causal Factors of an accident reaching the condition that they are all 
mutually independent, such as the Basic Events. Secondly, if these Necessary Causal 
Factors are not mutually independent, it would be more difficult to find the intersection 
part (i. e. the common factors) amongst those Minimal Cut Sets in order to apply 
Equation (4.1). 
4.4.3 Acquiring the likelihood of the accident via Minimal Cut Set Upper Bound 
approach 
Having considered the two difficulties mentioned above, it is clear that it would be 
almost impossible to apply FTA to achieve the quantitative analysis of the accident if 
the identified Necessary Causal Factors are not mutually independent. Hence, an 
approach combining the techniques of Fault Tree Analysis and Bayesian Network 
(FTA-BN) is proposed to overcome the difficulties. In other words, the FTA applied 
will not deal with the quantification issue at the Basic Event level, but at the Minimal 
Cut Set level instead. For the remaining part of quantitative analysis (i. e. the likelihood 
for each Minimal Cut Set), a Bayesian Network technique is applied as the means to 
acquire the quantified data for each Minimal Cut Set as well as the Top Event. This 
means, in this approach, that the quantified data for each Minimal Cut Set and Top 
Event are derived from a Bayesian Network. The FTA technique will only be applied to 
deal with the qualitative analysis. The Minimal Cut Set upper bound approach 
(Andrews and Moss, 2002) shown in Equation (4.2) can only be applied to calculate the 
likelihood of the Intermediate Events with their Minimal Cut Sets results acquired from 
a Bayesian Network. This is because this approach will introduce a certain amount of 
overestimate if there are common factors amongst these Minimal Cut Sets. Thus, the 
more the common factors, the larger the overestimate. The details of the processes 
regarding Bayesian Network are described in section 4.5. 
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P(IE)) 1-rl[1-P(K, )] 
i-I (4.2) 
where `n' is the number of minimal cut set and `K; ' is minimal cut set i, i=1, ..., n (equality exists when no event appears in more than one minimal cut set) 
As soon as the likelihood for each Minimal Cut Set has been acquired via the 
Bayesian Network model of the accident, the Fussell-Vesely Importance Measure (F- 
VIM) (see Equation (4.3)) can be used to rank the criticality for each Minimal Cut Set. 
The importance of Minimal Cut Set signifies the role that it plays in either causing or 
contributing to the occurrence of the Top Event. The importance measure is defined 
simply as the probability of occurrence of cut set i given that the system has failed 
(Andrews and Moss, 2002). 
P(K, ) 
I' 
P(T) (4.3) 
where `K; ' is minimal cut set i, i=1, ..., n 
4.4.4 The overestimate issue of Minimal Cut Set upper bound approach 
The following example illustrates the overestimate problem of the Minimal Cut Set 
upper bound approach with real figure. For demonstrating the differentiation between 
the answers acquired via Equations (4.1) and (4.2), the fault tree shown in Figure 4-7 is 
utilised in this example, in which three basic events C, D and E are independent to each 
other with probability 0.1 for each. Therefore the probability of Top Event is 0.019 
according to Equation (4.1). The calculation details are shown in Equation (4.4), where 
the accurate probability of the Top Event is obtained. 
P(TE) = P(CE + DE) 
= P(CE)+P(DE)- P(CDE) 
=0.01+0.01-0.001 
= 0.019 
(4.4) 
When Equation (4.2) is applied to deal with the calculation of overall probability 
of the Top Event, the answer turns out to be 0.0199. The details are shown in Equation 
(4.5). Both Equation (4.4) and Equation (4.5) are under the same condition that both the 
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likelihoods of MCSI and MCS2 are equal to 0.01. However, in Equation (4.5), a certain 
amount of overestimate (i. e. 0.0009) is encountered, which is caused by the common 
factor E that has been taken into account more than once, whilst Equation (4.2) is 
applied. This is also the reason why Equation (4.2) is the style of "not larger than" 
instead of "equal to". 
P(TE)MCSVB :! ý 1-(1-MCS1X1-MCS2) 
S1-(1-0.01)(1-0.01) (4.5) 
<_ 0.0199 
4.5 Bayesian Network (BN) for quantitative analysis 
The main purpose of this process is to construct a corresponding Bayesian 
Network model of an accident according to the qualitative analysis results described in 
the preceding sections. The model, which consists of a Directed Acyclic Graph and 
Conditional Probability Tables, is the major utility to perform the quantitative analysis 
of the accident. After constructing the model, not only the likelihood of each Minimal 
Cut Set (and/or Top Event) can be presented, but also the "what f' examinations can be 
carried out. The "what if' examination, which resorts to the functionalitjr of propagation 
of Bayesian Network, can easily reveal the change of factors in the model due to the 
change of one or few particular factors given. The propagation function is also a very 
useful tool to infer the critical factors and the effectiveness of countermeasures of an 
accident, from an objective viewpoint. In the following sections, the following topics 
are discussed in turn: a brief introduction of Bayesian Network techniques, the 
systematic procedure to construct the corresponding Bayesian Network model, the way 
to perform the "what if' examinations and finally the absorption problems that may be 
encountered whilst constructing the model. As a result of these discussions, an overview 
of the quantitative analysis of the proposed method emerges. 
4.5.1 A brief introduction of Bayesian Network technique 
In real world, the events involved in an accident are hardly mutually independent. 
Therefore, when the dependency amongst events has to be considered (i. e. the first 
difficulty mentioned in section 4.4.2 above), Bayes' Rule/Theorem (Bernardo and 
Smith, 2002), which is shown in Equation (4.6), seems to be one of the best solutions to 
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handle this issue. However, the conditional probability cannot be computed using a 
simple application of Bayes' Rule/Theorem. Therefore, a Bayesian Network technique 
is developed to address this difficulty. By exploiting conditional independencies 
entailed by influence chains, Bayesian Network is able to deal with the probabilistic 
inference amongst the events in an acceptable amount of time and space (Neapolitan, 
2004). 
P(AnB)=P(BI A)P(A)=P(AI B)P(B) 
where "I" means "given" or "on the condition of' 
(4.6) 
Since the dependencies amongst those Necessary Causal Factors are the major 
difficulty that has to be solved, the present study assumes that the Bayesian Network 
model of the accident, which is modelled and illustrated by the Directed Acyclic Graph 
to instantiate the WoO, is a feasible way to perform the quantitative analysis of the 
accident. This is because Bayesian Network technique is designed to deal with 
dependency with probability distribution, in which a Direct Acyclic Graph that encodes 
conditional probability distribution at its nodes is the core of Bayesian Network (Wang 
and Trbojevic, 2007). In short, that is: 
"BN" = "DAG" encoded with "conditional probability distribution" 
Wang and Trbojevic (2007) further specify the definition of Bayesian Network as 
follows. 
In a Directed Acyclic Graph, an edge (or arc) goes from one node (i. e. the 
source) to another (i. e. the target) and hence makes connection in only one direction. 
Acyclic implies that such a graph contains no cycle. In a Bayesian Network structure, 
nodes (usually drawn as circle) represent random (i. e. chance) variables such as 
events, that take values from the given domains. Arcs (normally drawn as either 
curved or straight lines having a terminating arrowhead) are used to represent the 
direct probabilistic dependence relations among the variables. Each influence 
relationship is described by an arc connecting an influencing (or parent) node to an 
influenced (or child) node and has its terminating arrowhead pointing to the child 
node. If a node has no parents, then its probability distribution is said to be marginal 
(or unconditional), otherwise it is conditional. 
As stated in section 4.3.4, in a Bayesian Network, the quantitative association 
amongst the modelled nodes is represented via a Conditional Probability Table (CPT). 
Each node encodes the value of conditional probability distribution into a Conditional 
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Probability Table associated with it. The encoded nodes with no predecessor are 
described by prior probability distributions. Those nodes with predecessors are 
described by posterior probability distributions. The conditional probability of a 
parameter, a, given a condition, b, would be written as P(alb), where the "I" vertical bar 
is read as "given that" or "given" (the indication of conditionality). Figure 4-8 illustrates 
a Bayesian Network example with two nodes and its associated Conditional Probability 
Tables. To obtain the quantified value with respect to these states, Node B is described 
by prior probabilities P(bj) and P(b2). Since Node B has an effect on Node A, then A is 
conditionally described by its posterior probabilities P(a jIb j), P(al l bz), P(a21 b1), and 
P(a2l b2). The subscript "1" or "2" is used to denote which state of the two states of the 
specified variable is addressed. 
Bý = 4`" Influencing (parent) node 
Bis a causeofA 
Influenced (child) node ýA= ý' A is an consequence of B 
bi Pj 
b2 P(b2) 
bi b2 
at Paib, Il Pa. b2 
a2 f(a2lbd 
d 
P a2 b 
"I" means "given" or "on the condition of ' 
Figure 4-8 The illustration of Directed Acyclic Graph & Conditional Probability Table 
From a table P(A, B) of probabilities P(ab b), the probability distribution P(A) can 
be calculated via Equation (4.7). Let ai be a state of A. There are exactly m different 
states of event B for which A is in state a1. Therefore: 
mm 
P(a) P(a,, bb)P(a, I bb)P(bb) 
J=1 J-1 
(4.7) 
This calculation expresses the fact that the variable B is marginalised out of the 
joint probability distribution, P(A, B) (resulting in P(A)) (Eleye-Datubo, 2005). This 
process is called marginalisation (or summing out) - because the variables other than a, 
are summed out (Russell and Norvig, 2003). In general, for any sets of variables A and 
B, the marginalisation rule can be written as follows: 
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P(A) =I P(A, B) 
H 
In addition, for conditional probabilities instead of joint probabilities, a variant of 
this rule uses the product rule as follows: 
P(A) _ P(A I B)P(B) 
B 
In other words, in Bayesian Network, the unconditional (or marginal) probability 
distribution of each node can be acquired via Equation (4.7) where the Directed Acyclic 
Graph encodes conditional probability distribution for each node (Eleye-Datubo, 2005; 
Neapolitan, 2004; Jensen, 2001). Therefore, the unconditional probability distribution 
(or marginalisation of probability) of P(a) (i. e. P(ai) and P(a, ) ) of the example in 
Figure 4-8 can be obtained via Equation (4.7), and the details are shown in Equation 
(4.8). 
2 
P(a1) _ P(a1 I h; )P'(b; ) =P(al I h1)l'(hi) + P(ai I h2)P'(b, ) ji (4.8) 
z 
P(a, )=yP(az h; )P(b; )=P(az I b, )P(b, )+P(az I hz)P(hz) 
j=l 
4.5.2 Backtracking the Intermediate Events via the factorisation equations of 
Minimal Cut Sets 
Fact Finding WBG Constructing Backtracking 
Information Minimal 
or evidence, 
Facts-00ý I actors-ý cut Sets t ul Sets--00. 
R'BA K-CPT & K-map 
In the proposed method, the Minimal Cut Sets of an accident are depicted by sets 
of Basic Events without specifying the Intermediate I-vents involved. It is very 
important that those Intermediate Events should not be overlooked when constructing 
the corresponding Bayesian Network model. This is because both Basic Events and 
Intermediate Events are all the identified Necessary Causal Factors of' the accident, in 
which the Intermediate Events are both the consequences of the Basic Events and the 
causes of Top Event. Therefore, in order to discover those Intermediate Events, a 
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1 
backtracking process has to be carried out before constructing the model. This process 
mainly explores the associated Intermediate Events according to the Basic Events 
contained in the Minimal Cut Sets of the accident. Through the backtracking process, 
clues reveal which Intermediate Events have been influenced by the associated Basic 
Events following a step by step approach, from the Basic Events to the Top event. In 
this section, only the notion of the process is described. The application of the 
backtracking regarding a real case is shown in section 5.5 as an example. 
When processing, it is helpful to highlight the backtracking paths by using circles 
and arrows in the equations (see Figure 4-9). For the purpose of quick reference, all the 
Intermediate Events involved in the Bayesian Network model are summarised in the 
second half part of the equations (i. e. the "where" part) with their influencing events (i. e. 
their Necessary Causal Factors). These backtracking equations are the blueprints for 
constructing the Bayesian Network model of Minimal Cut Sets in the next stage. For 
correctness, it is very important to maintain the equivalency in the equations between 
both sides of the equal sign from time to time. This is also the means to ensure that the 
backtracking outcomes are correct otherwise some Intermediate Events will easily be 
overlooked. Later, an incorrect example, in section 4.5.4, will be utilised to illustrate 
that the backtracking can be misdirected due to the Boolean absorption property in the 
factorisation equations and resulting in a wrong answer of backtracking. Since these 
backtracking equations are the blueprints to construct the Directed Acyclic Graph of 
Bayesian Network of an accident, the correctness of the backtracking equations is 
crucial to the subsequent outcome of the quantitative analysis of the accident. A 
validation mechanism to avoid this kind of error is hence proposed in section 4.5.4. 
TE - TE = (A 1" B)+ (A2 " B) 
TE= CD" TE=(A1+A2). E 
TE=(C"E)+(D"E) TE=(C"E)+(D"E) Al "I 
E=MCSI+MCS2 T K TE=MCSI+MCS2 r Ä F 
where : where : y 
MCS1=(C"E) MCS1=(C"E)=(A1"B) 
MCS2=(D"E) MCS2=(D"E)=(A2"B) C, 
A=C+D Al=C 
B=E A2=D 
B=E 
Figure 4-9 The illustration of backtracking process and equations for the analysis 
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For specifying how to perform the process, an example is used to illustrate the 
procedure as follows. In Figure 4-9, it shows the factorisation equations on the left and 
the backtracking outcomes on the right with regard to the example utilised in section 
4.4.1. Through a systematic procedure in the preceding section, it has shown that the 
Top Event was triggered by two Minimal Cut Sets; they are (C. E) and (D - E) . 
Meanwhile, it also depicts that there are two Minimal Cut Sets to provoke the event A to 
occur; they are (C) and (D) respectively. Now, in order to construct the Bayesian 
Network model of the example for the quantitative analysis, it is needed to clarify the 
Cause-Consequence path by tracking back to the Top Event from its Minimal Cut Sets 
through all the Intermediate Events involved. This has to resort to the factorisation 
equations with Boolean algebra again. In the factorisation (or downward) equations, it 
reveals the Why-Because relationship, but it also implies the Cause-Consequence 
information between each row, and the row abovelbelow. This process starts from the 
last row of the equations. In the row, the Minimal Cut Sets depict all the possible 
combinations of Basic Events which trigger the Top Event to occur. In addition, the 
Intermediate Events influenced by these Basic Events can also be revealed by searching 
for where these Basic Events derived from. For example, the difference between the 
first and second rows on the left hand side of Figure 4-9 shows that event A can either 
be triggered by event C or event D. This means either event C or event D alone can 
provoke event A to occur. Therefore a new symbol Al is utilised on the right hand side 
of the figure to denote the situation that event A is triggered by event C, and another 
symbol A2 denotes another situation that event A is triggered by event D. Meanwhile, 
the reason why event B happens is because of the existing of event E, and so on. In the 
end, the backtracking results for these Intermediate Events are summarised in the 
"where" part of the equations. They denote the influencing nodes (or Necessary Causal 
Factors) for each Intermediate Event in the Bayesian Network model. That is, the 
factors on the right hand side of the equal sign are the predecessor (or influencing) 
nodes to the Intermediate Events on the left hand side. 
On the left hand side of Figure 4-9 (i. e. the factorisation/downward part), some of 
the equations in the first half part have a backtracking/upward counterpart on the right 
hand side. The equations on the right hand side of the figure can be seen as the 
backward Why-Because paths. Although they look slightly different from their 
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counterpart on the left hand side, they are still equivalent except using different symbols 
to denote the same thing. This means that their results are equivalent despite the 
expressions on both sides being not the same (i. e. they should be equal). Therefore, it is 
very important to check the equivalency between both sides of the equations, from time 
to time, to ensure that the backtracking outcome is correct. If the equivalency between 
both sides of the equations cannot be maintained in any row of the equations, it 
indicates that, somewhere in the process, the backtracking results are incorrect. 
Especially, the absorption property of Boolean operation in the factorisation stage has 
the tendency to cause this kind of problem to happen. Therefore, extra caution has to be 
paid to this issue whilst carrying out this process. 
4.5.3 Constructing the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) of the accident 
Fact Finding WBG Constructing Backtracking 
Information Minimal BN 
or evidence-- t 
WBA K-CPT & K-map 
Having accomplished the backtracking process, a list of backtracking equations is 
in place. Thus, all the Intermediate Events involved in the accident are listed, one by 
one, with their direct Necessary Causal Factors on the right hand side of the equal sign. 
As noted previously, these backtracking equations are the blueprints to construct the 
Bayesian Network model of Minimal Cut set in the process. The Top Event is no longer 
represented by a single object. Instead, it is substituted by several Minimal Cut Sets as 
the proxies in the rest of the analysis procedure. Each Minimal Cut Set represents one of 
the WoOs in terms of the Reason's Swiss Cheese Model. That means that each 
combination of the Basic Events is the representative of the factors that cause the 
accident to occur. However, the Intermediate Events should not be overlooked even 
though they do not appear in the Minimal Cut Sets. The procedure to construct the 
Directed Acyclic Graph is described as follows. 
At the beginning of the process, the construction of the Directed Acyclic Graph 
starts from the Top Event, which is now represented by several Minimal Cut Sets. Each 
time, the process handles and focuses on one Minimal Cut Set only. These equations are 
interpreted in the way that, in each row of the backtracking equations, the 
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Intermediate/Top Events, on the left hand side of the equal sign, are the child nodes of 
their Necessary Causal Factors, which are on the right hand side as their parent nodes. 
Meanwhile, in the Directed Acyclic Graph, each influence relationship is described by 
an arc connecting from an influencing (i. e. parent or predecessor) node to an influenced 
(i. e. child or successor) node and has the arrowhead toward to the child node (Wang and 
Trbojevic, 2007). If a node does not exist in the Directed Acyclic Graph whilst 
interpreting one of the equations, the process will place the node into the corresponding 
location of the Directed Acyclic Graph according to the backtracking results. This 
process will look at each Minimal Cut Set in turn, from the top to the bottom of the 
backtracking equations iteratively. Having handled all the Minimal Cut Sets of the Top 
Event (i. e. the accident) in this process, the Directed Acyclic Graph of the accident 
should be established accordingly. 
In Figure 4-10, a Bayesian Network example which is the case that has been 
utilised in sections 4.5.2 to demonstrate the backtracking process is constructed. First of 
all, Node MCS1 is placed into the corresponding location in the Directed Acyclic Graph 
with label "MCSJ". According to the equation "MCS 1= (Al " B) ", two extra nodes are 
added into the Directed Acyclic Graph as the parents nodes of Node MCS1, and they are 
named as "Al" and "B" respectively. The arcs are drawn from Node Al to Node MCS1 
as well as the one from Node B to Node MCSJ. Since there is an equation depicting the 
causation for factor Al (i. e. Al=C), the process continues interpreting the equation and 
constructing the Directed Acyclic Graph with a new added node as the parent node of 
Node Al. "C" is the label of the new added node and it has an arc with arrowhead 
towards Node Al. In the same way, a new parent node for-Node B is placed, which is 
labelled as "E" with an arc from Node E to Node B. Up to this stage, it is the end of the 
construction for MCS1 since there is no further backtracking equation for either factor C 
or E. Therefore, the process turns to MCS2 for the interpretation and construction. 
The corresponding equation for MCS2 is "MCS2 = (A2. B)". This results in two 
new nodes being introduced in the Directed Acyclic Graph; they are MCS2 and A2 
respectively. Since Node A2 is the influencing node, the arc with an arrowhead is hence 
connected from Node A2 to Node MCS2. For Node B, due to it is already existed, only a 
new arc form Node B to Node MCS2 is added. This means that a node can influence 
more than one nodes as well as a node can be influenced by multiple nodes in the 
Bayesian Network. This feature is also in line with the reality; multiple causes result in 
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one particular consequence or multi consequences result from one particular cause. In 
addition, a new parent node for Node A2 is introduced and labelled as "D" due to the 
equation "A2=D". Finally, the entire process is accomplished, because all the Minimal 
Cut Sets have been handled accordingly. The outcome of the established Directed 
Acyclic Graph is shown on the right hand side of Figure 4-10 with the corresponding 
backtracking equations on the left hand side. 
TE=(Al. B)+(A2"B) 
TE=(A1+A2). E 
TE=(C"E)+(D"E) 
TE = MCS 1+ MCS2 
where : 
MCS1=(C"E)=(Al"B) 
MCS2=(D"E)=(A2"B) 
Al=C 
A2=D 
B=E 
MCS2 
A2 
1° 
i 
D 
Figure 4-10 The backtracking equations and the corresponding DAG 
4.5.4 The absorption problem whilst backtracking 
In this section, the problem of overlooking the Intermediate Events, the reason why 
it happens and the method to avoid it are addressed. The problem may happen when 
there is more than one backtracking path available, from a Basic Event to the Top Event, 
and the backtracking process is performed incorrectly due to the absorption in 
factorisation equations. Consequently, some of the Intermediate Events involved in the 
accident could be overlooked if the backtracking process does not consider all the 
possible paths. When this type of error occurs, it results in the established Directed 
Acyclic Graph being incomplete and the nodes in the Bayesian Network model to 
represent the associated Minimal Cut Sets being insufficient as a result. It would be 
helpful to appreciate this issue by using an example to explain how it happens, and how 
to avoid it through a proposed validation mechanism. Hence, in the rest of this section, 
an example is utilised and shown in Figure 4-11, in which the fault tree of the example 
is shown on the left and its corresponding Directed Acyclic Graph of Bayesian Network 
is on the right of the figure. 
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In this example, three Basic Events (i. e. event A, B and C) and two Intermediate 
Events (i. e. events D and E) are the Causal Factors of the Top Event. They result in 
"A+BC' as the outcome of the Minimal Cut Sets where MCS1 is represented by "A", 
and MCS2 is "BC". Since event A is a repeated Basic Event in this example, it will 
trigger more than one Intermediate Event (i. e. events D and E) to happen 
simultaneously if it occurs. This also means that there are two backtracking paths from 
event A to MCS1. Due to the fact that AC and AB have been absorbed by A in the 
factorisation equations, it could easily overlook either event D or event E when the 
backtracking initiates from the event A and only concentrate on one of the backtracking 
paths, instead of considering all the possible paths. This is also the reason why the 
absorption property of Boolean algebra can cause the problem that some Intermediate 
Events are overlooked during the backtracking process. Since the absorption property is 
frequently applied in the Boolean algebra operation, this kind of error is highly likely to 
occur. The correct factorisation and backtracking equations of the example are shown in 
the middle of Figure 4-11. 
0C 
TE=D"E 
+B +C) 
C+AB+BC 
BC 
= MCS 1+ MCS2 
where : 
MCS1=A=D1+E1 
MCS2=BC=D2"E2 
D1=A 
D2=B 
E1=A 
E2=C 
MCSI MCS1 MCS2 
rrý. 
EI DI D2 E2 
6ýö 
Figure 4-11 The fault tree, equations and Bayesian Network model of the example with 
repeated Basic Event 
In contrast, in Figure 4-12, it is supposed that the incorrect example only reveals 
one of backtracking path for event A. It results in that event D (i. e. factor DI) is the only 
Intermediate Event which is connected with event A in the Directed Acyclic Graph for 
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MCSI. As a result, the backtracking path via event E has been overlooked and the 
Directed Acyclic Graph is incomplete. 
Fortunately, this kind of error can be easily highlighted by checking the 
equivalency between the backtracking equations and the factorisation equations (see the 
equation highlighted by the circle in Figure 4-12). This implies that the equivalency 
between two equations has to be retained despite different symbols have been applied. 
In this incorrect example, factor El (i. e. one of the proxies of event E) was substituted 
by factor Dl in the backtracking equations resulting in that event E was overlooked. 
Since factor D1 is neither event E nor the proxy of event E, this contradiction 
immediately indicates that something has been done wrong with the backtracking 
process. Thus, in order to ensure that the Directed Acyclic Graph is constructed 
correctly, a good practice in the backtracking process has to be followed. That is, all the 
possible backtracking paths for the absorbed items has to be considered as well as the 
equivalency between the backtracking and factorisation equations has to be checked all 
the time. 
TE "E(D1+D2XDl+E 
+BXA+C)=(D1+D2XD1+E2) 
_ +AC+AB+BC 
A BC 
= MCS 1+ MCS2 
where : 
MCS 1=D 
MCS2=BC=D2"E2 
D1=A 
D2=B 
E2=C 
MCS 1 
T 
D1 
0 
MCS2 
D2 
0 
E2 
C 
Figure 4-12 The incorrect backtracking outcome of the example 
4.5.5 The Conditional Probability Table (CPT) of the Bayesian Network model 
Having established the Directed Acyclic Graph associated with the Minimal Cut 
Sets of an accident, the process turns to encoding the Conditional Probability Tables for 
each node in the graph in order to accomplish the corresponding Bayesian Network 
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model before being able to perform the quantitative analysis of the accident. As 
mentioned in section 4.5.1, the Conditional Probability Tables specify the probability 
distribution of every state of the nodes under the conditions given by their predecessors 
in the Bayesian Network. Basically, there is a probability distribution for every state of 
the child node considering every combination of the states of the parent nodes. In other 
words, if the conditions of the node are influenced by the node's direct predecessor(s), 
the posterior probability distributions values are given. If the node has no predecessor, 
the prior probability distributions of the node are entered into the Conditional 
Probability Tables. The dimensions of a Conditional Probability Table are determined 
by the number of parents, the state numbers of each parent and the number of states of 
the child node. Generally speaking, a Conditional Probability Table is a matrix of 
conditional probabilities (Eleye-Datubo, 2005). A conditional probability is a 
probability of one event, given that another event has occurred. More generally, for 
variable A with a set of states (a,, a2,..., a) and variable B with a set of states (bl, b1, ..., 
b, ), the conditional probability matrix P(alb) representing the conditional probability of 
A given B is as follows: 
P(a, 1 bl) P(a1 I b2) ... P(a1 I bm ) 
P(alb) _ 
P(a2 I b1) P(a2 I b2) 
... 
P(a2 I b. ) 
P(an I bl) P(an l b2) ... P(an l bm ) 
Once all the data of the Conditional Probability Tables for each node has been 
given, the Bayesian Network is able to calculate the marginalisation (or unconditional) , 
probabilities for each node. This is also the likelihood outcome for each node which is 
shown in the Bayesian Network model. It is important to note that the likelihood 
outcomes shown in the model are unconditional probability distribution although the 
data given in the Conditional Probability Tables is conditional. Theoretically, the best 
figures entered in the Conditional Probability Tables are derived from the historical 
statistic data according to other studies or researches if they are available. If the data 
does not exist, then experts' judgements are used as an alternative. These judgements 
can be done by an individual or a group of experts. If a group of experts is applied, it is 
preferred to obtain a consensus figure rather than several individual figures representing 
their opinions. Besides, a crisp value is essential due to the requirement of the 
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Conditional Probability Table. In order to harmoniously apply experts' judgements, a 
method is proposed to deal with group consensus issue and is detailed in Chapter 7. 
After finalising the Conditional Probability Tables of a Bayesian Network model, 
the quantitative analysis is now able to proceed. As noted previously, in the Bayesian 
Network model of Minimal Cut Sets, the Top Event of an accident is represented by 
several Minimal Cut Sets nodes rather than a single object. Each node of Minimal Cut 
Sets represents one of the WoOs of the. accident with the likelihood outcome. 
Nevertheless, the likelihood figures for each Minimal Cut Set are normally different 
because they consist of different combinations of Causal Factors. It should be noted that, 
in this model, the likelihood of the accident (i. e. the Top Event) is neither represented 
by any one of the Minimal Cut Sets nor simply their summation of likelihood outcomes. 
It has to resort to the Minimal Cut Set upper bound equation of FTA (see Equation (4.2) 
in section 4.4.3) with all the Minimal Cut Sets involved to obtain the approximate 
answer, or directly refer to the Top Event model depicted in section 4.3.5. 
A: (B: and C: ) 
occur not 
0.1 0.9 
EI: (E2:, DI: and D2: ) 
occur not A/B/C 
1 0 occur 
0 1 not 
MCS1_1 (and MCS1_2: ) 
occur not E1(D1) 
1 0 occur 
0 1 not 
MCS2: 
occur not D2 E2 
1 0 occur occur 
0 1 occur not 
0 1 not occur 
0 1 not not 
Figure 4-13 The Bayesian Network model of the repeated Basic Event example 
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In Figure 4-13, the Bayesian Network model associated with the repeating Basic 
Event example shown in Figure 4-11 is utilised to illustrate the notion. The Conditional 
Probability Tables are shown on the left hand side whilst the corresponding Bayesian 
Network model is on the right hand side. Each row of these tables depicts the 
probability distributions on the left half of the tables whilst the conditions given by its 
predecessors appear on the right of the same row. If a table subjects to no condition (e. g. 
the tables for nodes A, B and C), then prior probability distributions are given. In 
addition, the quantitative results displayed in the Bayesian Network model (on the right 
hand side of Figure 4-13) are the marginalised (or unconditional) likelihood outcomes 
in a percentage manner for each node. There are two nodes representing the MCS1 in 
the model of the example; they are Node MCS1_1 and Node MCSI_2. They are utilised 
to highlight that event A cannot either trigger event D or event E to cause the Top Event 
to happen. Any one of them should not be overlooked. Therefore, two nodes are shown 
in the model representing MCS1, but only one of their quantities will be applied to 
calculate the likelihoods of the Top Event. If the Minimal Cut set upper bound approach 
is applied, the computation details are shown in Equation (4.9), in which the probability 
figure applied for events A, B and C are 0.1 (or 10%) for each. 
P(TE)<1-(1-MCS1X1-MCS2)=1-(1-0.1X1-0.01)=0.109 (4.9) 
The result shown in the equation means the likelihood of the Top Event is not 
larger than 10.9% which coincides with the answer obtained via Equation (4.1). The 
equality exists when no factor appears in more than one Minimal Cut Set. It implies that 
the result obtained in light of the Minimal Cut Set upper bond formula will be 
somewhat overestimated providing that there are common factors amongst Minimal Cut 
Sets. That is, the more the common factors involved, the larger the result overestimated. 
It is very important to bear in mind with this feature whilst applying this approach for 
the analysis. However this approach is still suitable for comparison purposes if the 
precise answer is not mandatory. 
So far, the applied Bayesian Network software is only able to accept single crisp 
value for the entries of the Conditional Probability Tables. A practical problem may 
arise if there is more than one expert providing their estimations for the data of 
Conditional Probability Tables. It is unavoidable that they will disagree with each other 
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regarding the values of the tables sometimes. A method which applies fuzzy set theory 
to obtain a consensus values, as the compromise, for the data of Conditional Probability 
Tables of the Bayesian Network model is proposed and detailed in Chapter 7. In the 
method, the consensus values for each node are derived and aggregated from every 
expert's opinion. However, it does not mean that this method intends to ignore the 
differences of the judgements, but simply proposes one solution to aggregates the expert 
opinion and may allow a resolution of the disputes amongst these experts. 
4.5.6 The propagation of the Bayesian Network model for "what if" examination 
The propagation (or Bayesian inference) is another useful feature that the Bayesian 
Network can provide. "Bayesian inference is a process by which observation of a real- 
world situation are used to update the uncertainty about one or more variables 
characterising the aspects of that situation. It relies on the use of Bayes' Rule/Theorem 
as its rule of inference, defining the manner in which uncertainties ought to change in 
light of newly made observations" (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). It implies this feature 
can be used to examine the possible outcomes of every Causal Factor of the accident, 
based on the established Bayesian Network model, as "what if' examinations,. In 
addition, it can also be used to examine the possible solutions to prevent the similar 
accidents from happening again. Later, in section 5.5.6, the case study will show that 
the countermeasures which against some of the Intermediate Events are sometimes one 
of the efficient ways to prevent the similar accidents to happen again. This means that, 
from the view of Swiss Cheese Model, the Top Event can be prevented or relieved via 
blocking one of the holes represented by the Intermediate Events and resulting in the 
closure of the associated WoO of the accident. 
The "what if' examination is an application of propagation function. By giving a 
new figure of the uncertainly to one of the nodes in the Bayesian Network model, the 
updated node will then update its likelihood (or belief). Consequently, it also triggers a 
chain reaction to the other nodes as an epicentre. Those nodes which have connections 
with the updated nodes will update their likelihoods according to the dependencies 
associated with the epicentre. Hence the updated node becomes the supreme influencing 
nodes of the Bayesian Network model and all the other nodes turn out to be its 
influenced nodes at the time even though those whom are its predecessors. Although the 
updated node has changed the influencing direction to the predecessors at that time, the 
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dependencies between the node and its predecessor and others successors remain the 
same. In other words, the conditional dependencies amongst them depicted in the 
Conditional Probability Tables are still unchanged. In order to explain how it works out, 
it is necessary to cover some theoretical details about the feature before carrying on with 
the example application. 
In fact, the propagation feature is only part of Bayesian inference mechanism. 
Together with the concept of conditional independence and the techniques of 
marginalisation, it provides a basic tool for Bayesian belief updating. It should be noted 
that the arrowheads in the Directed Acyclic Graph only represent the real causal 
connections rather than the flow of information during the inferring. In other words, the 
information can be propagated in any direction in a Bayesian Network. Therefore, the 
key features of conditional independences and/or dependency-separation (i. e. D- 
Separation) have to be clarified before performing the propagation. Actually, D- 
Separation is another method to determine conditional independence. Both of them 
indicate the same thing. However, conditional independence is defined in terms of 
probabilities and D-separation in terms of paths in a graph (Eleye-Datubo, 2005). 
Eleye-Datubo (2005) further specifies that the characteristics of conditional 
independence may be experienced when two nodes are in a Bayesian Network model 
but the evidence about one cannot influence the other. To determine conditional 
independence in this setting, one must also consider all the undirected paths between 
these two nodes. Any node on any paths in the model may "block" the dependence 
along that path, and therefore if all the paths between the two nodes are blocked at least 
once, the two nodes will be independent (i. e. D-separated). This characteristic is crucial 
to fully understand the propagation function when it is applied to "what if' examination. 
Otherwise, the influencing paths might be blocked unexpected and the outcome of the 
propagation might be incorrect. Besides, the D-separation feature can be utilised as a 
mechanism to validate the correctness of the Directed Acyclic Graph of a Bayesian 
Network model. Yang (2006) suggests that the correctness of a qualitative Bayesian 
Network can be checked by carrying out the belief updating to each node and 
comparing the D-separation outcomes with the reality. In considering a node on a path 
in the network, Eleye-Datubo (2005) summaries the D-Separation can be distinguished 
from three types of connection: serial, diverging and converging. Each connection has 
its own propagation properties as follows: 
-83- 
Ch. 4: The method for qualitative and quantitative analysis 
Figure 4-14 Serial, diverging and converging connections to a node C on a path 
(from Eleye-Datubo, 2005) 
9 In a serial (head-to-tail) connection (i. e., BIC4A), any evidence entered at 
node A or node B can be transmitted along the directed or undirected path 
respectively (as in Figure 4-14 (a)(i)) providing that no intermediate node C on 
the path is instantiated (which thereby blocks further transmission by D- 
separation as in Figure 4-14(a)(ii)). 
" In a converging (head-to-head) connection (i. e., B -IC FA), entering evidence at 
node B will update node C but will have no effect on node A (Figure 4-14 (b)(i)). 
Evidence can only be transmitted between parents (i. e. nodes A and B) when the 
child (converging) node C has received some evidence (See Figure 4-14(b)(ii)). 
" In a diverging (tail-to-tail) connection (i. e., B E-C-IA), evidence can be 
transmitted between child nodes (i. e. nodes A and B) of the same parent (i. e., 
node C) providing that the parent is not instantiated (Figure 4-14 (c)(i)). 
-84- 
Ch. 4: The method for qualitative and quantitative analysis 
Otherwise, nodes A and B are conditionally independent (i. e., due to D- 
separation) given evidence at node C (Figure 4-14(c)(ii)). 
In the following example, the special case of belief updating called "Evidence" is 
applied, in which according to the information obtained, some particular nodes can only 
be one of the states stood (Jensen, 2001). For illustration, the MCS2 of the repeated 
Basic Event case, which is the example shown in Figure 4-13 in section 4.5.5, is utilised 
as the example. During the examination, the event D2 is assumed to occur (i. e. its 
likelihood is set as 100%) with evidence supported (see the right hand side of Figure 4- 
15). Consequently, the likelihood values of Node MCS2 and Node B arc both increased 
10 threes as they were before. However, the Node E2 and Node C are not influenced 
because of the converging D-Separation of Node MCS2. This means that the 
propagation information is not transmitted to Nodes E2 and C' through , ti1CS2. The 
outcome can be interpreted as event B being believed to have happened and the A1( 'S2 
increasing the likelihood from I% to 10% due to the "evidence" showing that factor D2 
happens. For quick referencing, the Conditional Probability 'Tables for Node D2 and 
Node MCS2 are shown on the left hand side of the figure. They are the same as the data 
shown in Figure 4-13 and will be utilised in the illustration of propagation calculation 
regarding Nodes MCS2 and B. 
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The propagation and marginalisation details for P(MCS21) , which represents the 
unconditional probability of the state "occur" of Node MCS2 under the condition that 
Node D2 has been updated by "evidence", are shown in Equation (4.10). The 
computation just simply applies Equation (4.7) to update its likelihood. However, the 
probability data with regard to Node D2 no longer applies from the Conditional 
Probability Table for the calculation, but from the "evidence" instead. In this example, 
the P(D21) and P(D22) are replaced by 100% and 0% respectively. To keep the 
calculation details short, only one of the states (i. e. the state of "occur") is illustrated. 
Since there are only two states within Node MCS2 and there is l's complement 
relationship between them, the likelihood of the other state of the node (i. e. state "not") 
can be obtained by simply subtracting the likelihood of the state "occur" by one (i. e. 
1-P(MCS21)). 
i=2 
j=2 
P(MCS21) _ P(MCS211 D21, E2, ) x P(D2, )P(E2j) (4.10) 
r=t j=t 
=(lxlx0.1)+(0xlx0.9)+(0x0x0.1)+(0x0x0.9) 
= 0.1+0+0+0 
= 0.1 
In contrast to Node MCS2, the propagation details for Node B is more complicate 
since Node B is the predecessor of Node D2. This is because now Node B turns out to 
be the influenced node of Node D2, rather than the influencing node as it was, `due to 
the "evidence" updating of Node D2. This introduces a small difficulty for carrying out 
the marginalisation of P(B1) because there is no immediate data for P(B1 D21) and 
P(B1 I D22) in the Conditional Probability Tables. Therefore Bayes' Rule/Theorem (see 
Equation (4.6)) is applied to obtain the answer of P(B1 I D2, ) with the data of 
P(D21 I B, ) (i. e. the data depicted in the Conditional Probability Tables) and the 
marginalised P(D21) before updating. It supposes to apply the same process to obtain 
the answer for P(B1 I D2, ). However, since the updated P(D22) is zero, no matter 
what value the P(B1 I D22) is, the answer of P(B1 I D22)P(D22) is always zero. Hence, 
the calculation for P(B1 I D22) can be omitted. Therefore, the updated P(B1) is 
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acquired via the calculation shown in Equation (4.11). For P(MCS22) , the updated 
P(B2) is also achievable via subtracting the acquired P(B1) from one as the short cut. 
1-2 
P(B1)P(B1 ID2, )xP(D2, )=P(B1I D21)P(D21)+P(B, I D22)P(D22) 
P(B1 I D21) = P(D21 I Bt)P(B1) / P(D21) = 
(1 x 0.1)/ 0.1=1 
P(B1 I D22) = P(D22 I Bl)P(B, )/P(D22) 
(4.11) 
P(D21) =1 & P(D22) =0 
P(B1)=(P(B, 1 D21)x1)+(P(B, ID22)x0)=(1x1)+(0x0)=1 
By applying the propagation function of the Bayesian Network model, the analyst 
is not only able to determine which countermeasures can effectively reduce the 
likelihood of the accident, but also more confident to say which factors take the 
significant role in causing the accident to happen. It also means that the Bayesian 
Network model would be a convenient tool for the accident investigation authorities to 
objectively conclude the critical Causal Factors as well as the effective countermeasures 
of the accident. This is because the Bayesian Network models can offer a 
comprehensive view for the analyst to score all the Causal Factors involved not only 
qualitatively but also quantitatively. In the next section, the validation of the Bayesian 
Network model will be the topic to be addressed. It is of vital importance for the 
correctness of the analysis results. 
4.6 The Sensitivity Analysis (SA) over a Bayesian Network model 
"Sensitivity Analysis is the study of how the uncertainty in the output of a model 
(numerical or otherwise) can be apportioned to different sources of uncertainty in the 
model input. The Sensitivity Analysis is hence considered by some as a prerequisite for 
model building in any setting, and in any field where the model is used" (Saltelli, 2002). 
It implies that the Sensitivity Analysis can be utilised to determine how "sensitive" a 
model is to the change in the value of the parameters and to the change in the structure 
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of the model. Since the structure of the Bayesian Network model (i. e. the qualitative 
analysis results) is established through a systematic procedure, the Sensitivity Analysis 
applied within this proposed method will only focus on two issues: (1) validating the 
Conditional Probability Tables data and (2) finding the critical factors of the model. 
This study will only address these two issues, further applications might be revealed in 
the future. 
It is believed that validating the model and finding the critical factors of a Bayesian 
Network model are imperative for the correctness of the analysis conclusions. In order 
to achieve these two goals, the technique applied is called Parameters Sensitivity 
examination, which is one of the applications of Sensitivity Analysis. In the 
examination, a series of parameters and values of the parameters are tested in order to 
appreciate the behaviour of the model which is changed due to the change of the 
parameters (Breierova and Choudhari, 1996). By showing how the model's behaviour 
responses to the change of the parameters value, Sensitivity Analysis is therefore 
applied, as the principle, to fulfil these two goals by evaluating the variations of the 
Bayesian Network model. Although the principle is the same, the procedures for 
achieving these two goals are different. Validating the model focuses on whether the 
outcomes of the entire model are in accord with the reality whilst finding the critical 
factors concentrates on the behaviours of individual nodes. Both of them have to resort 
to the mechanism of propagation of Bayesian Network in order to carry out the 
examination. Therefore, a Bayesian Network software, Netica (2008), was utilised to 
perform the computation and the propagation of the model. 
4.6.1 The validation of the Bayesian Network model 
Once a Bayesian Network model has been constructed by following the procedure 
described in the preceding sections, the correctness of the model becomes an imminent 
issue and has to be ensured before further progressing. That is, the validation of the 
Bayesian Network model is imperative and has to be made before the model is further 
used for the official accident analysis. As stated earlier, this process can resort to the 
technique of Parameter Sensitivity examination. By choosing some significant Causal 
Factors identified in the accident, variant probability values are given to the 
corresponding nodes in the Bayesian Network model as the "updated belief' ' to trigger 
the propagation of the model. Each time only one Causal Factor is selected and the 
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inputted value is changed from 0% to 100% step by step, for example 10% as the 
interval of the steps. Then the outcomes of the Bayesian Network model are changed 
accordingly and will be observed thoroughly. That is, the likelihoods for each node of 
the model will be updated according to the dependencies through the propagation 
function when the testing probability value is given to the selected node(s). The results 
of those Minimal Cut Sets (i. e. the proxies of the Top Event) are then recorded as the 
outputted data of the model. This examination process will be imposed to every selected 
factor, one by one, until all the selected factors have been tested thoroughly. Please note 
that each Causal Factor may be represented by more than one node in the Minimal Cut 
Set model. Therefore all the nodes in association with that particular factor have to be 
given the "updated belief' at the same time. If the Minimal Cut Set model is employed, 
the updated belief of the Top Event is acquired via the Minimal Cut Set upper bound 
formula (see Equation (4.2) in section 4.4.3) with those outcomes. This procedure is 
summarised as follows. 
1. Update the belief of the node(s) which represent one particular Causal Factor 
from 0% to 100% step by step, for example 10% as the interval of the steps. 
2. Record the updated result of Top Event as the output of the model or compute 
the updated result of those Minimal Cut Sets through Equation (4.2) to 
acquire the answer. 
3. Iterate previous steps until all the selected Causal Factors have been examined 
thoroughly. 
Having accomplished this process to all the selected Causal Factors, the figures 
with regard to the likelihood of the Top Event against those "updated belief' to each 
Causal Factor are acquired (see Figure 5-10 as an example). From those figures, the 
tendency of each selected Causal Factor can be revealed and compared. With the help of 
those figures, several requirements can be examined as the criterion. They are: 
1. These tendencies should be in line with the reality of the accidents. This is, 
the worse the negative behaviour of the factors, the higher the likelihood of 
the accident. 
2. The curves which are converted from those figures should converge to a small 
area, on the positive behaviour side, as the trend. This phenomenon is derived 
from the notion of Woo that if any one of the holes to line up the window has 
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been shut, the WoO no longer exists. That is, no matter which hole has been 
shut, the window should be closed. 
3. As long as all the Causal Factors have been set with the most adverse figures, 
the likelihood of the Top Event should reach the maximum figure. This is also 
rational correspondence to the reality. Since these selected Causal Factors 
were identified as the causes of the accident, the accident should happen 
whilst all the Causal Factors occur. 
A proper validation process can help the analyst to highlight the inadvertent error(s) 
of the Bayesian Network model. From the point of view of practicability, the proposed 
validation process is reasonable and achievable for being part of the method. Although 
the proposed validation process is sound for the purpose of the method, a further 
comprehensive validation method to improve the process may be considered in the 
future. 
4.6.2 Finding the critical Causal Factors of the accident 
Having validated a Bayesian Network model, finding the critical factors of the 
model is the aim of the next step. Yang (2006) suggests that, in a Bayesian Network, it 
is possible to differentiate the importance of the input nodes in terms of the individual 
safety contribution to the output variable by giving the same variation of input 
probabilities and comparing their influence magnitudes on the output node(s). A study 
also points out that a node (or parameter) whose specific value(s) can significantly 
influence the outcome of the model is identified as the critical factor, which greatly 
changes the system's behaviour with the change of the node's value (Breierova and 
Choudhari, 1996). They recommend that "A good sensitivity analysis should conduct 
analyses over the full range of plausible values of key parameters and their interactions, 
to assess how impacts change in response to changes in key parameters". Therefore, the 
proposed process to find out the critical Causal Factors of the accident is performed by 
examining all the nodes in the Bayesian Network model with full range of plausible 
values for each node. These values are deemed as the "updated belief' of the nodes to 
trigger the propagation of the model and compare their influence magnitude to the 
output node(s). This must be done systematically and thoroughly for ensuring that none 
of the nodes will be overlooked. Apparently, it would be time consuming and error 
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prone if this process is carried out manually. Fortunately, this requirement can be 
achieved easily through a built-in function of the utilised Bayesian Network software - 
Netica (2008). The explanation of the functionalities provided for sensitivity. finding is 
described in Appendix-C. 
Before executing this function via the software, a target node has to be assigned. 
After appointing one of the nodes representing the Minimal Cut Sets as the target node 
for the finding process, the software examines the sensitivity regarding the target node 
for every node in the model, one by one, step by step. A text report is provided at the 
end of the execution as the results. The report is divided into two parts; the details for 
individual node are in the first part and the comparison data is in the second part. The 
first part of the report provides detailed information associated with a "finding node", 
whilst the second part of the report provides a summary list of the sensitivities for each 
node. The second part of the report also shows the ranking of the "`finding nodes" listed, 
from high to low, according to the sensitivities results. By having the report, it is helpful 
for the analyst to identify which Causal Factors are more sensitive (or crucial) to one of 
the WoOs (i. e. the Minimal Cut Sets) of the accident. After applying this process to all 
the WoOs of the accident, one by one, and analysing these reports, it is now easier for 
the investigators to objectively identify which factors are crucial with a comprehensive 
picture. With these identified crucial factors, it would he helpful fier the investigation 
authorities to objectively conclude the comments and the recommendations in the 
investigation reports. It is recommended that this process should he executed before any 
recommendation of the countermeasures has been made. The countermeasures issue 
which is considered as the Risk Control Options will be discussed in the next sections. 
4.7 Influence Diagrams (ID) for Risk Control Option (RCO) 
Fact Finding WBG Constructing Backtracking 
Information 11m'ma1 61 
or evidence 
--Om- Facts-* Factors Cut Sets-Oo- Cut Sets--*. mudelýý model--11' 
N'B: 1 K-CPT & K-map lIll Constructing 
An Influence Diagrams is a graphical framework for representation and analysis of 
(Bayesian) decision making under uncertainty. It can solve "a decision problem 
amounts to (i) determining an optimal strategy that maximises the expected utility for 
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the decision maker and (ii) computing the Maximal Expected Utility of adhering to this 
strategy (Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008)". In addition, Jensen (2001) articulates a 
definition as that an Influence Diagrams consists of a Directed Acyclic Graph over 
chance nodes, decision nodes and utility nodes with the following structural properties: 
  there is a directed path comprising all decision nodes; 
  the utility nodes have no children. 
For the quantitative specification, we require that: 
  the decision nodes and the chance nodes have a finite set of mutually 
exclusive state; 
  the utility nodes have no states; 
  to each chance node A is attached a Conditional Probability Table P(AIpa(A)); 
  to each utility node U is attached a real-valued function over pa(t). 
From the view of the decision makers, the countermeasures against a particular 
type of accident may be seen as a decision problem. In the thought of cost-benefit, it 
would be improper if one only considers the likelihood of the occurrence without taking 
into account the cost and the payoffs of the countermeasures. A previous study (Eleye- 
Datubo, 2005) has shown that the Maximal Expected Utility of Influence Diagrams can 
be applied as the tools to evaluate the cost-benefit issue for safety-based marine and 
offshore decision making. In that study, the utility figures are relative to Implied Cost of 
Averting Fatality (IACF), which is a typical approach used in the offshore industry 
(Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). Instead of IACF, the study assumes that the same 
technique (i. e. the Maximal Expected Utility) can be utilised to analyse the accident for 
all the possible countermeasures considering the cost-benefit issue. Hence, the proposed 
methodology treats these countermeasures as the Risk Control Options incorporating 
into the Influence Diagrams model of accidents in order to obtain the Maximal 
Expected Utility of the countermeasures. The Maximal Expected Utility considers the 
likelihood of the occurrence as well as the cost and payoff of the countermeasures at the 
same time. The Influence Diagrams model is expanded from the established Bayesian 
Network model of the accident. In other words, the Bayesian Network model is the 
foundation of the Influence Diagrams model, in which the analysed results of the 
accident clarified in the preceding processes are the basis. Hence, the Influence 
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Diagrams model is eligible to be considered as a dedicated model which corresponds to 
the reality of the accident. Having established this model, it would be beneficial for the 
decision makers to assess all the available countermeasures, considering the cost-benefit 
issue, in order to choose the best solution to prevent the (or similar) type of accident 
from happening again. 
A concise summary regarding Influence Diagrams, Expected Utility and Maximal 
Expected Utility is given as follows. 
Influence Diagrams: 
"An influence diagram is a compact representation of a joint expected utility 
function" (Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008). In order to provide decision-making 
capabilities, a Bayesian Network can be expanded with utility functions and with 
variables representing decisions to form an Influence Diagrams. That is, 
"Influence Diagrams" = "Bayesian Network" + (decisions & utilities} 
Besides, a utility table U(D, S) depicting the utility for each configuration of 
decision alternative, d, d r= D, and outcome states, S, for the determining 
variable has to be yielded in order to assess the decision alternatives in D. 
Expected Utility: 
The Expected Utility (EU) of a given decision alternative d is: 
EU(d)=j: P(SI d)U(d, S) 
s 
where U(d, S) are the utility function of (d, S) encoded in the utility table of node 
U. The conditional probability P(SId) represents the belief in S given that d is 
performed (Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008). 
Maximum Expected Utility (MEU): 
A rational decision-maker should choose an action that maximises expected 
utility of outcome states. Thus, given that dl, d2,..., dk are the mutually exclusive 
decision alternatives of D, the decision alternative d that gives MEU is: 
(4.12) 
MEU(d) = mdx(EU(d, ), EU(d2),.... EU(dk)} (4.13) 
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Evaluation of the Influence Diagrams can be done by setting the decision node to 
a particular choice of action (i. e., the best RCO) and treating the node just as a 
nature node with a known value that can further influence the values of other 
nodes (Eleye-Datubo, 2005). 
In Influence Diagrams, the Decision nodes (usually drawn as rectangles or squares) 
represent the decision alternatives which are available to the decision makers. The 
nodes include a specification of the available decision options (i. e. choices). Edges into 
decision nodes indicate time precedence: an edge from a random variable to a decision 
variable indicates that the value of the random variable is known then the decision will 
be taken. By the same token, an edge from one decision variable to another decision 
node indicates the chronological order of the corresponding decisions. In contrast, the 
Utility nodes (normally drawn as diamond-shaped or hexagons) represent the figure of 
merit for a decision alternative. Each utility node has utility functions associating each 
utility with each states of its parents (Utility nodes do not have children). The 
probabilities of the nodes involved in the model are influenced by the decisions taken. 
Therefore the expected utility for each decision alternative can be computed accordingly 
(the global utility function is the sum of all the local utility functions) (see Equation 
(4.12)). The alternative with the highest expected utility is chosen; this is known as the 
Maximum Expected Utility principle shown in Equation (4.13) (Eleye-Datubo, 2005). 
4.7.1 Applying Influence Diagrams for selecting the Risk Control Option 
Fact Finding WBG Constructing Backtracking Countcrmeasurc(%) 
Information--ý 
Facts--* Factors--4 Cut Scts-ý 
V1ýmmalf B\º Ip 
nr evidence Cul Sets_ model. 
_ 
mudcl_f 
R('Ot 
WBA K-CPT & K-map III) Constructing 
An instance of Influence Diagrams which has considered the occurrence likelihood 
of analysed accident as well as the cost and payoff of countermeasures is proposed and 
shown in Figure 4-16. It does not mean that this is the only solution to implement this 
notion, instead other implementations are still possible. In other words, it is an example 
to show how Influence Diagrams to cope with the cost-benefit issue for decision makers 
in order to choose the most efficient countermeasure against the accident. In the 
following paragraphs, the proposed solution is depicted with the calculation details. 
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Figure 4-16 The example of Influence Diagrams for Risk Control Option selection 
An Influence Diagram can be obtained by expanding the Bayesian Network model 
of an accident, in which one Decision node (labelled as R('O) and one Utility node 
(labelled as the Cost) are added into the established Bayesian Network model. In 
addition, for each Minimal Cut Set of the accident, which is represented by a Chance 
node (labelled as the MC'S#; # EE N), an extra Chance node (labelled as the M('S#N) is 
attached with a Utility node (labelled as the Payoff) followed (see Figure 4-16 for the 
illustration). Node RCO denotes the available countermeasures for decision making. 
Node Cost specifies the costs for each Risk Control Option, and the number of utility 
function of the node depends on the state number that Node R('O has (i. e. the numbers 
of the alternative). Node MCSi#N represents the posterior status of the occurrence 
subject to the conditions of its parent nodes given (i. e. Nodes MCS)l and WO). The 
number of the states of Node MCS#N is decided by the states of Node A! C, 5'4. The 
Conditional Probability Table of Node MCS#N denotes the conditional probability 
regarding the effectiveness of the countermeasure. It is the prediction of the likelihood 
of the Top Event (or Minimal Cut Sets) if the Risk Control Options are imposed. The 
symbol "#" represents one digit of natural (or counting) number (i. e. #EN). For 
example, MCSI or MCS1N is instantiated if # is "1". Node Payoff, which has the same 
number of utility functions as the state number that its parent node has (i. e. Node 
MCS#N), specifies the benefits which can be acquired if one of the states of Node 
MCS#N occurs. For calculating the expected utility, Fquation (4.14) is applied. lach 
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alternative of the decision is calculated with the corresponding data of the nodes 
specified in the tables to obtain the answers of Risk Control Options one by one. 
EU(RCO) = U(Cost) +E P(MCS# NI MCS#, RCO) x U(Payoff) (4.14) 
For further illustration, the Directed Acyclic Graph of the proposed Influence 
Diagrams is shown on the right hand side of Figure 4-16. On the left hand side, the 
tables encoding these nodes are revealed. In this example, the decision node (i. e. Node 
RCO) has two alternatives: di and d2. If a decision is made based on d1, then the 
expected utility is quantified via EU(dj), which is shown in the first part of Equation 
(4.15). If a decision is based on d2, EU(d2) is applied, which is shown in the second part 
of the equation. 
EU (d, ) = U, (d, ) 
+P(s, )x[P(ni Isl, dl)UP(ni)+P(n2Isl, di)UP(n2)] 
+P(s2)x[P(n, I s2, d, )UP(n, )+P(n2 I s2, di)UP(n2)] (4.15) 
EU(d2)= U, (d2) 
+P(sl)x[P(nl I s1, d2)Up(ni)+P(n2 l sl, d2)Up(nz)] 
+P(s2)x[P(ni Ise, d2)Up(nl)+P(n2Is2, d2)Up(n2)] 
When the values of the expected utilities (i. e. EU(di) and EU(d2)) are acquired, the 
decision alternative d that provides the Maximal Expected Utility is given by: 
NEU(d) = max{EU(dl), EU(d2)} 
Theoretically, the Influence Diagrams model cannot only perform the Maximum 
Expected Utility functionality, but also execute the "what if' ' propagation testing since it 
is derived from Bayesian Network. This feature provides an extraordinary merit when 
Influence Diagrams are applied as the tool for assessing the best Risk Control Option. 
This is because this application can offer the decision makers a wider flexibility to 
examine the effectiveness of the countermeasures by testing variant conditions of the 
circumstances. Moreover, it also adheres to the accident analysis results and the cost- 
benefit consideration as a whole. A more comprehensive example which applies the 
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proposed Influence Diagrams pattern to deal with the assessment of Risk Control 
Options for Herald of Free Enterprise case is shown in section 5.7. In that case study, 
the proposed pattern is used to construct the Influence Diagrams model which is based 
on the qualitative and quantitative analysis results of the accident. In that section, the 
calculation details are also illustrated in order to appreciate the underlying computation 
of the process. 
4.8 Discussion 
The hypothesis of the proposed methodology implementing the Wo0 of Reason's 
Swiss Cheese Model via the Minimal Cut Set of FTA is inspired by the similarity of the 
definitions between the WoO and the Minimal Cut Set. Having this notion as the 
principle of the method, the gathered information or evidence of an accident during 
investigation stage are transformed into the listed facts, the Causal Factors, the Cut Sets, 
and then the Minimal Cut Sets in turn to acquire the qualitative analysis results. 
Subsequently the quantitative analysis results are obtained through the corresponding 
Bayesian Network model which is constructed according to the qualitative analysis 
results. Furthermore the Influence Diagrams model extending from the Bayesian 
Network model provides a cost-benefit analysis tool, in light of the analysis results, for 
the decision makers to select the best Risk Control Option. The entire relay-like 
procedure of the methodology adheres to the Swiss Cheese Model with several sound 
risk assessment techniques, as a whole, to achieve the goal of analysing an accident 
qualitatively , 
and quantitatively. In addition, having established the Bayesian Network 
and/or Influence Diagrams model of the accident, a dedicated simulator of the accident 
is available, with the feature of propagation of Bayesian Network, to perform a series of 
"what if' examinations, which offers an opportunity to objectively appreciate the 
influences that have effect on all the factors involved in the accident. In summary, from 
the perspective of data processing, the progress of the analysis procedure which is 
shown in Figure 1-3, and in several corresponding sections, is illustrated in Figure 4-17 
again. In the figure, the main stream is the evolution of the analytic data whilst the 
rectangles depict the relevant processes applied. 
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Figure 4-17 The data processing of the method 
Predictably, this method can be utilised not only for the accident analysis but also 
for the preliminary assessment on safety case at other social-tech applications if the 
proper mathematic models of the topics are not in place. The features of the proposed 
methodology are briefly listed as follows. 
 A systematic procedure to sort out the Minimal Cut Sets of the occurrences, as 
the qualitative analysis results, is in line with the WoO of Reason's Swiss 
Cheese Model. 
  Both the qualitative and quantitative analysis results of the occurrences can 
simultaneously be shown on a Bayesian Network model as well as an Influence 
Diagrams model. 
  The Bayesian Network model established according to the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis results can be seen as a dedicated simulator of' the 
occurrences to perform a series of what if examination. 
  An Influence Diagrams model based on the established Bayesian Network 
model of the occurrence is a useful tool for decision makers to evaluate the best 
Risk Control Option, whilst considering the cost-benefit issue, amongst variant 
available countermeasures. 
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Chapter Five - 
Case Study Using the Proposed Method: 
Herald of Free Enterprise 
Summary 
In this chapter, the tragedy of Herald of Free Enterprise (HoFE) is used as a case 
study to demonstrate the proposed method for identifying the Causal Factors involved 
in the accident and analysing the causation. This occurred on 6th March 1987 soon after 
leaving the harbour at Zeebrugge, Belgium The techniques applied by the method in 
analysing an accident qualitatively and quantitatively have been explicitly introduced in 
Chapter 4. They are: Why-Because Analysis (WBA), Karnaugh map (K-map), Fault 
Tree, Analysis (FTA), Bayesian Network and Influence Diagrams. The method also 
utilises the Sensitivity Analysis to validate the analysed outcomes and to find out the 
critical Causal Factors of the accident. In this chapter, the entire relay-like procedure is 
performed, with these techniques, onto the HoFE case in order to provide a thorough 
overview of the analysis method. In the final stage of the procedure, the analysed results 
of the case study is further extended into an Influence Diagrams model, and the 
Expected Utility of Influence Diagrams is used to evaluate several possible Risk 
Control Options (RCOs) in order to demonstrate the way of finding the best 
countermeasure with the consideration of cost-benefit. 
5.1 Introduction to the analysis 
As noted previously, the first intention of the analysis is to clarify the Causal 
Factors of an accident and the causation amongst them. Thus, the factors involved in 
the accident have to be identified in advance. Therefore the aim of the first process is to 
identify all the Causal Factors involved in the accident basing on the information or 
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evidence gathered during the investigation stage. Then, as stated in section 5.2.2, the 
Causal Factors for each Intermediate/Top Event and the causations amongst them are 
identified in turn. Next, the overall Why-Because (or Cause-Consequence) relationship 
amongst these Causal Factors will be depicted in a Why-Because Graph (WBG), 
according to the analysis outcome of WBA (section 5.2.3). However, this is not 
necessarily the final result of qualitative analysis since the analysed results might 
contain some irrelevant or redundant Causal Factors. In section 5.3, these Causal 
Factors (or Cut Set) are further clarified in order to obtain the Minimal Cut Set(s) for 
each Intermediate Event through the approximate simplification process (section 5.3.1). 
Hence, the Minimal Cut Set(s) of the accident are able to be obtained by using the Fault 
Tree Analysis techniques (section 5.4). The entire qualitative analysis can be achieved 
at this stage. 
For quantitative analysis of an accident, a Bayesian Network technique is mainly 
utilised (section 5.5). A Bayesian Network model of Top Event can be obtained by 
transforming the established Why-Because Graph into a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) 
with the associated Conditional Probability Tables (section 5.3.2). The DAG of the 
Minimal Cut Set model is constructed by resorting to the proposed backtracking process 
(section 5.5.1), in which the simplified Minimal Cut Set equations acquired from the 
preceding approximate simplification process are the blueprint. In conjunction with the 
associated Conditional Probability Tables (section 5.5.4), the Bayesian Network model 
of Minimal Cut Sets of the accident can be established accordingly. In terms of 
validation, the Sensitivity Analysis is applied to ensure that the quantitative analysis 
results are rational (section 5.6). Finally, in section 5.7, the Influence Diagrams 
technique is utilised as the means to evaluate the possible Risk Control Options (i. e. the 
countermeasures to prevent reoccurrence) from the cost-benefit viewpoint. 
The entire analysis procedure mainly relies on the gathered information and 
evidence collected during the investigation period. Subject expertise is also used, from 
time to time, to compensate the deficiency of the data, especially in the processes of 
WBA, approximate simplification, Conditional Probability Table of Bayesian Network 
and Influence Diagrams. Some assumptions on the data used for analysing the HoFE 
tragedy have been made by the author in order that the proposed methodology can be 
demonstrated. 
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5.2 Why-Because Analysis (WBA) for identifying the Cut Sets 
The technique applied for identifying the Causal Factors and Cut Sets that involve 
in an accident is primarily the WBA, but the order and the number of the processes 
applied in the proposed method are different from the original WBA. This is because 
some of the mechanisms the WBA provides can be substituted by the other processes 
proposed in the method. For instance, the "quality assurance process" of WBA is 
substituted by the proposed Sensitivity Analysis technique depicted in section 5.6. 
Therefore, the processes which involve WBA are limited in identifying the Causal 
Factors for each Intermediate/Top Event and constructing the Why-Because Graph. In 
the end of the WBA process, a list of Causal Factors is produced as one of the data pool 
for the subsequent analysing processes. It should be noted that the WBA is highly 
dependent upon the subject expertises during the analysis. A brief description of WBA 
applied in the proposed method is covered in section 4.2. 
5.2.1 Gathering information and determining the facts of the accident 
In general, the gathered information with regard to an accident is mainly collected 
and organised during the investigation stage. The guidelines proposed by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) for the investigation into marine accidents 
are enumerated in section 4.2.1 where the codes, resolutions and circulars adopted by 
the IMO are tabulated, and these have to be considered ensuring the correctness and 
thoroughness of the data when an investigation is carried out. In order to focus on the 
application of the method, the case study does not consider this issue. Instead, it is 
assumed that the information gathered in this chapter is correct and sufficient. 
All the identified facts or events listed in the following paragraph are extracted 
from the accident investigation report (DoT, 1987), which is available from Marine 
Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) website (httl2: //www. maib. lov. uk). v. uk). In addition, 
a video documentary from the National Geographic Channel (Seconds from Disaster - 
Capsized in the North Sea, which is available form YouTube website (NGC, 2008)) is 
also utilised. They are the major data sources used for demonstrating this analysis 
example. Facts extracted from these data sources are then transformed into a collection 
of listed statements and become the major data pool for identifying the Causal Factors 
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in the analysis. For referencing purposes, a short description in parentheses, as the 
notation of the "(source index)", at the end of each listed statement denotes which part 
of the DoT report the statements are derived from. For example the "(10.1; pp. 8)", in 
the second listed statement below, denotes that the statement is extracted from section 
10.1 on page 8 of the DoT report. 
These listed statements are enumerated as follows. The mechanism to perform the 
facts finding process is indicated in section 4.2.2. 
1. The chief officer relieved the 2nd officer from the duty of loading officer and then 
he left the bow door area without ensuring that the assistant bosun was present 
(10.5-10.8; pp. 8-9). 
2. The assistant bosun failed to carry out his duty to close the bow doors at the time 
(10.1; pp. 8). 
3. The master ordered a ship speed of 18 knots (9.2; pp. 7). 
4. A large quantity of water entered G deck and caused an initial lurch to port due to 
free surface instability - reached 30° (9.3; pp. 7). 
5. The Court was satisfied that at departure the HERALD had a mean draught of 
between 5.68 m and 5.85 m with a trim by the head about 0.8m (8.5; pp. 6). 
6. The ship was in fact overloaded significantly at departure (8.5; pp. 6). 
7. The ship was trimmed by the head in order to load E deck (8.1; pp. 5). 
8. The Court identified a need for more information about the weight cargo actually 
loaded and the desirability of fitting draught indicator (8.5; pp. 7). 
9. It was necessary to trim the ship by the head to allow the raised ramp to reach E 
deck (7.3; pp. 5). 
10. The ballast system could fill or empty No. 14 ballast tank at a rate of 115-120 tones 
per hours (7.3; pp. 5) (meaning that it would take at least 2 hrs to fill or empty the 
tank). 
11. The company employed a Master and two deck officers on this run (7.2; pp. 5). 
12. Frequently the order "harbour station" was given before loading was completed 
(11.1; pp. 10) (indicating pressure to leave the berth). 
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13. The lack of time available at Dover to handle both discharge and loading together 
with storing, was often mitigated by an early sailing from Zeebrugge in the 
previous voyage (11.3; pp. 11). 
14. "Master came to rely upon the absence of any report at the time of sailing as 
satisfying them that their ship was ready for sea in all respects. That was, of 
course, a very dangerous assumption" (12.3; pp. 12). This was encouraged by the 
standing order 01.09 specifying that "In the absence of such report the Master will 
assume, at the due sailing time, that the vessel is ready for sea in all respects" 
(12.3; pp. 12). 
15. Before this disaster there had been no less 5 occasions when one of the company's 
ship had proceeded to sea with bow or stern door open ... the management had not 
drawn them to the attraction of the other Masters (12.5; pp. 12). 
16. The fact that ... Captain Lewry 
had a personal responsibility for taking his ship to 
sea in an unsafe condition.. . he was seriously negligent in the discharge of his 
duties. The negligence was one of the causes contributing to the casualty (12.6; 
pp. 13). 
17. Senior Master Captain Kirby adopted a set of General Instructions issued by 
Captain Martin in July 1984. "2. The officer loading the main vehicle deck, G 
deck, to ensure that the water tight and bow/stem doors are secured when leaving 
port. " (13.2; pp. 14). He was content to accept without demur the Ship's Standing 
Orders issued by the company... If he had read the orders he would certainly have 
appreciated their defects ... Captain Kirby must bear his share of the responsibility 
for the disaster (13.3; pp. 14). 
18. The failure on the part of shore management to give proper and clear directions 
was a contributory cause to the disaster (14.1; pp. 14). 
19. It was the failure to give clear order about the duties of the Officers on the 
Zeebrugge run which contributed so greatly to the cause of this disaster (14.2; 
pp. 15). 
20. The worst features of the Standing Orders were that (1) they made no reference to 
closing the bow and stem doors, and (2) they appear to have led Captain Lewry to 
assume that his ship was ready for sea in all respects merely because he had had no 
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report to the contrary (15.3; pp. 16). 
21. There is no indication on the bridge as to whether the most important watertight 
doors are closed or not.... Indicator lights on the very excellent mimic panel could 
enable the bridge to monitor the situation in such circumstances (A memorandum 
issued by Captain Blowers on 28th June 1985) (18.4; pp. 23). 
22. The matter was raised again on 17th May 1986, a memorandum issued by Captain 
Kirby and Captain de Ste Croix, suggested that "17. Bow and stern doors. 
Open/Closed indication to be duplicated on bridge" (18.6; pp. 24). But on the 21st 
October 1986, Mr Alcindor replied "... the Bridge indication is a `no go"' (18.7; 
pp. 25). 
23. Captain Lewry told the Court ... that no attempt had been made to read the draught 
of his ship on a regular basis... Fictitious figures were entered in the Official Log 
which took no account of the trimming water ballast (19.2; pp. 26). 
24. The ship was operating outside her conditions as set out in (and, was therefore not 
complying with) the conditions under which the Passenger Ship Certificate was 
issued (19.3; pp. 26). 
25. Mr. Develin, a director of the Company and former "Chief Marine 
Superintendent", did not appreciate that the stability of the HERALD could be 
significantly affected if the ship was trimmed by the head (19.2; pp. 26). Mr. 
Develin ought to have been alert to the serious effects of operating at large trims. 
Furthermore he should have been concerned about Captain Martin's remarks about 
stability in a memorandum sent on 24th October 1983 (19.3; pp. 26). 
26. Mr. Ayers, who was at the relevant time a director of the Company, told the Court 
that in his view it was impossible for the officers to read the draught mark of the 
HERALD (19.5; pp. 27). 
27. Normal ballasting requirements are for Nos. 1 and 14 tanks ... to be filled for 
arrival Zeebrugge and emptied upon completion of loading ... Using one pump the 
time to either fill or empty the two tanks is approximately lhr. 55mins. Using two 
pumps ... can be reduced to approximately lhr. 30mins (20; pp. 29). 
28. Mr. Develin did not agree with the need for a high capacity ballast pump (20; 
pp. 29). An estimate was obtained for the installation of a pump at a cost of 
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£25,000. This cost was regarded by the Company as prohibitive (20; pp. 30). 
29. The "Marine Department' did not listen to the complaints or suggestions of their 
Masters. Those areas were: (a) complaints that ship proceeded to sea carrying 
passengers in excess of the permitted number. (b) The suggestion to have lights 
fitted on the bridge to indicate whether the bow and stern doors were open or 
closed. (c) Draught marks could not be read. Ships were not provided with 
instruments for reading draughts. At times ships were required to arrive and sail 
from Zeebrugge trimmed by the head, without any relevant stability information. 
(d) The suggestion to have a high capacity ballast pump to deal with the Zeebrugge 
trimming ballast (16.2; pp. 17). 
30. Water in large quantities continued to flood trough the open bow doors aperture 
(9.3; pp. 7). 
5.2.2 Determining the Why-Because subset for each Intermediate/Top Event 
Once all the information and evidence with respect to the accident are listed and 
organised as statements one by one, the causality among them becomes the most 
important issue in order to find out the answer of how and why the accident happened. 
Therefore, the aim of this process is to identify the Causal Factors as well as to clarify 
the causations between them according to the listed statements described in the 
preceding section. In this section, the Causal Sufficiency Criterion (CSC) of WBA is the 
major tool to transform these listed statements into Causal Factors and to clarify the 
causality among them. For the details of the process, section 4.2.3 is worth visiting. 
Recall the definition of CSC that "between a set of Causal Factors A, ... A,, and a 
consequence event B, it is impossible for B not to have happened if all of Ak; ke [1, N] 
have happened (Paul-Stüve, 2005)". This is similar to the definition of Cut Set of FTA; 
a Cut Set is a collection of Basic Events such that if they all occur the Top Event must 
also occur (Andrews and Moss, 2002). As mentioned before, the similarity between 
these two definitions is the reason why CSC is chosen as the tool to identify the Cut Set 
of Intermediate/Top events. The Cut Set is a set of direct Causal Factors which is 
sufficient to trigger a particular Intermediate/Top Event to occur where Intermediate 
Events are those events between Top Event and Basic Event in the fault tree. The 
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process repeatedly goes through these listed statements with CSC to identify the direct 
Causal Factors relating to each Intermediate Event, one by one, from the top (i. e. Top 
Event) to the bottom (i. e. Basic Event) of the fault tree. In each step, the process only 
concentrates on one particular Intermediate Event in order to find out the sufficient 
direct Causal Factors for that event. Therefore, a Why-Because subset can be set 
accordingly. In the end, once all the Why-Because subsets relating to each Intermediate 
Event have been sorted out, the Why-Because Graph is able to be drawn for further 
analysis in the following steps (see Figure 5-1 below). 
Normally each listed statement should be represented by a Causal Factor in which 
an event symbol (e. g. A or L8) is assigned in the analysis procedure. However, they are 
not necessarily one-to-one relationship although it is preferred. Sometimes, more than 
one Causal Factor refers to a single listed statement (see Figure 5-1 and LoF in section 
5.2.3). Conversely, it is also possible that a single event symbol refers to more than one 
listed statement. For example, in the Why-Because Graph in Figure 5-1, event J shows 
the symbols (10) and (27) meaning that the corresponding facts are listed in statements 
No. 10 and No. 27 in section 5.2.1. 
In this example, the process starts from the Top Event (i. e. the capsizing of Herald 
of Free Enterprise) by examining all the facts organised in the listed statements with the 
criteria (i. e. CSC) to identify all the direct Causal Factors which cause the Top Event to 
happen. In this way, the examination found that the factor "large quantity of water 
entered G deck (specified in sentence (4) of section 5.2.1)" is one of the direct Causal 
Factors that caused the Top Event (i. e. the capsize of the ship) to happen. This Causal 
Factor is hence added and labelled A, and an arrow arc is drawn from factor A to the 
Top Event as shown in Figure 5-1. Meanwhile factor A is also queued for further CSC 
examination. These arrow arcs infer that the direct Causal Factors (i. e. "Because" events) 
are the factors that cause the pointed event (i. e. "Why" event) to happen. In addition to 
Causal Factor A, there are two more Causal Factors existing; they are Causal Factors B 
and C. Causal Factor C is also identified from statement (4) and is defined as "lurch to 
port due to no enough upright GM force against Free Surface Instability (FSI)". 
Nevertheless, under the examination of CSC, factors A and C do not seem to be 
sufficient enough to trigger the Top Event to occur. The justification for including 
Causal Factor B is that, theoretically, a large amount of water inside the ship will not 
definitely cause the Free Surface Instability to occur. Ships can only capsize due to Free 
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Surface Instability when subject to three conditions simultaneously. These are: large 
amount of liquid inside the ship, no anti-FSI devices and the righting GM force of the 
ship is counteracted by excessive rolling. Therefore, a factor B of "No anti-FSI device" 
is justified to be added as the third Causal Factor of the Top Event. This addition is 
supported by a documentary program (Seconds from Disaster - Capsized in the North 
Sea) from National Geographic Channel (NGC, 2008). It is revealed that the absence of 
anti-FSI devices at the time should be accounted as one of the Causal Factors of the 
disaster. Examples of anti-FSI devices on vessels are longitudinal bulkheads (common, 
for example, on oil tankers), fast-draining scuppers or pumps (to remove water from the 
deck), transverse bulkheads/barriers to limit quantity and flow of water entering vessel. 
This examination results in three direct Causal Factors (i. e. factor A, B and C) being 
identified as the lined up holes of a Windows of Opportunity (WoO) in the Swiss 
Cheese Model, and are added into the Why-Because Graph with arrow arcs connecting 
to Top Event as the result. Up to this stage, the first CSC check against the Top Event is 
now accomplished. 
In the next step, factors A, B and C become the Intermediate Events and their direct 
Causal Factors need sorting in turn. Since event A has events D and F as the direct 
Causal Factors (see Figure 5-1), Events D and F are queued for further CSC 
examination. Eventually there is no further CSC examination for event Hl because it is 
assumed that its Causal Factors are out of the scope of the information gathered during 
the investigation or are not concerned in the analysis. Hence HI is treated as a Basic 
Event. That is, the process is iterated until reaching the limit of the information the 
investigation gathered or the boundary the analysis intended. Detailed CSC 
examinations for the rest of Intermediate Events of the accident are not specified further. 
Figure 5-1 contains the entire results. In the graph, the rectangles represent those 
Intermediate Events which are connected (or supported) by their direct Causal Factors 
while the circles denote those Basic Events which are the end of a branch of the fault 
tree. 
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Figure 5-1 The Why-Because Graph of HoFE accident 
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5.2.3 Constructing the Why-Because Graph (WBG) and List of Factors (LoF) 
In this process, as stated in sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5, there are two goals. The first 
goal is to integrate all Why-Because subsets regarding every Intermediate Event 
(including the Top Event). The outcome of the integration is the Why-Because Graph 
(see Figure 5-1 as an example). This graph is built according to the results derived from 
the previous CSC examination, step by step, from the top to the bottom. The second 
goal is to organise a list of Causal Factors which are involved in the accident. At the tail 
of the description for each factor, a number, in parenthesis, indicates where a listed 
statement is derived from. This provides an index for rapid referencing between the 
listed factors and the listed statements. For example, "(4)" at the end of the description 
of factor A shows that factor A is derived from the listed statement No. 4 in section 5.2.1. 
Most of the listed statements have at least one corresponding event in the WGB whilst 
some of the symbols are concluded from two or more listed statements. For example, 
factors A and C are supported by the listed statement No. 4 while factor J is concluded 
from listed statements No. 10 and No. 27. 
The following list is the complete LoF of the HoFE case and can be seen as a quick 
reference of the Causal Factors. It is also a useful auxiliary reference for the following 
processes. 
TE (Top Event): HoFE lurched to port side and capsized due to Free Surface 
Instability (FSI) 
b A: A large quantity of water entered G deck (4) 
B: No Anti-FSI device (bulkhead or scupper) existed 
U C: Insufficient upright GM force against FSI (4) 
D: HoFE Trimmed by head of 0.8m (5) 
b El: Spring tide occurred 
b E2: Deficiency of harbour ramp to load ship in all conditions (7)(9) 
r* E3: Requirement load on E deck (7) (9) 
b F: Bow door left open while sailing (30) 
c G: Poor stability (25) 
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b HI: Ship speed reached 18 Kts (3) 
b H2: No draught indicators were fitted (8) (26) 
b J: Insufficient time to empty the ballast tanks (10) (27) 
K: The captain assumed that his ship was ready for sea (16) (20) 
> Ll: Shore management did not consider anti-FSI was necessary 
b L3: Ship manning was not enough (11) 
b L4: Ship took no account of trimming water ballast (23) 
> L5: The ship was operating outside her approval condition (24) 
U L6: Time pressure for an early sailing from Zeebrugge (13) 
b L7: Senior Master was content with existing Ship's Standing Orders (17) 
* L8: Failures of Shore Management (18) (29) 
b M: The assistant bosun was not present to close the bow door (2) 
b N: HoFE overloaded significantly (6) 
b 0: No high capacity ballast pump was installed (27) (28) 
b P: No indicator of bow door status fitted on the bridge (21) (22) 
Q: Management did not draw door incidents to the other Masters (15) 
> R: Master came to rely upon the absence of any report (14) 
U Si: Regulating Authorities had not addressed FSI 
b T: The Chief Officer left bow door unmanned (1) 
U U: Poor Ship's Standing Order (SSO) to crews (20) 
r* V: Harbour Station (HS) order was given before loading was completed (12) 
U W: Failure to give clear order about the duties (19) 
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5.3 Simplifying the approximate Minimal Cut Sets (MCS) and 
constructing the Bayesian Network model of Top Event 
There are two goals in this process. They are: (1) clarifying the Minimal Cut Sets 
for each Intermediate Event and (2) constructing the Bayesian Network model of Top 
Event. So far, the analysed results obtained for each Intermediate Event are Cut Sets 
rather than Minimal Cut Sets. As stated earlier, the difference between Minimal Cut 
Sets and Cut Sets is that a Minimal Cut Set consists of necessary and sufficient Causal 
Factors whilst a Cut Set consists of sufficient Causal Factors. Thus, two techniques, 
Karnaugh map (K-map) and K-style Conditional Probability Table (K-CPT), are 
utilised in order to transform the Cut Sets into Minimal Cut Sets if they are achievable. 
In short, the approximate Minimal Cut Set is named as Minimal Cut Set hereafter. Later 
in the second half of this section an example will be illustrated to show how these two 
techniques work together to achieve the first goal. The theoretical background is 
covered in section 4.3. Having completed this transformation, a list of Boolean 
equations depicting the Minimal Cut Set(s) for each Intermediate Event is provided as 
one of the outcomes of the process. These Boolean equations are essential for 
constructing a Bayesian Network model of Minimal Cut Sets of an accident which is 
depicted in section 5.5. 
5.3.1 Determining the approximate Minimal Cut Set(s) for Intermediate Events 
In the determining process (see Figure 5-2 as an example), the corresponding Why- 
Because Graph of an Intermediate Event (i. e. a Why-Because subset) is shown on the 
left of the figure, and the Boolean equation for the Minimal Cut sets is shown on the 
right. In the middle, the associated K-CPT and K-map are tabulated. Each row 
represents a subset and the transforming results are produced from the left to the right in 
turn according to the data in the column on the left, as the input source. Experts' 
estimates might be needed in K-CPT if the historical statistic data is not available, and 
the simplification rules of Karnaugh map (revealed in section 4.3.2) are applied for 
obtaining the minimised sum-of-products Boolean expressions for each Intermediate 
Event. In the following paragraph, the determining process applied on the Why-Because 
subset of Intermediate Event A is demonstrated as an example. The entire processing 
results are shown in Figure 5-2, Figure 5-3 and Figure 5-4. A list of Boolean 
-111- 
Ch. 5: Case Study Using the Proposed Method: Herald of Free Enterprise 
expressions regarding the Minimal Cut sets of Intermediate Events of the case study is 
shown at the end of this section. 
The determining process starts from the Top Event (i. e. the accident) and visits 
each Intermediate Event, which is drawn in a rectangle symbol in the Why Because 
Graph. Then, the execution of the process is similar to factorisation in algebra and only 
stops at the end of the branch, which is a Basic Event shown in a circle symbol. 
Therefore, each time, the process only necessarily focuses on one Why-Because subset 
for reasoning. For example, in the subset with regard to Intermediate Event A, the 
reasoning is only concentrated on event A and its direct Causal Factors; they are factors 
D, F and HI (see Figure 5-2). The details of processing the rest of the Intermediate 
Events are not included, but the entire results of the process are shown in a means of 
graphs, maps, tables and Boolean equations in Figure 5-2, Figure 5-3 and Figure 5-4. 
In event A, it is shown that about two thousands tonnes of sea water entered into 
the ship within 30 seconds because the bow door of the ship was widely opened (i. e. 
factor F) and the ship's speed reached 18 knots (i. e. factor HI) whilst the ship was 
trimmed by head (TBH) around 0.8m (i. e. factor D), according to the accident 
investigation report (DoT, 1987). Hence, it is presumed that the experts assign a value 
of "0.95" depicting the occurrence probability of event A subjecting to this condition. 
Therefore, the value is inputted into the entry of the K-CPT which represents factors Hl, 
F and D appearing simultaneously (i. e. H1=1, F=1 and D=1 are given as the condition). 
Meanwhile, in the entry of "(HI, F, D) = (1,40)", "0.9" is given as the occurrence 
probability, which is almost the same as the previous one. This is because factor D is 
considered as a minor influencing factor when the bow wave reaches 4 metres above sea 
level due to the ship's speed reaches 18 knots and comes up with the shallow water 
effect occurring at the same time. In such circumstance, the entire bow door area was 
engulfed by the bow wave and factor D becomes relatively insignificant although it had 
been considered as an important Causal Factor at the first investigation. 
This consideration had been confirmed by a full scale sea trial with her identical 
sister ship Pride of Free Enterprise which took place 9 weeks after the disaster. Both 
the model tests and the Pride experiment indicated clearly that at Combinator 6, which 
is a speed indication of about 18 knots, the bow wave welled up the bow doors, i. e. 
perhaps 2m above the level of the top of the spade (DoT, 1987). The Pride sea trial also 
revealed that there was almost no bow wave reaching the bow door over the spade if the 
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speed was under 15 knots, even though the ship (Pride of Free Enterprise) was 
ballasted and trimmed by head about 1 metre. Therefore, it is appropriate to assume that 
the probability given that (HI, F) = (0,1) is "0.1" no matter factor D existed or not. 
This means that the accident would almost not have happened if the ship's speed had 
not reached 18 knots in the entrance of the harbour, even though she (HoFE) was 
trimmed by head about 0.8 M with her bow door was opened. This also explains why 
the disaster had not happened before the HoFE accident, even though at least five 
incidents had been reported where the ships sailed with bow door open when 
proceeding to sea (DoT, 1987). Unfortunately, HoFE did not make it this time, due to a 
series of human errors compounded by her higher speed in the harbour and her heavy 
condition of loading. For the rest of the entries, as the bow door is closed ("F=0"), the 
probability values are very low and assigned "0.01". Once the K-CPT of event A has 
been accomplished, the associated K-map can be obtained if an appropriated 
approximate criterion is applied. For example, a value (in K-map) is deemed as one if it 
is larger than 0.8 (in K-CPT), and as zero (in K-map) if it is small than 0.2 (in K-CPT). 
Having set up the K-map, a simplified Boolean expression associated with the 
approximate Minimal Cut Sets of event A can be obtained following a K-map 
simplification procedure. An illustrated example is A -- Hl " F. 
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H1: over 18Kts 
G: poor stability 
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El: spring tide 
E2: ramp deficiency 
E3: E deck loading 
J: more than 2hrs 
K`- M 
F: bow door opened 
K: no re-check 
M: Ass. Bosun was 
absent 
K-CPT: 
A=0 A=1 
BC=00 0.01 0.05 
BC=01 0.1 0.2 
BC=11 0.1 0.99 
BC=10 0.01 0.1 
K-CPT: 
D=0 D=1 
H1F=00 0.01 0.01 
H1F=01 0.1 0.1 
H1F=11 0.9 0.95 
H1F=10 0.01 0.01 
K-CPT: 
H1=0 H1=1 
G=O 0.05 0.2 
G=1 0.8 0.95 
K-CPT: 
K-map: 
A=0 A=1 
BC=00 z0 4 
BC=01 z0 =0 
BC=11 O =1 
BC=10 z0 =0 
K-map: 
D=0 D=1 
H1F=00 z0 z0 
H1 F=01 =0 =0 
H1F=11 =1 =1 
H1F=10 =0 =0 
K-map: 
H1=0 H1=1 
G=0 =0 =0 
G=1 =1 =1 
E1J=00 E1J=01 E1J=11 E1J=10 
E2E3=00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
E2E3=01 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.05 
E2E3=1 1 0.05 0.9 0.9 0.05 
E2E3=10 0.01 0.1 0.1 0.01 
K-map: 
EN=00 E1J=01. E1J=11 E1J=10 
E2E3=00 z0 ý0 =0 =0 
E2E3=01 =0 _0 zz0 =0 
E2E3=11 ý0 _1 =1 =0 
E2E3=10 ZO _0 --0 Z0 
K-CPT: 
K=0 K=1 
M=0 0.01 0.01 
M=1 0.1 0.99 
K-map: 
K=O K=1 
M=o to =4 
M=1 =o =1 
TE--A"B"C 
AAdHI"F 
CMG 
DstsE2"E3"J 
FzK"M 
Figure 5-2 The determining process for approximate MCS (1/3) 
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K-CPT: K-map: 
D=O D=1 
N=O 0.05 0.1 
N=1 0.2 0.95 
D=0 D=1 
N=O =0 
N=1 =0 =1 
K-CPT: K-map: 
P=0 P=1 
QR=OO 0.01 0.6 
QR =01 0.05 0.8 
R=11 0.9 0.99 
QR =10 0.01 0.7 
P=0 P=1 
QR=OO =0 =1 
R =01 z0 =1 
R=11 --1 =1 
R=10 =0 ý1 
K-CPT: K-map: 
H2=0 H2=1 
L4L5 0.05 0.1 
=00 
L4L5 0.2 0.8 
=01 
L4L5 0.2 0.95 
=11 
L4L5 0.1 0.8 
=10 
K-CPT: 
L3=0 L3=1 
UV=00 0.05 0.8 
UV=01 0.1 0.9 
UV=11 0.9 0.99 
UV=10 0.1 0.95 
K-CPT: 
w=o w=1 
L7=0 0.05 0.2 
L7=1 0.1 0.95 
H2=0 H2=1 
L4L5 ;0 =0 
=00 
L4L5 ;0 =1 
=01 
L4L5 z: ý0 =1 
=11 
L4L5 0 ; 21 
=10 
K-map: 
L3=0 L3=1 
Uv=00 =0 :1 
UV=01 z-0 Z1 
W=11 =1 -- 1 
UV=10 z0 =1 
K-map: 
w=o w=1 
L7=0 =r0 
L7=1 z0 ý1 
Figure 5-3 The determining process for approximate MCS (2/3) 
G--D"N 
GAP+(Q"R) 
N-- 
(H2 " L4) + (H2 " L5) 
T sL3+(U"V) 
UsteW"L7 
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M: 
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The same procedure 
for: 
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to empty the tanks 
0: no high power 
ballast pump fitted 
P: no bow door 
indicator fitted 
Q: Masters was 
unaware the door 
incidents 
R: Masters relied on 
the absent of any 
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Figure 5-4 The determining process for approximate MCS (3/3) 
Jzo 
O; ts L8 
P; t; L8 
Qsý L8 
RAU 
V ste L6 
W; ze L8 
Once all of the Intermediate Events in the Why-Because Graph have passed the 
simplification process, the direct Causal Factors remaining in each Minimal Cut Set of 
the Intermediate Events can be considered as Necessary Causal Factors. This also 
means that they are the necessary and sufficient factors. A summary of the Boolean 
equations for the Minimal Cut Sets of these Intermediate Events is shown in Equation 
(5.1). However, it should be noted that the Necessary Causal Factors defined in the 
proposed method are those significant factors which can highly likely, instead of 
definitely, cause the Intermediate/Top Events to happen if they all occur. This is the side 
effect of the proposed approximate simplification law that some factors will be ignored 
due to the simplification. That is the simplification compromises the details of the 
Causal Factors in order to reveal the individual Window of Opportunities of the 
accident. 
K-CPT: K-ma : 
T=0 0.01 T=0 =0 
T=1 0.8 T=1 MST 
Therefore: 
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TE; zA"B"C 
A; tý HI"F 
CMG 
DmýE2"E3"J 
FswK"M 
G; teD"N 
Jsý-, O 
KAP+(Q"R) 
M-- T 
N--H2"(L4+L5)=(H2"L4)+(H2"L5) 
0 -- L8 
PL8 
QL8 
RAU 
T L3+(U"V) 
UiW"L7 
VzL6 
WýL8 
5.3.2 Constructing the Bayesian Network of Top Event of an accident 
(5.1) 
Having accomplished the first goal, the next task is to construct the Bayesian 
Network model of Top Event of an accident. By directly transforming the Why-Because 
Graph into the Directed Acyclic Graph and forming the Conditional Probability Table 
derived from the K-CPT, a Bayesian Network model in relative to the Top Event can be 
constructed accordingly. Figure 5-5 illustrates the corresponding Bayesian Network 
model of . 
Top Event of the case study, and the data regarding the Conditional 
Probability Tables is tabulated in Appendix-A. Up to this stage, a Top Event model, 
without the details of Minimal Cut Sets, is accomplished and the quantitative analysis 
can be proceeded if the WoOs of the accident is not the issues concerned. The 
difference between these two models is that the Top Event model only shows the 
aggregated influences of the Causal Factors with respect to the accident, rather than the 
individual WoOs. In section 3.2, more details regarding this issue are covered. Again, as 
noted earlier and specified in section 4.3, the Minimal Cut Sets model of an accident is 
obtained by compromising the accuracy of the Causal Factors involved in order to gain 
the extra information of WoOs. The distortion of the analysis outcomes is unavoidable 
because of the approximate simplification of the method. 
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Figure 5-5 The Bayesian Network model of Top Event of HoFE 
5.4 Applying Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for finalising the qualitative 
analysis 
Eventually, having clarified the Minimal Cut Sets for each Intermediate Event, the 
Minimal Cut Sets of an accident can be clarified by performing a factorisation operation 
with thöse Minimal Cut Sets of every Intermediate Event, in which Boolean algebra is 
used again. The theoretical explanations regarding this process are described in section 
4.4. At the end of this process, all the possible Minimal Cut Set(s) of the accident will 
be revealed as part of the qualitative analysis results of the accident. As mentioned 
before, each Minimal Cut Set of the accident represents one of the Window of 
Opportunities to cause the accident to happen, which is represented by a combination of 
identified Basic Events. However, these Basic Events are not the only identified Causal 
Factors to cause the accident to happen, but simply the representatives. These Basic 
Events are the Causal Factors of those Intermediate Events whilst those Intermediate 
Events are the Causal Factors of the accident (i. e. Top Event). Those Intermediate 
Events are located in the middle of the causation branch and should not be overlooked 
even though they are not shown in the Minimal Cut Set(s) of Top Event. Later, in 
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section 5.5, the case study will illustrate a comprehensive picture to discover those 
Intermediate Events through a backtracking process. Before backtracking, the Minimal 
Cut Set(s) of the accident has to be determined first. The tragedy of Herald of Free 
Enterprise is still the example utilised in the following process. For the theoretical 
details of the process, it is worthy to revisit the explanations in section 4.4. 
5.4.1 Determining the approximate Minimum Cut Sets of the accident 
Although factors SI and LI have been denoted in the Why-Because Graph of the 
accident as the Necessary Causal Factors of event B (i. e. No Anti-FSI device (bulkhead 
or scupper) existed) in the preceding section, there is no intention to discuss it further 
since there is no official evidence to support this speculation. Therefore there is no 
factorisation operation for event B. This means that event B will not be substituted by 
factors SI and LI in the following process. 
The determining process starts from the Top Event again. In the first row of 
Equation (5.2), the Top Event is replaced by "A"BB. C ", which is shown on the right 
hand side of the approximation sign. This determination derives from the summary of 
Minimal Cut Sets of Intermediate/Top Events, which are concluded in section 5.3.1. It 
shows that there are three events deemed as the Necessary Causal Factors of the Top 
Event. Subsequently, in the second row of the equations events A and C are replaced by 
(Hl - F) and G respectively, according to the summary. Then event F is replaced by 
(K "M), and G is replaced by 
(D " N), and so on for the rest of succeeding Intermediate 
Events. This means that these Intermediate Events are iteratively replaced by their 
Minimal Cut Set(s), and then the Minimal Cut Set(s) replaced by their Necessary Causal 
Factors, until reaching the bottom of the Why-Because Graph, which is a circle symbol 
in the graph denoted as a Basic Event. In the end, there are only Basic Events left in the 
equations, such as Hl and L8, etc. During the determining process, the properties or 
axiom laws of Boolean algebra have to be applied in order to obtain the most simplified 
results. The absorption property, for example, reduces the number of the terms for event 
A from four down to two in the last second row of the equation. This is because that two 
identical (H1 " L8 . L7 " L6) items can be simplified into one (i. e. A+A=A 
or AvA= A) in Boolean algebra. 
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Finally there are only four Minimal Cut Sets yielded as the result of the process; 
they are MCSl MCS4. This means that the accident can occur provided that any one of 
the Minimal Cut Sets occurs. When an insight is taken into these equations, it reveals 
that all of the factors involved can be divided into three major parts; they are portions A, 
B and C. For example, in Equation (5.2) the (Hi " L8 " L3) is denoted as Al and the 
(E2. E3 " L8 " H2 " L4) is as C1 for MCSI. It also can be seen as that factors H1, L8 and 
L3 eventually trigger event A to occur and the combination of factors E2, E3, L8, H2 
and L4 makes event C happen. However there is another combination of the factors that 
can trigger event A to happen; this is (Hl " L8 " L7 " L6) denoted as A2 in short. The same 
as event A, there are two combinations of the factors that can provoke event C; they are 
(E2. E3 " L8 " H2 " L4) denoted as C1 and 
(E2-E3-L8-H2-L5) denoted as C2 
respectively. As long as events A, B and C occur at the same time, the Top Event occurs 
no matter which combination of these factors triggers events A and C to happen. That is 
why there are four possible combinations of the factors that could make the accident 
happen. 
TE--A"B"C 
ý(H1"F)"B"G 
ý(H1"K"M)"B"(D"N) 
e[Hl"(P+Q"R)"T]"B"{(E2"E3"J)"[(H2"L4)+(H2"L5)]} 
[Hl"(P+Q"R)"(L3+U"v)]"B"{(E2"E3.0)"[(H2"L4)+(H2"L5)J 
g2[(H1"P"L3)+(Hl"P"U"V)+(H1"Q"R"L3)+(H1"Q"R"U"V)]"B" 
[(E2. E3.0. H2 " L4)+ 
(E2 
" E3.0. H2 " L5)] 
m [(H1"L8"L3)+(H1"L8"(W "L7)"L6)+(H1"L8"U"L3)+(H1"L8"U"(W "L7)"L6)] 
"B"[(E2"E3"L8"H2"L4)+(E2"E3"L8"H2"L5)] 
e[(H1"L8"L3)+(H1"L8"(L8"L7)"L6)+(H1"L8"(W"L7)"L3)+(H1"L8"(L8"L7)"L6)] 
"B"[(E2"E3"L8"H2"L4)+(E2"E3"L8"H2"L5)] 
m [(H1"L8"L3)+(H1"L8"L7"L6)+(Hl"L8"(L8"L7)"L3)+(H1"L8"L7"L6)] 
"B"[(E2"E3"L8"H2"L4)+(E2"E3"L8"H2"L5)] 
[(H1"L8"L3)+(H1"L8"L7"L6)]"B"[(E2"E3"L8"H2"L4)+(E2"E3"L8"H2"L5)] 
m MCS1+MCS2+MCS3+MCS4 
(5.2) 
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where : 
MCS1=(Hl"L8"L3)"B"(E2"E3"L8"H2"L4)=A1"B"Cl 
MCS2=(Hl"L8"L3)"B"(E2"E3"L8"H2"L5)=A1"B"C2 
MCS3=(Hl"L8"L7"L6). B"(E2"E3"L8"H2"L4)=A2"B"Cl 
MCS4=(Hl"L8"L7"L6)"B"(E2"E3"L8"H2"L5)=A2"B"C2 
Al=(Hl"L8"L3) 
A2=(Hl"L8"L7"L6) 
C1=(E2"E3" L8" H2" L4) 
C2=(E2"E3"L8"H2"L5) 
The Minimal Cut Sets which could cause the accident to happen have been 
revealed through a systematic procedure., Nevertheless it is dangerous to only focus on 
these Basic Events and overlook those Intermediate Events since they do not emerge in 
the Minimal Cut Sets. One thing should be kept in mind is that these Intermediate 
Events are still the Causal factors (the same as Basic Events) to make the holes exist in 
the layers forming the Window of Opportunities. Later, in section 5.6, the case study 
will show an example that the accident can be prevented by blocking any one of the 
holes due to these holes can be shut by reducing the occurrence probabilities of one or 
few associated Causal Factors, including those Intermediate Events. It will also show 
why the likelihoods of different Minimal Cut Sets are not the same. 
FTA technique is capable of doing qualitative analysis as well as quantitative 
analysis provided all the Basic Events are mutually independent. This assumption is 
almost impossible to comply with in the method because the identified Basic Events 
involved in an accident are normally correlative to each other. Therefore another 
appropriate technique has to be applied in order to overcome this difficulty. Bayesian 
Network is hence chosen as the technique to handle the quantitative analysis of an 
accident. In the following section, the way to carry out the quantitative analysis with 
Bayesian Network is under the spotlight. 
5.5 Applying Bayesian Network (BN) for quantitative analysis 
In this section, the processes to establish a corresponding Bayesian Network model 
regarding the Minimal Cut Sets of an accident, according to the qualitative analysis 
results acquired in the preceding sections, for the quantitative analysis are discussed. It 
is crucial to ensure that the established Bayesian Network model is able to present all 
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the identified Causal Factors without overlooking any Intermediate Event. Therefore, a 
backtracking process, which consists of two operations, to sort out the Intermediate 
Events involved and the correlation between them has to be done before constructing 
the model of the accident. The backtracking process mainly reveals the clues as to 
which Basic Events in the Minimal Cut Sets can influence those Intermediate Events. It 
is a step by step process, from those Basic Events to the Top Event. These backtracking 
paths, which are highlighted by the circles and arrows shown in Equations (5.4) and 
(5.5), are very useful for fording the backtracking equations. These equations will then 
become the essential blueprints for constructing the corresponding Bayesian Network 
model in the next stage. For the purpose of quick reference, all the Intermediate Events 
involved in the model are summarised in the second half part of the equations (i. e. the 
"where" part) with their influencing events (i. e. the Causal Factors shown on the right 
hand side of the approximation sign). For validation, it is very important to examine the 
equivalency, in the equations, between the factorisation part and backtracking part from 
time to time. It is also the way to ensure that the backtracking outcomes are correct 
otherwise some Intermediate Events will easily be overlooked. Later, in section 5.5.3, 
an incorrect example will be demonstrated to show a potential problem which is prone 
to overlooking those Intermediate Events and a proposed validation mechanism to avoid 
it. 
5.5.1 Backtracking the Intermediate Events via the factorisation equations of 
Minimum Cut Sets 
In section 5.4, the Minimal Cut Sets of an accident are represented by sets of Basic 
Events. However the Intermediate Events lying between those Basic Events and the Top 
Event in the fault tree should be taken into account as well. The process to sort out those 
Intermediate Events involved starts from the Minimal Cut Sets of the accident. By 
utilising the Why-Because causation (i. e. the factorisation equations), the process can 
track back the corresponding Cause-Consequence relationship from the Basic Events of 
the Minimal Cut Sets through the associated Intermediate Events to the Top Event, and 
then sort out the backtracking paths and Intermediate Events involved. For more details 
regarding this issue, section 4.5.2 is worthy to revisit. The systematic procedure to track 
back the Intermediate Events of the case study is described in the following sections. 
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5.5.1.1 Factorisation operation (Downward Why-Because) 
In section 5.4, it has been showed that the HoFE tragedy was triggered by four 
Minimal Cut Sets, which are represented by sets of Basic Events. In order to clearly 
demonstrate how the backtracking process works, the Necessary Causal Factors of event 
A (including the in-between Intermediate Events) are used as an example. The process 
starts from revisiting the factorisation equations related to event A and fords that it has 
two Minimal Cut Sets involved; they are A1= (Hl " L8 " L3) and A2 = (HI " L8 " L7 " L6). 
They are two Sets of Basic Events representing those Necessary Causal Factors to 
provoke event A to occur. Equation (5.3) is elicited from the portion associated with 
event A in the factorisation equations (i. e. Equation (5.2)) in order to present a clearer 
view of the process without unnecessary clutter. 
In Equation (5.3), it shows where Al and A2 derive from. It also implies the Why- 
Because causation between each row, and the row above/below. For instance, the 
differences between the second and third rows show that event K (the consequence) is 
triggered when either event P occurs or events Q and R happen simultaneously. In 
addition, the reasons why events P or Q can occur are because factor L8 exists in the 
fifth row while event R is influenced by event U, and so on. The factorisation operation 
described in Equations (5.2) and (5.3) can be seen as the Downward Why-Because path 
leading from the Top Event at the top of the fault tree to the Basic Event at the bottom 
of the tree. 
A H1"F 
zH1"(K"M) 
z H1"(P+Q"R)"M 
(H1"P"M)+(H1"Q"R"M) 
(H1"L8"T)+(H1"L8"U "T) 
(H1"L8"T) 
H1"L8"(L3+U"V) 
(H1"L8"L3)+(H1"L8"U "V) 
(H1"L8"L3)+(H1"L8"W -L7 -L6) 
z (H1"L8"L3)+(H1"L8"L8"L7"L6) 
z (H1"L8"L3)+(H1"L8"L7 "L6) 
Al+A2 
where : 
A1=(H1"L8"L3) 
A2=(H1"L8"L7"L6) 
(5.3) 
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5.5.1.2 Backtracking operation (Upward Cause-Consequence) 
Although, the details regarding the downward operation of the equations have been 
shown above, further analysis of the equations is required in order to sort out the Cause- 
Consequence correlation (i. e. backtracking equations) to build the Bayesian Network 
model of the accident for the quantitative analysis. That is, a backtracking operation of 
the equations is needed and is illustrated as follows. 
As mentioned before, event A is neither directly triggered by events H1, L8 and 
L3 (i. e. the Minimal Cut Set Al) nor events H1, L8, L7 and L6 (i. e. the Minimal Cut Set 
A2), but through a series of Intermediate Events. The reverse Why-Because path (i. e. the 
Cause-Consequence correlation) from these Basic Events to event A have to be clarified 
in order to identify which Intermediate Events are involved. This process starts from the 
last row of the factorisation equations which are labelled as Al and A2. When 
backtracking to event T, it reveals that (L3) and (UV) are the Minimal Cut Sets of event 
T respectively, and that is the main reason why there are two Minimal Cut Sets for event 
A. Therefore a new symbol TI is utilised to denote the situation that event T is triggered 
via event L3 (i. e. Ti L3 ). Meanwhile another symbol T2 denotes that event T is 
triggered by events U and V when they occur simultaneously (i. e. T2 U U. V ). Now, 
event T can also be expressed as (TI +T2) in the backtracking equations resulting from 
the two Minimal Cut Sets triggering event T to occur. Subsequently, the propagation of 
event T results in the propagation of event M. That is, two extra symbols (i. e. M1 and 
M2) are applied to depict that event M is triggered by which Minimal Cut Sets of event 
T respectively (i. e. Ml Ti and M2; ts T2). This is justified from the factorisation of 
MT denoted'in Equation (5.1). In the same way, symbol KI is used to denote event K 
is triggered by event P (i. e. Kl s: e P) as well as symbol K2 for it is provoked when event 
Q and R occur at the same time (i. e. K2 Q"R). 
When backtracking the Minimal Cut Set A2 for event A, there are two factors L8 
identified (as shown in row 9 of equation (5.4)), one derived from event TV (see the 
circle mark with an arrow in row 9 of Equation (5.4)), and the other one from event Q or 
P (in row 4). However, only one L8 is left in the end of the factorisation equations 
because of the idempotency property (i. e. A+A=A or A A. A= A) of Boolean algebra 
(see row 10 of Equation (5.4)). Thus event L8 should be restored to two instances before 
tracking back to event W (from row 9 to row 8) while joining with event L7 (i. e. W" L7 ) 
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for event U (row 7). In addition, event L6 (in row 8 of the equation (5.4)) comes from 
event V (row 7). It is revealed when rows 7 and 8 of the equations are compared. In 
Equation (5.4), there is always a corresponding backtracking/upward equation on the 
right hand side in addition to the factorisation/downward equations. Although the 
backtracking equations look slightly different from their counter part on the left hand 
side, both of them are equivalent except using different symbols to denote the same 
thing. For example, in row 7 of Equation (5.4), event T was replaced by (L3 +U" V) 
during factorisation. This means that it has two Minimal Cut Sets which are represented 
by (L3) and (U "V) respectively. Hence, the symbol TI is utilised to denote the 
condition influenced by L3 and the symbol T2 for the condition of U U. V (row 6) during 
backtracking. Thas is, despite the expressions on both sides are . slightly different, the 
equivalency between both sides should be kept. In a similar fashion, another two 
symbols F1 and F2 (row 1) are added into the backtracking outcome for event F to 
denote the situation of (KI-MI) and (K2 " M2) respectively (i. e. Fl --Kl " M1 and 
F2--K2-M2), and eventually revealing Al; --HI-Fl and A2 --Hl " F2 to end the 
backtracking operation. In the end, the backtracking equations for event A, consisting of 
Minimal Cut Set Al and A2 in factorisation part, are summarised in the "where" part of 
Equation (5.4). 
O 
Factorisation Backtracking 
11 
0 
1. ) AmHI"F 
2. ) wH1"(K"M) 
3. ) wH1"(P+Q"R). M 
4. ) w(H1" M)+(H1" R"M) 
5. ) r(H1 T)+(H1.! "T) L 
6. ) w(H1"L8"T) 
7. ) wHI"L8"(L3+ V "L8"L3)+(HI"L8"U"V) 
8. ) w(H1"L8"L3)+(H1"L "W"L L6 
9. ) w (H1"L8"L3)+(H1 "L8"L8"L7"L6) 
10. ) w(H1"L8"L3)+(H1"L8"L7"L6) 
11. ) m Al+A2 
2' IMI 
) Am Hl-(F J+ F2 
2. ) r HI. " Kl M1 2"M2 
3. ): (HI " 1"M1)+(HI. 2"M2) 
4. ) (HP. l1)+(I1 " f2) 
5. ) +(H1"L8"7'1)+(Jf1"L8"U"T2) 
6. ) r. H1"L8" l+T2)n(H1"L8"Tl)+(111"L 2) 
7. ) . (H1"L8 .3 
ýN1"L /"V 
8. ) ' (H1"L8"L3)+(NI"L8 W "L7"L6) 
9. ) w(H1"L8"L3)+(ffl"L L8 L7-L6) 
10. ) '. (Nl "L8"L3)+(H1"L8"L7"L6) 
11. ) -AI+A2 
(5.4) 
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where : 
Al m(Hi. L8"L3)ý(Hi. P"Ti); w (Hi. K1"MI)A6 HI. Fl 
A2 its (Hi. L8"L7"L6); v (HI"L8"L8"L7"L6)m 
(HI*L8"W "L7"V) so 
(HI 
"L8"U"V) 
z(Hl"L8"U"U"V) (Hl"L8"U"T2)a(HI-Q"R"M2)a(HI"K2"M2)as HI-F2 
F1sts KI. M1 
F2swK2"M2 
K1+wP 
K2s+Q"R 
M1 Au T1 
M2mT2 
Ti L3 
T2#U"V 
PwL8 
Q#L8 
RAU 
UswW"L7 
Vsw L6 
WswL8 
The backtracking process for event A is now completed. So far, there is no 
backtracking process for event B since no factorisation has taken place. 
In the backtracking of event C, the operation starts at the end of the factorisation 
equations of event C. However the following discussion will only focus on the details of 
the backtracking part without discussing the factorisation of event C. Equation (5.5) 
contains the factorisation details (on the left hand side, elicited from Equation (5.2)) and 
the backtracking equations (on right) for event C. There are two Minimal Cut sets 
represented by two set of Basic Events that can provoke event C to occur. They are 
(E2 " E3 " L8 " H2 " L4) and 
(E2 " E3 " L8 " H2 " L5) , and are labelled as CI and C2 
respectively in the factorisation equations. Moreover, event L8 (in row 5) replaces event 
O (in row 4) for both CI and C2 in the factorisation part of Equation (5.5). Therefore, in 
the backtracking equations, it is obvious that event 0 was caused by event L8. In other 
words, event L8 is the only factor to determine whether event 0 occurs or not. 
Meanwhile, event J is influenced by event O. In addition, event N was replaced by 
" (H2 " L4)+ 
(H2 " L5)" (row 3) when performing the factorisation. Hence, during the 
backtracking, two different symbols, Ni and N2, are utilised to label these two Minimal 
Cut Sets of event N respectively (i. e. Ni -- (H2 " L4) and N2 sv- (H2 " L5) ). This means 
that either Ni or N2 can provoke event N to happen. It is also similar to the occurrence 
of event G. Therefore two new symbols, GI and G2, are added to depict the provoking 
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O 
condition of (D " Ni) and 
(D " N2) respectively for event G. It is quite straightforward 
to define event D since it consists of events E2, E3 and J (row 3). Eventually, the 
backtracking results for event C with regard to correlative Intermediate Events are 
finalised and summarised in the "where" part of the equations. In these equations, the 
factors on the right hand side of the approximation sign are the Necessary Causal 
Factors to the Intermediate Events (on left). Again, for validation, the equivalency 
between both sides of the equations has to be kept from time to time. As noted 
previously, these backtracking equations are the essential information, as the blueprints, 
to construct the Bayesian Network model of Minimal Cut sets of an accident. It is vital 
to secure the backtracking results are correct. Finally, the backtracking process is 
completed and is possible to conduct the Bayesian Network model constructing process, 
which mainly relies on the summarised backtracking equations shown in Equation (5.4) 
for event A, and Equation (5.5) for event C. 
Factorisation Backtracking 
1. ) C -- G 1. ) C st; GI + G2 
2. ) z&D "N 2. ) tt D" (N1 + N2) = (D " N1) + (D " N2) 
3. ) 
J(j2"E3" 
"[(H2"L4)+(H2"L5)] 3. ) c(E2"E3" "(N1+N2) 
4. ) z(E2"E3" "H2"L4)+(E2"E3. O"H2"H5) 4. ) Pý (E2"Exjw +(E2"E3.0-N 
5. ) #(E2"E3 L8 H2"L4)+(E2"E3"L8"H2"L5) 5. ) s: d(E2"E3"L8 H2" +(E2"E3"L8 H2"L5 
6. ) sts Cl + C2 6. ) p Cl + C2 
0 
(5.5) 
where : 
Cl se (E2"E3"L8"H2"L4) (E2"E3. O)"(H2"L4)a (E2"E3"J)"N1 szs D"N1 sjG1 
C2 (E2 " E3 " L8 " H2 " L5) 3 (E2. E3-0). (H2-L4)sts (E2-E3-J)-N2 zD- N2 ms G2 
G1zD"N1 
G2--D-N2 
Dz E2"E3"J 
N1 sti H2 " L4 
N2 H2 " L5 
J-- 0 
0 L8 
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5.5.2 Constructing the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) of the Bayesian Network 
model for Minimal Cut sets 
Having accomplished the backtracking process, lists of backtracking equations are 
revealed. In the HoFE example, the backtracking equations are shown in the "where" 
part of Equations (5.4) and (5.5). They are the blueprints for constructing the DAG of 
Bayesian Network of the accident in this process. The way to establish the DAG is 
described in section 4.5.3 and is briefed as follows. An arc connects from an influencing 
(parent or predecessor) node to an influenced (child or successor) node and has the 
arrowhead toward the child node (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). Therefore, at the 
beginning, the DAG starts the construction from the Top Event, which is now 
represented by four Minimal Cut Sets (i. e. MCSI MCS4). Since the process has to deal 
with them in turn, MCS1 is the first one to be handled. The MCS1 consists of Al. B B. C1 
according to Equation (5.2) in section 5.2.1. This implies that MCS1 is provoked (or 
influenced) by these three Causal Factors. Thus, node MCS1, which is one of the 
proxies of Top Event, is placed first. Subsequently, nodes Al, B and C1 are added into 
the DAG respectively with an arc, depicting the influence relationship, toward node 
MCS1 to establish the correlations amongst them (see Figure 5-6). These connections 
are in light of the equations (i. e. MCS1-- Al "B" CI), which means that node MCS1 is 
the successor of these three new added nodes. In addition, according to the backtracking 
equations (5.4) summarised in section 5.5.1, factor Al is influenced by factors HI and 
F1 (i. e. Al; ze Hl " F1). Therefore, two new added nodes, F1 and H1, are joined as the 
predecessor of node Al. In a similar fashion, another arrow arc connects node C1 with 
node G1 expressing G1 is the predecessor of C1, according to Cl Gl depicted in the 
backtracking equations (5.5). After further step by step processing through the 
backtracking equations in turn, the DAG of Bayesian Network for MCS1 is eventually 
accomplished when all the Intermediate Events, as well as Basic Events, involved have 
been placed in the DAG accordingly. The process is carried out on the other Minimal 
Cut Sets in the same way and finally builds up the entire DAG of Bayesian Network 
model for the Minimal Cut sets of the accident. In the end, Figure 5-6 is the whole 
picture showing the DAG with around forty nodes included. 
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Figure 5-6 The Bayesian Network model for HoFE accident 
5.5.3 The absorption problem while backtracking 
Although the construction of the DAG of Bayesian Network model for the accident 
has been accomplished in the preceding section, there is one aspect regarding the 
backtracking process that needs further consideration. As specified in section 4.5.4, it is 
the problem caused by absorption, in which the Intermediate Events are wrongly 
tracked back due to the fact that more than one backtracking path, from the Basic 
Events to the Top Event, is available. For instance, the absorption problem might occur 
in the backtracking of event A in the HoFE example. 
In order to highlight this issue, part of Equation (5.2) in section 5.4.1 regarding 
event A is extracted and shown in Equation (5.6). This equation shows that only two 
groups of Basic Events are left in the end of the factorisation due to the absorption 
property of Boolean algebra. Since the second and fourth groups (i. e. A2 and A4) are 
identical, they are absorbed into one group. Meanwhile, the third group denoted as A3 is 
also absorbed into Al, and eventually only two groups of Basic Events have been left as 
the Minimal Cut Sets of event A. The absorption property is frequently applied in 
Boolean algebra equations for simplification purposes, but this might cause confusion 
while carrying out the backtracking. 
-129- 
Ch 5: Case Study Using the Proposed Method: Herald of Free Enterprise 
Az [(H1"L8"L3)+(H1"L8"L7"L6)+(H1"L8"(L8"L7)"L3)+(H1"L8"L7"L6)] 
=A1+A2+A3+A4=(H1"L8"L3)+(H1"L8"L7"L6) 
where 
A1=H1"L8"L3 
A2=H1"L8"L7"L6 
A3=H1"L8"L7"L3 
A4=H1"L8"L7"L6 
(5.6) 
An invalid example which is shown in Equation (5.7) and Figure 5-7 is the 
outcome resulting from this type of confusion. In contrast, Equation (5.4) in section 
5.5.1.2 is the valid version and is compared with. The incorrect Equation (5.7) shown 
below looks similar to the valid one, but actually these two equations are not equivalent. 
The difference between them is in the backtracking part. The omission of some of the 
Intermediate Events associated with item A2 is under the spotlight when these two 
equations are compared. Precisely speaking, events Q and R are omitted in Equation 
(5.7). This results from the absorption of factor L8 in factorisation and wrongly tracking 
back in backtracking process. If the backtracking equations were not verified before 
building the DAG of Bayesian Network, the Bayesian Network model would look like 
the one shown in Figure 5-7. When it is compared with the valid version (i. e. the one 
shown in Figure 5-6), nodes Q and R are omitted in the DAG, which is pointed out by 
an ellipse in Figure 5-7. It is assumed that the mistake occurs when the process merely 
tracks factor L8 back to factor P, rather than factors P and Q at the same time. This 
problem can happen when the group (or item) A2 is the only start point to launch the 
backtracking in this case, rather than from the groups A2 and A4 at the same time. 
Consequently, the Intermediate Events Q and R, which are also influenced by the L8, 
are overlooked due to the absorption in the factorisation operation. The overlooking of 
some Intermediate Events in the DAG can happen when the backtracking is performed 
from a single absorbed item rather than from all the identical items. 
Fortunately this mistake can be picked up by checking the equivalence between the 
backtracking equations and the factorisation equations in the process. For instance, one 
of the inconsistencies is highlighted in Equation (5.7) by the ellipses. In this example, 
the equation (in row 4) on the left hand side does not equivalent to the one on the right 
hand side, because factor P is neither equal to (Q " R) nor one of the proxies of them. In 
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order to avoid this type of mistake, the good practice is to initiate the backtracking from 
all the items before any absorption takes place and to check the backtracking equations 
with the factorisation counterparts for equivalence all the time during the backtracking 
process. 
Factorisation Backtracking 
o 
A-HI"F 
Q zH1"(K"M) 
zHl"(P+Q"R)"M 
z(H1"P"M) Hl"Q"R M x(Hl P"Ml + H1 P M2 
4(Hl"L8"T)+(Hl"L8"U"T)=(Hl"L8"T) -(Hl"L8"T),, (Hl"L8"Tl)+(Hl"L8"T2) 
Hl"L8"(L3+U"V) w Hl"L8"(T1+T2)=(H1"L8"Tl)+(Hl"L8"T2) 
(Hl"L8"L3)+(Hl"L8"U"V) (Hl"L8"L3)+(Hl"L8"U"V) 
(HI"L8"L3)+(Hl"L8"W"L7"L6) (Hl"L8"L3)+(HI"L8"W"L7"L6) 
z (Hl"L8"L3)+(H1"L8"L8"L7"L6) v(Hl"L8"L3)+(Hl"L8"L8"L7"L6) Q 
z(Hl"L8"L3)+(Hl"L8"L7"L6) ;d 
(Hl"L8"L3)+(Hl"L8"L7"L6) 
v Al+A2 su 
Al+A2 
(5.7) 
Figure 5-7 An incorrect Bayesian Network model caused by absorption 
5.5.4 The Conditional Probability Table (CPT) of the Bayesian Network model 
After constructing the Directed Acyclic Graph of the accident, the Conditional 
Probability Tables of the model have to be completed before the corresponding 
Bayesian Network model being able to perform the quantitative analysis of the accident. 
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These tables specify the probability distributions for each state of the nodes, contained 
in the Directed Acyclic Graph, under certain conditions. In other words, the Conditional 
Probability Table tabulates the conditional probability distribution of each node 
according to Bayes' rule specified in section 4.5.1. Once all the data of the Conditional 
Probability Tables have been given, the Bayesian Network model is able to calculate 
and show the outcomes of marginalisation (or unconditional) likelihood for each node. 
It is worth revisiting section 4.5.5 if further technique details are required. Figure 5-8 
shows the established Bayesian Network model regarding the HoFE example applied in 
this case study. The likelihood outcomes shown on the display are marginalised (or 
unconditional) although the data entered is conditional probability distribution. 
Regarding the data for these Conditional Probability Tables, there is no doubt that the 
historical statistic data is the first choice to derive from. However, if the historical 
statistic data is not available at the time, experts' judgement will be one of the practical 
solutions to resort to. In this example, all the data given for the Conditional Probability 
Tables is presumed to be rationally correct although it is neither associated with 
historical statistic data nor expert judgements, but the researcher's estimation for the 
demonstration only. 
In Table 5-1, the Conditional Probability Tables for nodes L8, L7, JV and U of the 
established Bayesian Network model are shown. The entire' Conditional Probability 
Table of the model is tabulated in Appendix-B. Instead of working out the 
marginalisation of the nodes by hand, a Bayesian Network software package (i. e. Netica) 
is utilised to perform this tedious job. The tables which belong to the nodes that have 
predecessor(s) consist of two parts; the data part (the data shows on the left hand side of 
the tables) and the conditions part (given by their parent or predecessor nodes on the 
right hand side of the tables). If there is no condition part in the tables, it means that this 
node has no predecessor and the data is depicted by prior probability distributions. 
Otherwise it is depicted by posterior probability distributions. For not distracting the 
concentration of the explanation, only two states are imposed onto every node in this 
case; but more than two states are still practical. The label of each state of the nodes 
follows the title of the node with a subscript number to distinguish them. For example, 
the L81 denotes the state No.! of node L8. Each entry of these tables depicts the 
probability distributions subject to the condition given on the right hand side (i. e. the 
condition part) of the tables. For example, the cell located at the cross of row one and 
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column one in the data part of the table for node U depicts the probability of state Uj 
under the condition of W1 and L71. 
Table 5-1 The Conditional Probability Table for nodes L8, L7, Wand U 
of the Bayesian Network model 
L8: (Shore Management) 
good (L81) 
management 
poor (L82) 
management 
0.2 0.8 
L7: (Senior master was content 
withnut demur the SSO) 
Concerned Satisfy (L71) L72 
0.8 0.2 
W. (ctntQ to o; vP clear order about the duties) 
Clear (W1) Vague (W2) L8 
0.95 0.05 good management L81 
0.05 0.95 poor management L82 
U: (Ship Standing Order (SSO) to crew) 
poor SSO 1 good SSO (U2) W L7 
_ 0.1 0.9 Clear (WI) Satisfy (L71) 
0.05 0.95 Clear WI concerned(L72) 
0.95 0.05 Vague (W2) Satisfy (L71) 
0.2 0.8 vague (W2) concerned(L72) 
5.5.5 The quantitative analysis results of the Bayesian Network model 
Although the Netica software will perform the marginalisation of all the nodes in a 
second, it is worthy to demonstrate the calculation details in light of equation (4.7) in 
section 4.5.1 in order to appreciate how it works. The demonstration takes only four 
nodes, nodes L8, L7, Wand U, of the established model (see Figure 5-6) as the example 
and tabulates their Conditional Probability Tables in Table 5-1. The data depicted in the 
tables for nodes L8 and L7 are unconditional (or prior) probability distribution since 
they have no predecessor. Hence the demonstration will only concentrate on the 
marginalisation of nodes Wand U respectively. Before carrying out the marginalisation 
process for node U, the unconditional probability distribution of node iV has to be 
acquired beforehand. Therefore the marginalisation process for node W is the first to be 
dealt with and each state of the node has to be handled individually. The marginalisation 
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process for node W is illustrated in Equation (5.8) where the data for nodes W and L8 
refer to Table 5-1. In the equation, the P(W1 I L81) depicts the probability of state W, 
under the condition given by state L81 of node L8. The data in the cell crossed at 
column Wl and row L81 in the table of node W is referred to and the value of 0.95 is the 
answer for P(W1 I L81). Besides, P(L8, ) is the unconditional probability distribution of 
state L81 of node L8. Since node L8 is depicted by prior probability distribution in the 
table, the figures shown in the cell can be directly referred to as P(L8, ) and 0.2 is the 
result. By the same token, the remaining parts of the equation are handled with the 
associated data in the tables. Eventually the answer with regard to P(W1) turns out to be 
0.23 and the answer for P(W2) is acquired as 0.77. 
2 
P(W1) _ 2> ý P(WI I L8j) x P(L8j) = P(Wi I L81)P(L81)+P(R'i I L82)P(L82) 
_ 
(5.8) 
x 0.2) + (0.05 x 0.8) = 0.19 + 0.04 = 0.23 . 
8ý 
2 
P(W2)=LP(W2I L8, )xP(L8f)=P(ß'2 I L8, )P(L81)+P(W2 I L82)P(L82) 
J-1 
=(0.05x0.2)+(0.95x0.8)=0.01+0.76=0.77 
After finalising the calculation of P(W1) and P(W2), the marginalisation of node 
U is now able to proceed with the Conditional Probability Table data of nodes U and L7 
specified in Table 5-1. The calculations for P(U1) and P(U2) are a little more 
complicated than P(W1) and P(W2) since node U has two parent nodes rather than just 
one as node W has. Nevertheless, the principle is still the same except the workload of 
the calculation is twice as for node W. The details of the calculation are illustrated in 
Equation (5.9). The answers for P(U1) and P(U2) are 0.6367 and 0.3633 respectively. 
Although these manual calculation results look slightly different from the results 
displayed on the Netica software shown in Figure 5-8, they are correct. The study 
presumes that the differences resulted from the round and display function of the 
software. That is, 0.6367 is displayed as 0.637 due to the use of only 3 digits after the 
decimal point are taken and rounded in the software. 
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i=2 
, 
j-2 
P(U1) _ P(U1 I W,, L7j) x P(Wi)P(L7, ) 
=1 
= P(U1 ( W,, L71)P(W)P(L7, )+P(U1 I Wl, L72)P(Wl)P(L72) 
+P(U1I W2, L71)P(W2)P(L71)+P(U1 I W2, L7z)P(W2)P(L72) 
=(0. lx0.23x0.8)+(0.05x0.23x0.2)+(0.95x 0.77 x 0.8)+(0.2 x 0.77 x 0.2) 
= 0.0184 + 0.0023 + 0.5852 + 0.0308 = 0.6367 
/=2 
j=2 
P(U2) = ZP(U2 IWi, L7, ) x P(W)P(L7 j) 
i=i 
(5.9) 
= P(U2 I Wi, L71)P(W1)P(L7, )+P(U2 I W1, L72)P(Wi)P(L72) 
+P(U21 W2, L71)P(W2)P(L7, )+P(U2 ý W2, L72)P(W2)P(L72) 
= (0.9 x 0.23 x 0.8)+(0.95 x 0.23 x 0.2)+ 
(0.05x0.77x0.8)+(0.8x0.77x0.2) 
= 0.1656+0.0437 + 0.0308+ 0.1232 = 0.3633 
Having finalised the Directed Acyclic Graph and Conditional Probability Tables of 
the Bayesian Network model for the accident, the quantitative analysis is now able to 
proceed. Both the qualitative and quantitative analysis results are presented in Figure 5- 
8. As mentioned before, the Top Event is no longer represented by a single object in the 
model, but four Minimal Cut Sets instead. This is because there are four possible 
combinations of these factors that can lead the ship to the accident according to the 
preceding qualitative analysis result. Each Minimal Cut Set represents one of the 
Window of Opportunities of the accident but their likelihoods are different. The 
marginalisation results for each node, including these four Minimal Cut Sets, are shown 
in a percentage manner with their short notation. For example, "capsized 28.2"of node 
MCSI denotes the likelihood of capsizing of the ship is 28.2% under the threat of those 
factors represented by MCSJ. 
It should be noted that the overall likelihood of the accident is not the likelihood 
represented by any one of the Minimal Cut Set acquired in the Bayesian Network model. 
This is because, in a Bayesian Network model of Minimal Cut Sets, the Top Event of 
the accident is represented by several Minimal Cut Sets rather than a single object as it 
is in FTA. As elucidated in section 3.2, each Minimal Cut Set only represents one of the 
possible combinations of those Necessary Causal Factors to trigger the accident to occur, 
the quantity of each Minimal Cut Set can only bear part of the total responsibility. Thus, 
the way to obtain the answer of the overall likelihood of the accident is not simply 
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summing up these likelihoods. It has to resort to the FTA Minimal Cut Set upper bound 
formula (see Equation (4.2) in section 4.4.3), although a certain amount of overestimate 
is introduced. This overestimate is unavoidable as long as there are common factors 
existing among those Minimal Cut Sets. That is, the more the common factors, the 
larger the overestimate. However, if there is no common factor among those Minimal 
Cut Sets, this formula still has a chance to obtain an accurate figure. 
Equation (5.10) shows the calculation details of the total likelihood of this example 
according to the upper bound formula. This means the likelihood of the accident (i. e. 
capsizing of the ship) is not larger than 66.32%. The reason why the equation is "not 
larger than" rather than "equal to" is that the calculated result in light of this formula 
will be somewhat overestimated due to those common factors have been counted more 
than once. It is very important to bear in mind with this feature while applying this 
formula for analysis; this figure is only suitable for comparison and not for the precise 
answer. It is recommended that the overall accident likelihood should refer to the 
Bayesian Network model of Top Event which is introduced in section 5.3.2 and discuss 
the individual Minimal Cut set figures via this Minimal Cut Set model. 
P(TE)S1-(1-0.282X1-0.205X1-0.268X1-0.194)=0.6632 (5.10) 
Figure 5-8 The Bayesian Network model of Minimal Cut Sets of the accident 
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5.5.6 The propagation of the Bayesian Network model 
The propagation is another powerful feature of Bayesian Network. This feature can 
be used to perform "what if' examination in order to predict the possible outcomes of 
each factor involved in the model under the conditions given, as well as the possible 
solutions to prevent the similar accidents from happening again. It is worthy to revisit 
section 4.5.6 for the theoretical details regarding the propagation of Bayesian Network. 
In this section, some assumed examples will be used to illustrate how this functionality 
works and how it can be utilised for inferring. For instance, the accident report indicated 
that the "poor shore management" should take a significant part of the responsibility of 
the tragedy (DoT, 1987). In other words, if the shore management had listened to the 
complaints, suggestions or wishes of their Masters, the accident could have been 
prevented. For verifying this allegation, the established Bayesian Network model of the 
accident can now be used to examine if this argument is rational. Instead of adjusting 
the shore management factor (i. e. L8: shore management) directly, the demonstrated 
example amends factor W (i. e. failure to give clear order about the duties) for 
illustrating some particular features of propagation. It is assumed that if the orders given 
regarding the duties were clear then the probability of P(W1) in the model would be 
increased from 20% to 100%. Consequently, the likelihoods of MCSI-MCS4 shown in 
the established model (see Figure 5-9) reduce to 13.4%, 10.2%, 10.8% and 8.5% 
respectively. They are almost 50% less than the previous outcomes when Figure 5-9 and 
Figure 5-8 are compared. 
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Figure 5-9 The propagation outcomes with the value of node iW changed 
From the Bayesian Network model shown in Figure 5-9, it approves this argument. 
This is achieved by updating the belief of node W assuming a new piece of evidence has 
been found. It makes node W act like an epicentre and a chain reaction of belief update 
is triggered over the Bayesian Network model. All the other nodes in the model are 
influenced and updated according to the dependencies to the epicentre node (i. e. node 
YT). Hence the epicentre node becomes the supreme influencing node over the Bayesian 
Network model and all the other nodes turn out to be its influenced nodes at the time 
even though those used to be its predecessors. However the dependencies between them 
remain the same, only the influencing direction has been reversed. This means that node 
L8 now becomes one of the influenced nodes, rather than an influencing node, of node 
W, although the dependency between them is still the same as before. Since nodes L8 
and U are directly connected with node W, the calculation details for their belief 
updating are illustrated as an example. Because node U is still a successor of node Was 
it was, the marginalisation equations for node U remain the same as Equation (5.9) 
except the probability of P(W1) and P(W2) are changed; they are now 100% and 0% 
respectively. Thus, the likelihood values of P(U1) and P(U2) become 9% and 91% 
accordingly (see Equation (5.11)). 
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1-2 
J-2 
P(U1)P(U11 W,, L7J)xP(W, )P(L7J) 
i=1 
=(0.1x1x0.8)+(0.05x1x0.2)+(0.95x0x0.8)+(0.2x0x0.2) 
=0.08+0.01+0+0=0.09 
1=2 
''Z (5.11) P(U2) _ P(U2 I W,, L7j) x P(W, )P(L71) 
=(0.9xlx0.8)+(0.95x1x0.2)+(0.05xOx0.8)+(0.8xOx0.2) 
=0.72+0.19+0+0=0.91 
Nevertheless, the situation for node L8 is different because it becomes the 
influenced node of node W. This means that the influencing direction is now reversed, 
from node W to node L8 instead. Therefore, the unconditional Probability distributions 
depicted in the Conditional Probability Table for node L8 are not the proper data to be 
directly applied and have to be acquired through the marginalisation formula shown as 
Equation (5.12). 
2 
P(L81) _ ýP(L81 I W, ) x P(W, ) = P(L81 I W)P(W, )+P(L81 Wz)P(W2) 
J. 1 
z 
(5.12) 
p(L82) _ ZP(L82 W1)xP(W1) = P(L82 I WW)P(W)+P(L82 I W2)P(WYW) 
i-1 
There is still a problem due to the fact that no corresponding data with respect to 
P(L8 I W) is available in the Conditional Probability Table. Fortunately, the P(L8I W) 
can be derived from P(W I L8) via Bayes' rule since the dependency between nodes L8 
and W is still unchanged. The details of the calculation for P(L8 W) are shown in 
Equation (5.13). The entire updated outcomes of these nodes (i. e. the Bayesian Network 
model) are shown in Figure 5-9. From the figure, it shows that the shore management 
has been improved, from 20% to 82.6% if the orders given are always clear. It also 
shows that this remedy can dramatically reduce the likelihood of the overall occurrence 
around 50% when the likelihood outcomes of the four Minimal Cut Sets are compared 
with the outcomes shown in Figure 5-8. The overall likelihood of the accident is now 
36.24% according to Equation (5.14). 
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However, this remedy cannot completely prevent the accident to happen because 
some other Window of Opportunities may still exist. It should be noted that the value to 
update node W (or any other node) does not necessarily have to be either 100% or 0% 
(it is just a special case of belief update called Evidence). Precisely speaking, the 
Evidence means that "the information obtains when some particular nodes can only be 
one of the states stood" (Jensen, 2001). Actually, the belief update can be any figure 
between 0 and 1 (i. e. E [0,1] ). 
P(L81 I W) = P(W I L81)P(L8, ) / P(W1) = (0.95 x 0.2) / 0.23 = 0.826 
P(L82 I W, ) = P(W I L82)P(L82) l P(W) = (0.05 x 0.8) / 0.23 = 0.174 
P(L81 I Wi) = P(W2 I L81)P(L81)/P(W2) 
P(L82 I W) = P(WW I L82)P(L82) / P(W2) 
(5.13) 
P(W1) =1 & P(W2) =0 to work with Equation (5.12) 
P(L81) = P(L81 I W)P(W1)+P(L81 I W2)P(W2) = 0.826 
P(L82)= P(L82 I W)P(Wi)+P(L82 I W2)P(W2) = 0.174 
P(TE)51-(1-0.13X1-0.102X1-0.108X1-0.085)=0.3624 (5.14) 
By using the propagation function, it is not only able to determine which factors 
can effectively reduce the likelihood of the accident, but also has more "evidence" to 
say which factors highly likely caused the accident to happen. For instance, in the HoFE 
example, all the evidence has shown that the bow door of the ship was definitely opened 
while sailing and theship's speed reached 18 knots at the time. Such evidence can be 
used to test the established Bayesian Network model to see if the evidence outcomes are 
in line with the reality. Having set up such new evidence, the updated likelihoods of 
these four Minimal Cut Sets soar dramatically while factors F1 and F2 (i. e. status of 
bow door) are both set to the status of "Opened" and factor Hl to "over 18 Kts" (see 
Figure 5-10). Hence the likelihood of MCS1-MCS4 arise by around one more time. All 
the Causal Factors on the left of the figure are almost confirmed to happen. However the 
nodes on the right group only have little change. This updated outcome of the Bayesian 
Network model does confirm the situation that the ship capsized at that time. 
-140- 
Ch. 5: Case Study Using the Proposed Method: Herald of Free Enterprise 
(1-0.54X1-0.39X1-0.542)1-0.392)=0.9219 (5.15) 
Figure 5-10 An application of Evidence examination in which 
"bow door opened' and "ship speed over 18 Kts" are confirmed 
This functionality is very useful when the Bayesian Network model is applied for 
further analysis, because it can provide the investigators with a comprehensive view 
about the influences from one factor to the others over the network. It also means that 
the Bayesian Network model can provide the investigation authority a convenient tool 
to discover the critical factors and the effective countermeasures against the accident. 
Therefore, the authority may be able to conclude a qualitative and quantitative analysis 
of an accident more confidently. However it still remains an important issue unsolved 
yet - how to validate the established Bayesian Network model. The next section will 
provide an answer to this question. 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis of the Bayesian Network model 
Sensitivity Analysis is a technique to determine how "sensitive" a model is to the 
change in the value of the parameters and to the change in the structure of the model (as 
discussed in section 4.6). Regarding the correctness of the structure of a Bayesian 
Network model, Yang (2006) also suggests that it can be checked by carrying out a D- 
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separation examination to each node and comparing the outcomes with the reality. 
Without distracting the discussion, it is presumed that the structure of the example 
model has been checked via D-separation examination and is correct. Hence, the 
Sensitivity Analysis applied for the proposed method merely focuses on two goals. 
They are firstly validating the Conditional Probability Tables of the established 
Bayesian Network model and secondly finding the critical factors of the model. 
Although further applications of Sensitivity Analysis associated with Bayesian Network 
might be possible, the study would first address these two goals and demonstrate the 
relative applications in the next two sections. 
5.6.1 The validation of the established Bayesian Network model of the accident 
The correctness, or at least reasonableness, of the established Bayesian Network 
model is the prerequisite of the following accident analysis as well as the fairness of the 
conclusions and recommendations of the analysis. Therefore, the validation of the 
established Bayesian Network model is the first aim to achieve before further 
progressing. The examination applied for this purpose is called parameter sensitivity 
examining, which is one of the applications of Sensitivity Analysis. For further 
information with respect to this application, it is worth revisiting section 4.6.1. In order 
to perform this examination, several significant Causal Factors have to be chosen in 
advance. By giving variant probability values, as the belief updates, to the selected node 
to trigger the propagations, the behaviours of the model are compared with the reality. If 
the model's behaviours are in line with the observations of the real world, it would be 
more confident to say that the established Bayesian Network model coincides with the 
reality. In this examination, the inputted values are ranged from 0% to 100% step by 
step, and 10% is the interval of the step. 
Therefore, in this example, four human factors are selected as the significant 
Causal Factors to perform this parameters analysis examination. They are the Assistant 
Bosun, the Chief Officer, the Captain and the Shore Management. In the established 
Bayesian Network model these factors are represented by node M (the Assistant Bosun 
was not present to close the bow door), T (the Chief Officer left bow door early), K (the 
Captain assumed that his ship was ready for sea) and L8 (the Shore Management) 
respectively. They were those crucial human factors that should be taken into account, 
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according to the DoT accident report. This is also the reason why these four factors are 
chosen for the examination. Their inputted values, as the belief updates, will be applied 
to one of the chosen node and changed values step by step, in turn, in order to observe 
the changes of the outputs (i. e. MCSI MCS4) according to the propagation outcome. 
Each time, only one of the factors will change the inputted value whilst the value is set 
from 0% (i. e. the most negative behaviour) to 100% (i. e. the most positive behaviour) 
with 10% as the interval for each step. Hence, when the propagation is triggered, the 
likelihoods of the nodes are updated according to the value inputted and the 
dependencies amongst them. It should be noted that some of Causal Factors may be 
represented by more than one node in the Minimal Cut Set model. For example, there 
are two nodes (i. e. node M1 and M2) representing the Assistant Bosun in the model. 
Therefore all the nodes relating to that particular factor have to be changed accordingly 
if there are any. Having updated the belief of the corresponding nodes, the overall 
likelihood of the accident is observed via aggregating the likelihoods of these four 
Minimal Cut Sets with Equation (4.2). The examining outcomes and the comparison 
with regard to these four factors are showed in Figure 5-11. The brief conclusions of the 
outcomes are: 
1. If the Probability distributions of these four human factors can be reduced, the 
likelihood of the accident decreases as well. 
2. All the curves of these factors in the figure converge to a small area while the 
inputted value is set to 100%. It means that the eventual outcome of different 
countermeasures against any one of these four Causal Factors is almost the 
same since they all can shut the Window of Opportunity, no matter which 
holes of the window have been blocked. 
3. The factor of "Assistant bosun was not present to close the bow door" seems 
to be the most critical factor in the model because its adversely influenced 
result is the worst due to its immediate feature to the accident. 
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Figure 5-11 The Sensitivity Analysis results regarding 
these four critical human factors involved in the accident 
These conclusions are in line with the reality of the accident and are considered 
respectively as follows. 
Firstly, according to the outcomes of the parameter sensitivity examination, the 
worse the human factors performance (i. e. the Assistant Bosun, the Chief Officer, the 
Captain and the Shore Management), the higher the likelihood of the accident. This is 
concluded by interpreting the trends of these curves shown in the figure, in which the 
inputted values represent the performance of the human factors and 0% of the value is 
the worst case. The tendencies of these factors are the same. They all have the most 
adverse consequences (on the left of the curves) due to the adverse behaviours (i. e. 0% 
is the inputted values) and the lowest likelihood of the occurrence (on the right) when 
the alertness is given (i. e. 100% is the values). 
Secondly, the bow door could have been closed if any one of them had been 
carried out their duties properly. Accordingly, the accident would not have happened if 
the bow door had been closed. In other words, these four factors line up the trajectory 
and can be seen as an instance of Window of Opportunity. Once any one of the holes in 
the window has been shut, the Window of Opportunity does no longer exist. That also 
explains why the curves converge to a small area. The convergence means the 
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effectiveness of the countermeasures against any one of the selected factors are similar. 
These countermeasures are the means to ensure that the practitioners carry out their 
duties properly. 
Thirdly, the Assistant Bosun is the most immediate factor to the accident and can 
be seen as the active failure. The curve representing the factor of Assistant Bosun has 
the most adverse outcome when comparing with the other three factors. In contrast to 
Assistant Bosun, the Shore Management is the most distant and indirect as the latent 
condition. In addition, the magnitude and the trend of the factor are apparently different 
from the curve of Assistant Bosun. This phenomenon may be utilised to distinguish the 
active failure and latent condition factors of the accident when the Bayesian Network 
model is applied. However, it should also be considered, from another point of view, as 
to why the Assistant Bosun's unintentional error could result in such disastrous 
consequences as though he was entrapped. The management pretended that the 
Assistant Bosun would never fail without any defence (or alarm) mechanism but after 
all he is still a human being. The management should have considered a mechanism to 
prevent this crucial function from failure, such as a positive reporting procedure. If the 
Ship Standing Orders had been designed so that the Assistant Bosun should be required 
to report that the bow door was closed actively, rather than passively, before setting out 
for the sea, the captain should have realised that something was wrong at that time. 
5.6.2 Finding the critical factors of the model 
In addition to the validation of the established Bayesian Network model, 
Sensitivity Analysis can also be used to indicate which parameters (or factors) are 
critical to the model. Having validated the model, finding the critical factors of the 
model is the next step. As noted in section 4.6.2, a node (or parameter) whose specific 
value(s) can significantly influence the outcome of the model is identified as the critical 
factor, which greatly changes the system's behaviour with the change of the node's 
value (Breierova and Choudhari, 1996). In order to ensure that any node has not been 
overlooked, this process should be performed systematically and thoroughly for all the 
nodes in the model. Having the help of a built-in function (i. e. Sensitivity to Finding) of 
the employed Bayesian Network software (i. e. Netica), this requirement can easily be 
achieved. Before performing this function, a target node has to be selected first. The 
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selected target node is the node of concern at the moment. By checking all the nodes in 
the model and obtaining the sensitivity analysis results regarding the target node, the 
entire results can be acquired through a report. 
By appointing node MCSI as the target node in this example, both Table 5-2 and 
Table 5-3 tabulate the sensitivities, to the target node, for each finding node (i. e. the 
other nodes except node MCS1) involved in the model. Table 5-2 shows one of the 
instances (i. e. node M1) in the first part of the report and Table 5-3 lists the entire 
second part of the sensitivity finding report. The second part of the report also ranks all 
the nodes listed, from high to low, according to the sensitivities to the target node. The 
meanings of these data shown in the tables are briefly tabulated in Table 5-4 and the 
details of the definitions are specified in Appendix-C. By analysing these tables, it is 
more confident to say that the factor "Assistant bosun was not present to close the bow 
door", which is presented by node M1 in the model, is the most sensitive (or critical) 
human factor to MSC1, which represents one of the Window of Opportunity of the 
accident. This seems reasonable and is in line with one of the conclusions depicting in 
the last section. 
Table 5-2 The first part of the report: the detailed information for each finding node 
Sensitivity of'MCS1'to findings at'Ml': 
Probability ranges: Min Current Max RMS Change 
capsized 0.0626 0.2816 0.3785 0.1457 
safe 0.6215 0.7184 0.9374 0.1457 
Entropy reduction = 0.0906 (10.6 
Belief Variance = 0.0212 (10.5 
-146- 
Ch 5: Case Study Using the Proposed Method: Herald of Free Enterprise 
Table 5-3 The second part of the report: the summary list of the sensitivities 
Sensitivity o f'MCS1' due to a finding at an other node: 
Node Mutual Info Variance of Beliefs 
MCS 1 0.8577 0.2023 
Al 0.2462 0.0633 
Cl 0.2217 0.0554 
- Fl 0.1959 0.0493 
Ml 0.0906 0.0212 
G1 0.0864 0.0234 
K1 0.0723 0.0173 
MCS3 0.0718 0.0214 
MCS2 0.0537 0.0163 
P 0.0492 0.0116 
D 0.0457 0.0125 
L8 0.0397 0.0094 
0.0368 0.0088 
O 0.0357 0.0084 
Ti 0.0326 0.0073 
J 0.0309 0.0078 
W 0.0274 0.0069 
L3 0.0175 0.0040 
Ni 0.0129 0.0033 
H1 0.01 0.0025 
U 0.0097 0.0026 
R 0.008 0.0022 
K2 0.007 0.0019 
E3 0.0063 0.0017 
A2 0.0056 0.0016 
L4 0.0048 0.0012 
T2 0.0044 0.0012 
G2 0.0042 0.0012 
F2 0.0041 0.0012 
E2 0.0029 0.0008 
M2 0.0028 0.0008 
MCS4 0.0023 0.0007 
B 0.0017 0.0004 
C2 0.0012 0.0003 
H2 0.0003 0 
N2 0 0 
L5 0 0 
L7 0 0 
L6 0 0 
V 0 0 
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Table 5-4 The brief explanation of the meanings of the sensitivity report 
Title Definition 
Minimum belief that each state q of Q can take due to a Min finding at F. This provides a value for each state. 
Maximum belief that each state q of Q can take due to a Max finding at F. This provides a value for each state. 
The square root of the expected change squared of the belief 
of state q of Q, due to a finding at F. This provides a value for RMS Change 
each state. This is the standard deviation of P(gjf) about P(q) due 
to a finding at F, with the finding at F distributed by P (f). 
The mutual information between Q and F (measured in bits). Entropy reduction The expected reduction in entropy of Q (measured in bits) (Mutual Info) due to a finding at F. 
The expected change squared of the beliefs of Q, taken over Belief Variance 
all of its states, due to a findin at F. 
Notation: 
Q: is the query variable 
F: is the varying variable 
q: is a state of the query variable 
f is a state of the varying variable 
RMS: is "root mean square", which is the square root of the average of the 
values squared. 
After carrying out the same examination to all the WoOs (i. e. Minimal Cut Sets) of 
the accident, one by one, and gathering their results, the investigators are able to 
identify the critical factors with a broadened picture. Having concluded these identified 
critical factors according to the Bayesian Network model, it would be helpful for the 
authorities to decide which conclusions and recommendations are objective to the 
investigation report. These two Sensitivity Analysis processes may repeat if any 
improper value of the nodes has been found during the process. It is expected that this 
critical factors finding process can lead to the resolution of the experts' disagreements 
or arguments in terms of critical factors by appreciating the influences of each node to 
the model. 
5.7 Influence Diagrams for the accident analysis 
In this section, the study will demonstrate an instance that applies the Maximum 
Expected Utility (MEU) of Influence Diagrams as the tool to assess the Risk Control 
Options (RCOs) against the analysed accidents. The Influence Diagrams model is 
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derived from the established Bayesian Network model of the accident, as the foundation, 
having considered cost-benefit issue. The Risk Control Options represented by the 
Expected Utilities in the model are the countermeasures to the analysed accident. From 
the view of decision making, it would be helpful if the countermeasures for preventing 
the type of accidents are evaluated in terms of cost-benefit and the effectiveness of all 
possible solutions. In order to illustrate this notion, a pattern of Expected Utility which 
is proposed in section 4.7 will be applied to the Herald of Free Enterprise example in 
the next two sections. Four presumed Risk Control Options are utilised as the 
countermeasures to construct the corresponding Influence Diagrams model for the 
demonstration. 
5.7.1 Applying Influence Diagrams to assess the Risk Control Options (RCOs) 
against the accident 
In order to demonstrate the process of applying Influence Diagrams, as the tool, to 
assess the Risk Control Options for accident analysis, the established Bayesian Network 
model for the accident of Herald of Free Enterprise is used and expanded. It is presumed 
that the established Bayesian Network model, constructed through the proposed method, 
is validated. For finding the best countermeasure from all of the possible solutions, an 
Influence Diagrams model which is constructed by adding several Decision and Utility 
nodes, including some Chance nodes, into the established Bayesian Network model is 
utilised. These new added nodes are four Chance-nodes (i. e. node MCSIN - MCS4N), 
one Decision node (i. e. node RCO) and five Utility nodes (i. e. node Payoff I- Payoff `_4 
and node Cost). This construction follows the proposed pattern of Expected Utility 
depicted in section 4.7.1 to construct the Influence Diagrams model in order to assess 
the four-alternative Risk Control Options for decision-making (see Figure 5-12). These 
four Risk Control Options are mainly against the (or similar) type of HoFE accident 
with estimated costs figures for demonstration purposes. All the assumptions used are 
based on a five year period of ship's expected operating life. All the costs for equipment 
include the maintenance fee (estimated at roughly 5% of purchase price per year). These 
four Risk Control Options are listed and depicted as follows. 
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º R000: Nothing has been improved except the crews have been replaced. No 
further corresponding countermeasures are taken. Hence there is no extra cost 
imposed. 
º RCO 1: Sufficient manpower is provided; it can be seen as ensuring that two crew 
members are always at the bow door to secure its closure before sailing. In this 
case, the extra cost is £20,000 per year. 
RC02: A bow door monitoring system is installed; this allows the captain to 
check the status of the bow door anytime during the journey. £20,000 is the cost 
for installation and £1,000 is the maintenance fee per year. 
º RCO3: It can be deemed as a set of tougher safety regulations is imposed (e. g. 
International Safety Management Code) or an Anti-FSI (Free Surface Instability) 
device is geared, such as the installation of a longitudinal bulkhead on the G 
deck. It is assumed that its initial cost is £200,000 and £10,000 is the annual 
expense. 
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In order to simplify the explanation, the following paragraph only concentrates on 
the calculation details of the Risk Control Options for MCSIN. The calculations 
regarding the rest of the Minimal Cut Sets over the Risk Control Options are not 
detailed further; instead Netica software is used. In the new constructed Influence 
Diagrams model, an extra Chance node is added following each Minimal Cut Set node, 
as a child node. Therefore four new Chance nodes (i. e. MCSIN MCS41V) represent the 
posterior status (i. e. the remedied outcomes) of the Minimal Cut Sets after the Risk 
Control Options are implemented. Each such extra child node is named following its 
parent node with an extra "N" at the end of the label. For example MCSIN denotes the 
posterior status of MCS1. Table 5-5 shows the Conditional Probability Tables for nodes 
MCS1N - MCS4N whilst Table 5-6 shows the data for nodes Payoff and Cost. The 
conditional probability data for MCS2N - MCS4N is the same as MCSJN, and also 
refers to Table 5-5. Since the Conditional Probability Table data for the Utility nodes 
Payoff 1- Payoff j are identical, only one instance is shown in Table 5-6. It has two 
entries: -£8,000,000 (if ship is capsized and totally lost) and £4,000,000 (if ship is safe 
in 5 years time and has the revenue returned). In addition, the posterior status of the 
Minimal Cut Sets (i. e. MCSIN - MCS4N) depicts the probability (or prediction) 
regarding the change of the likelihood of these Minimal Cut Sets (i. e. MCSI - MCS4) 
when these Risk Control Options are implemented. For example, in Table 5-5 the most 
left top data entry specifies the posterior occurrence probability for capsize is almost 
equal to one if RCOO is implemented and the condition given by MCSJ happens. It 
means, in this example, that if the likelihood of capsize under the condition given by 
MCSI is 28.2% (as indicated for MCSJ in Figure 5-12), then 99.9% of the 28.2% will 
be the likelihood for MCS1N to be capsized. In other words, the final likelihood 
outcome of node MCSJN depends on the likelihood result of its parent node (i. e. node 
MCSJ). 
Table 5-5 The Conditional Probability Table of nodes MCSI N- MCS4N 
MCS 1~4 capsized Safe 
RCO RCOO RCO1 RCO2 RCO3 RCOO RCO1 RCO2 RCO3 
4 N MCS 1 capsized 
0.999 0.2 0.2 0.05 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 ) ( - 
safe 0.001 0.8 0.8 0.95 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
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Table 5-6 The Utility tables for Payoff and Cost 
Payoff 
capsized £ -8,000,000 
safe £ 4,000,000 
Cost 
RCOO £ 0 
RCO1 £ -100,000 
RCO2 £ -25,000 
RCO3 £ -250,000 
By applying Equation (5.16) in section 5.7.2, the individual Expected Utility 
results against each Minimal Cut Set over all the possible countermeasures (i. e. Risk 
Control Options) are listed in Table 5-7. In the table, the row MCS1 - MCS4 reveal the 
Expected Utilities results when only one particular Minimal Cut Set is considered over 
RCO1 - RCO4 respectively. For instance, each entry in the row labelled as MCSI 
reveals the Expected Utility under the condition that MCS1 is the only Minimal Cut Set 
considered in the model when these four Risk Control Options are imposed individually. 
Therefore the Expected Utility results with regard to one particular Minimal Cut Set 
over each Risk Control Option can be specified individually. This is achieved via the 
calculations detailed in section 5.7.2, in which the Expected Utilities for MCS1 are the 
examples illustrated. Table 5-7 tabulates the manual calculation results as well as the 
Netica software readouts. This table provides an opportunity to appreciate how these 
Expected Utilities responsed to each Minimal Cut Set and then influence to the 
synthesis outcomes for each Risk Control Option. The row "EU(Total)" depicts the 
value that sums up the four entries which represent the individual Minimal Cut Sets in 
the same column. The row labelled as "EU (corrected)" is the result by taking out three 
times of "cost" value from the "EU(Total)" value in each column. This is because, in 
each row belonging to each Minimal Cut Set, the "cost" has already been taken into 
account once at every entry. There will be three times of redundant "cost" value 
overestimated if the figure for each Expected Utility simply sums up the data in the 
same column of the table without correction. Therefore, the redundant "cost" value 
should be taken out for correction. The figures shown in row "Netica display" are the 
Expected Utility outcomes over each Risk Control Option while these four Minimal Cut 
Sets are considered simultaneously. They are derived from the readout shown in the 
Influence Diagrams model of HoFE (see Figure 5-12). The differences between the data 
-152- 
Ch 5: Case Study Using the Proposed Method: Herald of Free Enterprise 
shown in row "EU (corrected)" and "Netica display" are minor and is reasonably 
believed to be from the effective decimal digits taken. Therefore, according to this 
outcome, there is no doubt that the RCO3 (i. e. gear up Anti-FSI devices for the ship) is 
the best choice of the countermeasure in five year time when considering the posterior 
occurrence probability and cost-benefit issue simultaneously. This is concluded from 
the ranking result of RCO3 > RCO2 > RCO 1> RCOO. 
Table 5-7 The summary of Expected Utility for each RCO and MCS 
(manual 
calculations) 
RCOO RCO1 RC02 RC03 
MCS1 £ 610768 £ 3214584 £ 3289584 £ 3572184 
MCS2 £ 1532920 £ 3398460 £ 3473460 £ 3617460 
MCS3 £ 778432 £ 3248016 £ 3323016 £ 3580416 
MCS4 £ 1664656 £ 3424728 £ 3499728 £ 3623928 
EU (Total) £ 4586776 
1f. 13285788 £ 13585788 £ 14393988 
EU (corrected) £ 4586776 £ 13585788 £ 13660788 £ 15143988 
INetica 
display £ 4590000 ;C 13580000 £ 13660000 1Z 
15140000 
P. S. the minor difference between the outcomes of "Netica display" and "EU 
(corrected)" results from the effective decimal digits taken (i. e. only four digits are 
rounded and shown in the Influence Diagrams model) 
5.7.2 The Expected Utility (EU) calculation details for MCS1 
In this section, the calculation details which acquire the Expected Utility results for 
MCSI over these four Risk Control Options are illustrated. The likelihood outcomes 
regarding MCS1 - MCS4 shown in the established Bayesian Network model are listed 
in Table 5-8 for the following calculations although only the data of MCSI will be 
utilised. The equation applied for the calculation is shown in Equation (5.16) below. 
The data involved in the calculation also refers to Table 5-5 and Table 5-6. The details 
of the calculation are illustrated in Equation (5.17), in which the individual Expected 
Utility results (i. e. RCOO-RCO3) for MCSI are illustrated one by one with the data 
involved. In the equation, some of the data has to refer to Table 5-5, which shows the 
posterior occurrence probability of each individual Minimal Cut Set when these Risk 
Control Options have been implemented. 
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Table 5-8 The likelihood for each MCS in the Bayesian Network model 
MCS1 MCS2 MCS3 MCS4 
capsized 0.282 0.205 0.268 0.194 
safe 0.718 0.795 0.732 0.806 
EU(MCS 1, RCO) =U (Cost)+E P(MCS 1N I MCS 1, RCO)x U(Payoff) (5.16) 
There are four parts in Equation (5.17). The first part of the equation (i. e. 
EU(MCSI, R000)) reveals the calculation details for acquiring the Expected Utility 
given MCS1 over RCOO whilst Equation (5.16) is applied. Therefore the U(Cost) 
is 
inputted by zero when referring to the data entry of RCOO in Utility Table Cost (see 
Table 5-6). Then, for P(MCS IN I MCS 1= capisized, RCO = RCOO), it has to refer to 
Table 5-5 at column "MCS1=capsized" and "RCO=RCOO". This was 0.999 for 
"capsized" and 0.001 for "safe" respectively. In the Utility Table "Payoff', there are two 
states (i. e. "capsized" and "safe" in Table 5-6). This represents the revenue that the ship 
can obtain under these two different circumstances. Hence, the data for U(Payoff) to be 
picked up, from the table, depend on which condition the P(MCS IN I MCS 1) is given. 
For example, in Equation (5.17), 0.999 x£-8,000,000 is taken for "MCSI N=capsized" 
and 0.001 x £4,000,000 for "MCSl N safe" when "MCS1=capsized". Finally, the 
answer acquired for EU(MCS 1, RCOO) is £ 610,768 when Equation (5.16) and those 
data shown in the tables are applied. In order to validate the outcomes of Equation 
(5.17), an Influence Diagrams model regarding this demonstration is utilised and shown 
in Figure 5-13. The Expected Utility results are under the condition that only MCSI 
exists, and therefore the reading of node RCO can be utilised to validate the results 
acquired by the manual calculation. Although there are minor differences between the 
manual calculations outcomes and the software readings, they are reasonably equivalent. 
Again, such minor differences are believed resulting from the differences of the 
effective decimal digits taken (i. e. only three digits after the decimal point are taken for 
the manual calculation but there are far more than three digits in the software). For 
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instance, the software reading shows the Expected Utility of RCOI is £3.215e6 (i. e. 
3.215 x 106) whilst the result of the manual calculation is £ 3,214,584. They are not the 
same but the difference is minor. 
EU(MCS1, RCOO) = £0 
+ 0.282 x (0.999 x£-8,000,000 + 0.001 x £4,000,000) 
+ 0.718 x 0.001 x£-8,000,000 + 0.999 x £4,000,000) 
= £0 + 0.282 x (£ - 7,992,000 + £4,000) + 0.718 x 
(£ 
- 8,000 + £3,996,000 
= £610,768 
EU(MCS1, RCOI) =£ -100,000 
+ 0.282 x (0.2 x£-8,000,000 + 0.8 x £4,000,000) 
+ 0.718 x (0.001 x£-8,000,000 + 0.999 x £4,000,000) 
_£ -100,000 + 0.282 x 
(£ 
-1,600,000 + £3,200,000)+ 0.718 x 
(£ 
- 8,000 + £3,996,000) 
_ £3,214,584 
(5.17) 
EU(MCS 1, RCO2) =£- 25,000 
+ 0.282 x (0.2 x£-8,000,000 + 0.8 x £4,000,000 
+ 0.718 x (0.001 x ;E-8,000,000 + 0.999 x £4,000,000) 
=£- 25,000 + 0.282 x (£ -1,600,000 + £3,200,000) + 0.718 x (£ - 8,000 + £3,996,000) 
= £3,289,584 
EU(MCS 1, RCO3) =£- 250,000 
+ 0.282 x (0.05 x£-8,000,000 + 0.95 x £4,000,000) 
+ 0.718 x (0.001 x£-8,000,000 + 0.999 x £4,000,000) 
=£- 250,000 + 0.282 x (£ - 400,000 + £3,800,000)+ 0.718 x (£ - 8,000 + £3,996,000) 
= £3,572,184 
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Figure 5-13 The Influence Diagrams of HoFE accident while only MCSI exists 
5.8 Discussion 
From the case study examined in this chapter, the hypothesis of implementing the 
Window of Opportunity of Reason's Swiss Cheese Model with the Minimal Cut Sets of 
FTA has been demonstrated, although it is an approximate outcome. It is not carried out 
via FTA alone, but several risk assessment techniques are used, one by one, step by step 
in the procedure. Each of these techniques (i. e. WBA, Karnaugh map, FTA, Bayesian 
Network and Influence Diagrams) provides a particular part of the procedure which has 
been formulated from Reason's Window of Opportunity in his Swiss Cheese Model. 
This method brings a comprehensive picture of the accident structure via the Baycsian 
Network model with results of both qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
With the help of the Bayesian Network model, an insight into the occurrence that 
diagnosing the critical factors involved and predicting the interactions amongst these 
factors are available. This is achieved by employing the Bayesian Network propagation 
feature which enables "what if' examination to be performed in order to objectively 
figure out which factors are critical and what the possible influences from one factor to 
another will be. In addition to the Bayesian Network model, the Influence Diagrams 
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model which is in conjunction with Utility and Decision nodes based on the established 
Bayesian Network model can offer the decision makers with a useful tool to examine 
the cost-benefit of the countermeasures from several choices in order to select one of the 
best Risk Control Option. 
In summary, this case study has shown that the proposed method is capable of 
achieving the requirements of analysing an accident qualitatively and quantitatively as 
well as evaluating the best countermeasure efficiently. The advantages of the method 
are briefly listed as follows. 
 A systematic procedure to sort out the Minimal Cut Sets of the accident as the 
qualitative analysis result is in line with the notion of Window of Opportunity of 
Reason's Swiss Cheese Model. 
  Both the qualitative and quantitative analysis result of the accident can 
simultaneously be shown on a Bayesian Network model. 
 A Bayesian Network model established according to the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis results can perform a series of "what if' ' examinations. 
  The applied Sensitivity Analysis method is capable of relieving the problem of 
validating the analysed results as well as finding out the critical factors via a 
thorough and systematic process. 
  An Influence Diagrams model based on the established Bayesian Network 
model of the accident is a useful tool for decision makers to select the best Risk 
Control Option from various countermeasures. 
  The application of Expected Utility based on the accident analysis results has 
considered occurrence likelihood, effectiveness of the RCOs and payoff issues 
for decision makers to select the best countermeasures as a means of cost-benefit 
resolution. 
From another perspective, although this method is dedicated to marine accidents 
analysis, it could be employed to other domains for the application of preliminary safety 
prediction, especially for the topics where no proper mathematic model is available. 
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Chapter Six - 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System - for 
Maritime Accidents (HFACS-MA) 
Summary 
From the viewpoint of Human and Organisational Factors (HOFs) of maritime 
accidents and the prevailing human factors analysis methodology in the aviation 
industry, it is obviously worthwhile to develop a dedicated HOFs framework to deal 
with the human factor issue for the maritime industry. In this chapter, a prototype 
HOFs 
framework is proposed and named as Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System for Maritime Accidents (HFACS-MA). Several advantages that the framework 
can offer are demonstrated in different sections. In section 6.2, the details of the 
proposed framework are specified level by level to show the hierarchy of HOFs. The 
benefits for the investigators in identifying the human factors issues during the 
investigation stage are described in section 6.3. Finally, in section 6.4, an example 
analysis showing the combination of the framework with the Fault Tree - Bayesian 
Network (FT-BN) analysis results of the accidents can provide investigators a more 
comprehensive picture of the influence of the human factors involved in the accident. 
6.1 Introduction 
"What makes the `Swiss cheese' model particularly useful in accident investigation 
is that it forces the investigators to address latent failures within the causal sequence of 
events as well. ... However, a 
limitation of Reason's model is it fails to identify the 
exact nature of the `hole' in the cheese" (Shappell and Wiegmann 2003b). Although the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) guidelines have specified the procedure to 
be followed and the topics to be covered when the investigators collect the information 
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or evidences for human factor involved in marine casualties and incidents, there is still 
no dedicated HOFs framework for the maritime industry to illustrate the hierarchy of 
the causal sequences. Therefore, the necessity to develop a specific HOFs framework 
for the maritime industry to help the investigators to identify the human factors 
involved, as well as to figure out the causality amongst these factors, should be 
considered. 
This study therefore proposes the notion of HFACS-MA, which mainly follows the 
principles of the Human Factors Analysis and Classffication System (HFACS) (see 
Figure 3-6) (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003b) and the Systemic Occurrence Analysis 
Methodology (SOAM) (EUROCONTROL, 2005). Most importantly, it complies with 
the guidelines for the investigation of human factors in marine casualties and incidents 
(IMO A. 884), which was adopted by IMO in 1999. Both HFACS and SOAM apply 
Reason's (1997) Swiss Cheese Model as the kernel concept of the framework. However, 
SOAM has also considered Hawkins's (1987) SHEL model (i. e. Software, Hardware, 
Environment and Liveware when identifying the causal factors which the sharp end 
personnel encountered at the time of the accidents. In contrast, HFACS has concentrated 
more on the contextual influences of active failures and latent conditions amongst 
different levels. 
The proposed HFACS-MA framework mimics the classification of HFACS but the 
content of level one (i. e. Unsafe Acts) and level two (i. e. Preconditions) have been 
modified according to the requirements of IMO guidelines. In the proposed Unsafe Acts 
level, it incorporates aspects of Reason's (1990) Generic Error Modelling System 
(GEMS) including the differentiation between errors and violations. Furthermore, in the 
Preconditions level, it adheres to the SHEL model as the core to distinguish the types of 
factors involved. Figure 6-1 gives an overview of the framework, from which at least 
two advantages can be gained. In the first place, it is not only a dedicated HOFs 
framework, satisfying the requirements of maritime industry, but also suitable for the 
proposed Fault Tree Analysis - Bayesian Network (FTA-BN) analysis method, which is 
detailed in Chapters 4 and 5, to classify the identified critical factors into their proper 
categories. This classification of the HOFs is the foundation for further statistical study 
or data exchanging between authorities regarding safety issues. In the second place, it 
will help the investigators to gain a more comprehensive picture about the relative 
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causal influences of various human factors aspects when gathering information or 
evidence during an accident investigation period. 
The aviation industry has relied on HFACS in analysing the underlying human 
factors causes of accidents for many years (Wiegmann and Rantanen 2003; Wiegmann 
et al., 2005; Scarborough et al,. 2005; Shappell and Wiegmann 2003a; Shappell et al., 
2007). HFACS has also made valuable contributions to investigations of railway 
accidents (Reinach and Viale, 2006; Baysari et al., 2008). The present study considers 
that it should be beneficial to incorporate HFACS into the proposed framework for 
maritime accident analysis. The resultant HFACS-MA framework has the following 
aspects: 
  The Unsafe Acts level takes into account Reason's GEMS model and can be 
seen as the centre component of the SHEL model (i. e. the central Liveware), 
which represents the conditions of sharp end personnel. 
  The Preconditions level consists of the four components of the SHEL model and 
the Personnel Factors proposed in the original HFACS framework. This is in 
line with the study that has been made by Celik an Er (2007). They has pointed 
out the "integrated unit" (i. e. hardware) shall be considered within the HFACS 
in order to identify the design-based human factors. Thus the proposed approach 
presumes that the preconditions of sharp end personnel encountered at the time 
of an accident can be more comprehensively specified with the proposed 
Preconditions level. That is the investigators should consider Software, 
Hardware, Environment, peripheral Liveware, and Personnel Factors 
comprehensively at this level. 
  In the IMO guidelines, no specific differentiation is made between Unsafe 
Supervision and Organisational Influences; both are considered as parts of the 
Management issue. This study recommends that the framework should remain as 
four levels as in the original HFACS approach. It is believed that it would 
benefit the maritime industry to make a clear distinction between the possible 
causal influences at Supervisory and at Organisational levels rather than simply 
counting them together as the factors of Management. 
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6.2 The framework of HFACS-MA 
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Unsafe i 
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Figure 6-1 The overview of the HFACS-MA framework 
In this section, each level of the proposed framework is specified, from the sharp 
end personnel level to the organisational level, with the categories contained in the level 
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and the brief explanations of each category. The proposed HOFs framework (i. e. 
HFACS-MA) comprises four levels (see Figure 6-1); they are: 
b Unsafe Acts (i. e. the lowest level); 
Preconditions; 
Unsafe Supervision; 
b Organisational Influences (i. e. the highest level). 
Each level consists of several categories. For example, there are three categories 
comprising the Organisational Influences level. Each category defines numerous items 
as the human factors of the type. It is intended that the specific items of each level can 
be varied according to the requirements of the applied fields or realm. Some of the 
levels contain a table listing examples of potential items in the categories. What the 
present study wants to emphasise is that the items given in these tables are only 
indicated as potentially relevant. They are not determined yet, but to illustrate the notion 
of the HOFs framework. Those items are mainly elicited from the definitions of human 
element in IMO guidelines A. 884(21), in which the terms and the definitions are given. 
In the following sections, the overview of the levels and the preliminary definition 
of each category will be shown. Nevertheless, the details of items for each category and 
the definitions of each item need to be carried out by other comprehensive studies, and 
is out of the scope of this study. At this stage, the study only gives an overview of the 
framework and its application in cooperating with the FTA-BN method for accident 
analysis. 
6.2.1 Unsafe Acts 
The first (or lowest) level of the proposed HOFs framework is Unsafe Acts level. 
The IMO guidelines suggest that "an unsafe act is defined as an error or violation that 
is committed in the presence of a hazard or potential unsafe condition" (IMO A. 884). 
This definition seems to derive from Reason's suggestion that "an unsafe act is an error 
or a violation committed in the presence of a potential hazard: some mass, energy or 
toxicity that, if not properly controlled, could cause injure or damage" (Reason, 1990). 
Reason further defines "the psychological varieties of unsafe acts which are classified 
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initially according to whether the act was intended or unintended and the distinction 
between errors and violations" (Reason, 1990) (see Figure 6-2). 
Figure 6-2 The classification of "Unsafe Acts" (from Reason, 1990) 
This differentiation between error and violation is also adopted by the HFACS 
when defining the unsafe acts of operators; it is loosely classified into two categories: 
errors and violations. Errors represent "the mental or physical activities of individuals 
that fail to achieve their intended outcome" whilst violations refer to "the wilful 
disregard for the rules and regulations that govern the safety" (Shappell and Wiegmann, 
2003b). Meanwhile, U. S. Department of Defence (DoD) defines unsafe acts of their 
practice version as "those factors that are most closely tied to the mishap, and can be 
described as active failures or actions committed by the operator that result in human 
error or unsafe situation" (U. S. DoD, 2005). 
Therefore, the proposed HOFs framework adopts. Reason's Generic Error 
Modelling System (GEMS) to distinguish errors from violations in order to follow the 
suggestions of the IMO guidelines. The study suggests that the unsafe acts level 
consists of two categories; they are errors and violations (see Figure 6-3). Their detailed 
definitions are described in the next two sections. 
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(GEMS) 
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Skill-based Rule-based Knowledge- Routine Exceptional 
Errors Mistakes Based Mistakes Violations Violations 
Figure 6-3 The "Unsafe Acts" level of HFACS-MA 
6.2.1.1 Errors (GEMS) 
In this category, the key feature is GEMS, which is asserted by Reason as that, 
"when confronted with a problem, human beings are strongly biased to search for and 
find a pre-packaged solution at the Rule-Based (RB) level before resorting to the far 
more effortful Knowledge-Based (KB) level, even where the latter is demanded at the 
outset" (Reason, 1990). This means that "errors (i. e. slips and lapse) occurring prior to 
problem detection are seen as being mainly associated with monitoring failures, whilst 
those that appear subsequently (RB and KB mistakes) are included under the general 
heading of problem-solving failures" (Reason, 1990). Figure 6-4 outlines the dynamics 
of the GEMS. 
It is believed that errors or mistakes described in GEMS are derived in large part 
from Rasmussen's Skill-Rule-Knowledge classification of human performance and 
yield three basic human error types (Reason, 1990), in which errors are unintended and 
"a mistake is an intentional action, but there is no deliberate decision to act against a 
rule or plan" (IMO A. 884) (see Figure 6-2). In other words, "errors are factors in a 
mishap when mental or physical activities of the operator fail to achieve their intended 
outcomes as a result of Skill-Based errors leading to an unsafe situation" (U. S. DoD, 
2005). These are failures in execution, e. g. lapses or slips. In contrast, Rule-Base or 
Knowledge-Base mistakes are actions that are carried out as planned but the actions are 
inappropriate; these are failures in planning (IMO A. 884). 
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Figure 6-4 The dynamics of the GEMS (from Reason, 1990) 
In summary, these three types of errors or mistakes are defined as follows: 
Skill-Based (slips and lapse) errors: "slips are an unintentional action where 
the failure involves attention whilst lapses are an unintentional action where 
the failure involves memory" (IMO A. 884). Here, "attention failures 
commonly occur during highly automatic behaviour and memory failure often 
appears as omitted items in a checklist, place losing, or forgotten intention" 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003b). 
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/ Rule-Based mistakes: They are the mistakes involving "the inappropriate 
matching of environmental signs to the situational component of well-tried 
troubleshooting rules" (Reason, 1990). The control mechanism operating at 
the Rule-Based level is goal-oriented, but it is a feed-forward control which is 
structured by the large number of rules stored. 
º Knowledge-Based mistakes: They happen "when the individual has run out 
of applicable problem-solving routines and is forced to resort to attention 
processing within the conscious workspace. Mistakes at the Knowledge- 
Based level have hit-and-miss qualities not dissimilar to the errors of 
beginners and will be less predictable in their forms" (Reason, 1990). 
6.2.1.2 Violations 
Violations are "factors in a mishap when the actions of the operator represent 
wilful disregard for rules and instructions, and lead to an unsafe situation" (U. S. DoD, 
2005). These rules and instructions, including regulations, govern safe behaviour. 
Unlike errors, violations are deliberate and occur much less frequently since they often 
involve fatalities (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003b). Meanwhile, the IMO guidelines 
state that "a violation is a planning failure where a deliberate decision to act against a 
rule or plan has been made" (IMO A. 884). Both the IMO guidelines and IHFACS 
suggest that the violations can be divided into two types: Routine and Exceptional. 
0 Routine violations: routine violations are those factors which "tend to be 
habitual by nature and often tolerated by governing authority" (Shappell and 
Wiegmann, 2003b). "Routine violations occur everyday as people regularly 
modify or do not strictly comply with work procedures, often because of 
poorly designed or defined work practices" (IMO A. 884). "If a routine 
violation is identified, one must look further up the supervisory chain to 
identify those individuals in authority who are not enforcing the rules" 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003b). 
º Exceptional violations: exceptional violations appear as "isolated departures 
from authority, not necessarily indicative of individual's typical behaviour 
pattern, nor condoned by management" (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003b). An 
exceptional violation "tends to be a one-time breach of a work practice, such 
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as safety regulations being deliberately ignored to carry out a task. Even so, 
the intention was not to commit a malevolent act but just to get the job done" 
(IMO A. 884). Shappell and Wiegmann (2003b) point out that most 
exceptional violations are usually "heinous and have an extreme nature. They 
are considered exceptional because they are neither typical of the individuals, 
nor condoned by the authority". 
6.2.2 Preconditions (SHEL) 
Preconditions are the second level of the framework and are deemed as latent 
states which create potential for a wide variety of unsafe acts. Each precondition can 
contribute to a large number of unsafe acts, depending upon the prevailing conditions. 
This means that, at this level, the "some-to-many mapping between preconditions and 
unsafe acts play a significant part in both provoking and shaping an almost infinitely 
large set of unsafe acts" (Reason, 1990). Hence "the only sensible way of dealing with 
these unsafe acts is, first, to eliminate their preconditions as far as possible and, second, 
to accept that, whatever the measures taken, some unsafe acts will still occur, and so 
provide defences that will intervene between the acts and their adverse consequences" 
(Reason, 1990). 
The original HFACS suggests that the process involves analysing preconditions of 
unsafe acts should include the condition of the operators, environmental and personnel 
factors (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003b). However, the IMO guidelines recommend 
that the first step in the human factors investigation process is the collection of "work- 
related information regarding the personnel, tasks, equipment, and environmental 
conditions involved in the occurrence" (IMO A. 884). Precisely speaking, the guidelines 
recommend the use of the SHEL model as an organisational tool for the investigators 
avoiding that critical information will be overlooked or lost during an investigation. 
The original SHEL model, named after the initial letters of its components, 
Software (S), Hardware (H), Environment (E) and Liveware (L), was first developed by 
Edwards (1972). Later, Hawkins developed the Edwards's SHEL model from the view 
of the interfaces between a central Liveware element (i. e. the sharp end personnel) and 
other components to construct a "building block" style model. In this model the four 
components surround the central Liveware and affect the behaviour of the central 
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Liveware (see Figure 6-5 (a)). In the model, the edges of the blocks are not simple and 
straight since interfaces are rarely, if ever, perfectly aligned, and the central Liveware is 
usually the one has to adapt to incompatibility (Hawkins, 1987). This model helped the 
subsequent study of the human factors involved in flight. However, both models are 
based on the exactly same concepts. 
(a) SHEL model (b) multiple SHEL model 
Figure 6-5 The demonstration of the SHEL model (from Hawkins, 1987) 
Moreover, in a complex system (e. g. involving distributed cognition), it is often 
necessary to have multiple Software, Hardware, Environmental and Liveware elements 
existing (see Figure 6-5 (b)). In the SHEL model's viewpoint, the mismatch of the 
interfaces between the operators and the surrounding components can be the sources of 
human error. In this sense, the categories proposed in the Preconditions level are: 
condition of operator, software, hardware, environment and Liveware (see Figure 6-6). 
The application of the SHEL model leads to some dramatic differences from the 
original HFACS approach. This is because the "identification of a mismatch may be the 
identification of a safety deficiency in the system" (IMO A. 884). In summary, 
Preconditions are factors in a mishap if active and/or latent preconditions - such as 
conditions of the operators, software, hardware, environmental or other personnel (i. e. 
Liveware) practices, conditions or actions of individuals - result in human error or an 
unsafe situation. Thus, investigators must dig deeper into this level to explore why the 
unsafe acts occurred. Each category of the level is detailed in the following sections. 
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Figure 6-6 The "Preconditions" level of HFACS-MA 
6.2.2.1 Condition of Operator(s) 
The human element placed at the centre of the SHEL model is "the most valuable 
and flexible in the system. Each person brings their own capabilities and limitations to 
the work" (IMO A. 884). Hence, "the condition of an individual can, and often does, 
influence the performance on the job" (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003b). HFACS 
suggests that three conditions of operators can directly impact the performance; they are 
adverse mental states, adverse physiological states and physical/mental limitations. Also 
personal readiness should be counted in this category because a compromise in personal 
readiness can lead to the failure of physical or mental preparation for duty. 
6.2.2.2 Software 
Software is the non-physical part of the system including organisational policies, 
procedures, manuals, checklist layouts, charts, maps, advisories and, increasingly, 
computer programs (IMO A. 884). "They are often less tangible than those associated 
with the Liveware-Hardware interface and encompass the non-physical aspects of the 
system, e. g. symbology" (Hawkins, 1987). 
6.2.2.3 Hardware 
Hardware refers to "the equipment part of a transportation system. It includes the 
design of work stations, displays, controls, seats, etc. " (IMO A. 884). "The natural 
human characteristic of adapting to Liveware-Hardware mismatches masks, but does 
not remove, their existence and the operators may never be aware of the deficiency, 
even when it finally leads to disaster" (Hawkins, 1987). 
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6.2.2.4 Environment 
Environmental factors are "factors in a mishap if physical or technological factors 
affect practices, conditions and actions of an individual and result in human error or an 
unsafe situation" (U. S. DoD, 2005). Sometimes the broad political and economic 
constraints under which the system operates are included in this category. The 
regulatory climate is a part of the environment because it affects communications, 
decision-making, control and co-ordination" (IMO A. 884). 
º Physical: Physical environment aspects are factors in a mishap if 
environmental phenomena such as "internal and external weather, climate, 
temperature, visibility, vibration, noise and other conditions, which constitute 
the conditions within which people are working", affect the actions of 
individuals and result in human error or an unsafe situation (IMO A. 884). 
This subcategory mainly focuses on the nature of environmental factors. 
º Technological: Technological environment aspects are "factors in a mishap 
when workspace design factors or automation affects the actions of 
individuals and result in human error or an unsafe situation" (U. S. DoD, 
2005). These factors encompass a variety of issues including the design of 
workplace and controls, information exchanging characteristics, task factors 
and automations. This subcategory emphasizes the importance of artificial 
environmental factors, e. g. harbour, waterway and traffic control issues, and 
so on. 
6.2.2.5 Liveware 
The peripheral Liveware refers to "the system's human-human interactions, 
including such factors as management, supervision, crew interactions and 
communications" (IMO A. 884). This is because, increasingly, "attention is being turned 
to the team-work of the system from the individual since group influence can be 
expected to play a role in determining behaviour and performances" (Hawkins, 1987). 
In summary, the Preconditions level focuses on revealing the underlying factors 
behind the act or decision of an individual or group. Therefore, it is important to 
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determine whether there were any factors in the work system that may have facilitated 
the expression of the given failure mode at the Unsafe Acts level. They can be found by 
examining the work system information, and are organised using the SHEL or GEMS 
model (IMO A. 884). Table 6-1 lists some example items for each category involved in 
the Preconditions level. These items are elicited from the IMO guidelines and are not a 
complete listing. The aim of showing the list is to provide a conceptual image of the 
scope. The details of the items can be varied according to the requirements of different 
domains or different authorities, and additional research is needed for determining them. 
Table 6-1 The example items of Preconditions 
> Condition of Operator(s) 
" personality 
" physical condition 
" activities prior to 
accident/occurrence 
" assigned duties at time of 
accident/occurrence 
" actual behaviour at time 
of accident/occurrence 
" attitude 
> Software 
" procedures and standing 
orders 
" regulations 
> Hardware 
" ergonomic design of 
working, living and 
recreation areas and 
equipment 
" ship design 
" state of maintenance 
" equipment (availability, 
reliability) 
" cargo characteristics, 
including securing, 
handling and care 
> Environment 
º Physical 
" adequacy of living 
conditions 
" adequacy of food 
" level of ship motion, 
vibrations, heat and noise 
" weather and sea 
conditions 
" ice conditions 
º Technological 
" port and transit conditions 
(VTS, pilots, etc) 
" traffic density 
" level of automation 
> Liveware 
" communication 
" on-board management and 
supervision 
" teamwork, 
" ship-shore communication 
" surveys and inspections 
(international, national, 
port, classification 
societies, etc. ) 
" organisations representing 
ship owners and seafarers 
(Note: This is a partial listinj 
6.2.3 Unsafe Supervision 
In practice, a mishap event can often be traced back to the supervisory chain of 
command. Reason (1990) originally names this level as line management deficiencies, 
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which are defined as the consequences of higher-level decision making, but it is not 
purely a function of these decisions. This is because the incompetence of any set of 
supervisions could exacerbate the adverse effects of high-level decisions or even good 
decisions to have bad effects. "Conversely, competence at the supervisory level could 
do something to mitigate the unsafe effects of fallible decisions, make neutral decisions 
have safer consequences, and transform good decisions into even better ones" (Reason, 
1990). "There is a many-to-many mapping between possible unsafe supervision and the 
various preconditions of unsafe acts, and the interaction between them is extremely 
complex". Any precondition could be the product of several different unsafe 
supervisions; the converse is also true. In this sense, four categories are proposed for the 
Unsafe Supervision level; they are: Inadequate Supervision, Planned Inappropriate 
Operations, Failed to correct Known Problem, and Supervisory Violations (Shappell 
and Wiegmann, 2003b). These categories follow the suggestion of the HFACS and are 
in line with Reason's Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation associated with 
supervisors who influence the condition of operators and the operation environment. 
Each of these categories is briefly described in the following sections. 
Unsafe I1 
Planned Failure to Inadequate Inappropriate correct Known 
LSU?! 
sory 
Supervision Operations Problem Violations 
Figure 6-7 The "Unsafe Supervision" level of HFACS-MA 
6.2.3.1 Inadequate Supervision 
The role of any supervisor is to provide his/her personnel with the opportunity to 
succeed. Hence, they have to provide whatever it takes to ensure that the job is done 
safely and efficiently. Therefore, "any thorough investigation of accident causal factors 
must consider the role supervision plays in the genesis of human error", despite 
"empowering individuals to make decisions and function independently" (Shappell and 
Wiegmann, 2003b). Thus, the category of Inadequate Supervision is defined as a factor 
in a mishap when supervision has failed to identify a hazard, recognise and control risk, 
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provide guidance, training and/or oversight, etc., and results in human error or an unsafe 
situation (U. S. DoD, 2005; 10). 
6.2.3.2 Planned Inappropriate Operation 
Planned Inappropriate Operation is "a factor in a mishap when supervision fails to 
adequately assess the hazards associated with an operation and allows for unnecessary 
risk. It is also a factor when supervision allows non-proficient or inexperienced 
personnel to attempt missions beyond their capability or when crew makeup is 
inappropriate for the task or mission" (U. S. DoD, 2005). Examples of these issues are 
the improper crew pairing and improper manning during a period of downsizing. 
6.2.3.3 Failure to correct Known Problem 
This refers to those instances where "deficiencies among individuals, equipment, 
training or other related safety areas are "known" to the supervisor, yet are allowed to 
continue uncorrected" as well as "the failures to consistently correct or discipline 
inappropriate behaviour certainly fosters an unsafe atmosphere and prompts the 
violation of rules" (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003b). Likewise, the failure to report 
these unsafe tendencies and initiate corrective actions is another example. They can be 
deemed as a factor in a mishap when supervision fails to correct known deficiencies in 
documents, processes or procedures, or fails to correct inappropriate or unsafe actions of 
individuals, and this lack of supervisory action creates an unsafe situation (U. S. DoD, 
2005; 11). 
6.2.3.4 Supervisory Violations 
Supervisory Violations are those instances when existing rules, regulations and 
doctrine are disregarded or violated by the supervisors when they manage organisational 
assets". Likewise, "flaunting authority, which is the same as failing to enforce existing 
rules and regulations, is a violation at the supervisory level and invariably sets the stage 
for the tragic sequence of events that predictably follow" (Shappell and Wiegmann, 
2003b). In other words, they are factors in a mishap when supervision, whilst managing 
organisational assets, wilfully disregards instructions, guidance, rules, or operating 
instructions and this lack of supervisory responsibility creates an unsafe situation (U. S. 
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DoD, 2005). Table 6-2 lists some of the example items which refer to the IMO 
guidelines. 
Table 6-2 Selected examples of Unsafe Supervision 
> Unsafe Supervision º Inadequate Supervision 
º Planned Inappropriate Operation organization of on- 
division of tasks and board training and 
responsibilities drills 
" composition of the crew º Failure to correct known 
" manning level problem 
" workload/complexity of tasks º Supervisory Violation 
" working hours/rest hours Certificates (authorized 
" planning (voyages, cargo, unqualified crews or 
maintenance) equipment) 
" opportunities for recreation 
" assignment of duties 
(Note: This is a partial listing) 
6.2.4 Organisational Influences 
Fallible decisions of upper-level management can directly affect supervisory 
practices, as well as the preconditions and actions of operators. Unfortunately, these 
organisational errors often go unnoticed by safety professionals (Shappell and 
Wiegmann, 2003b). In considering fallible decisions, it is important to be aware that 
"system accidents have their primary origins in fallible decisions made by designers and 
high level managerial decision makers". Since they are "an inevitable part of the design 
and management process, the question is not so much how to prevent them from 
occurring, as how to ensure that their adverse consequences are speedily detected and 
recovered" (Reason, 1990). Therefore, the Organisational Influences are defined as 
"factors in a mishap if the communications, actions, omissions or policies of upper-level 
management directly or indirectly affect supervisory practices, preconditions or actions 
of the operator(s) and result in system failure, human error or an unsafe situation" (U. S. 
DoD, 2005). These latent conditions generally involve issues related to Resource 
Management, Organisational Climate, and Organisational Process and are detailed as 
follows. 
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Organisational II 
Influences ýý r 
Resource Organisational Organisational 
Management Climate Process 
Figure 6-8 The "Organisational Influences" level of HFACS-MA 
6.2.4.1 Resource Management 
"This category encompasses the realm of corporate-level decision-making 
regarding the allocation and maintenance of organisational assets such as human 
resources (personnel), monetary assets, equipment, and facilities". Such resources are 
typically based upon two, sometimes conflicting, objectives - the goal of safety and the 
goal of on-time, cost-effective operations (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003b). This is 
because all organisations have to allocate resources to two distinct goals: production 
and safety. In the long term, they are clearly compatible, but there are occasionally 
short-term conflicts of interest due to the fact that all resources are finite (Reason, 1990). 
Unfortunately, history tells us that "safety is often the loser in such battles, and as such, 
it is the first to be cut in organisations having financial difficulties" (Shappell and 
Wiegmann, 2003b). Management should ensure that "human-factors engineering 
principles are known and utilised and that existing specifications for equipment and 
workplace design are identified and met". Hence, Resource Management is defined as a 
factor in a mishap "if resource management processes or policies, directly or indirectly, 
influence system safety and results in poor error management or creates an unsafe 
situation" (U. S. DoD, 2005). 
6.2.4.2 Organisational Climate 
Organisational Climate can be seen as the working atmosphere referring to a broad 
class of variables that influence worker performance within the organisation. The 
HFACS suggests that the climate can be broken down into three categories; they are 
structure, policies and culture. The structure reflects the chain-of-command, delegation 
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HFACS suggests that the climate can be broken down into three categories; they are 
structure, policies and culture. The structure reflects the chain-of-command, delegation 
of authority, communication channels, and formal accountability for actions. The 
culture refers to the unofficial or unspoken rules, values, attitudes, beliefs, and customs 
of an organisation. In other words, culture is "the way things really get done around 
there". Meanwhile, the policies are "official guidelines that direct management's 
decisions about such things as hiring and firing, promotion, retention, sick leave, and a 
myriad of other issues important to the everyday business of the organisation" (Shappell 
and Wiegmann, 2003b). All these issues affect attitudes about safety and the value of a 
safe working environment. Hence it is defined as "a factor in a mishap if organisational 
variables including structure, policies and culture influence individual actions and 
results in human error or an unsafe situation" (U. S. DoD, 2005). 
6.2.4.3 Organisational Process 
This category refers to "corporate decisions and rules that govern the everyday 
activities within an organisation.... Other organisational factors such as operational 
tempo, time pressure, and work schedules are all variables that can adversely affect 
safety. ", It can be subdivided into three subcategories; they are operations, procedures 
and oversight (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003b). Operations refer to "the characteristics 
or conditions of work that have been established by management". Procedures are "the 
official or formal procedures as to how the job is to be done". Oversight is viewed as 
"monitoring and checking of resources, climate and processes to ensure a safe and 
productive work environment". Generally speaking, Organisational Processes can be 
defined as "a factor in a mishap if organisational processes such as operations, 
procedures and oversight negatively influence individual, supervisory and/or 
organisational performance and results in unrecognised hazards and/or uncontrolled risk 
which leads to human error or an unsafe situation" (U. S. DoD, 2005). 
Again, Table 6-3 is just an example of the listing. Another study to figure out the 
details of the items is needed and is out of the scope of this research. 
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Table 6-3 Selected examples of Organisational influences 
> Organisational influences 
º Resource Management 
" policy on recruitment 
º Organisational Climate 
" safety policy and 
philosophy (culture, 
attitude and trust) 
" general management 
policy 
º Organisational Process 
" management commitment 
to safety 
" scheduling of leave 
periods 
" port scheduling 
" contractual and/or 
industrial arrangements 
and agreements 
(Note: This is a partial listing) 
6.2.5 The management factors and m-SHEL model 
The m-SHEL model (see Figure 6-9) was first introduced by Kawano when he 
carried out a human factors research project for Tokyo Electric Power Company. This 
model is derived and expanded from SHEL model in order to solve the problem of not 
incorporating the management factors when it is applied to the human factors involved 
in an organisation (Kawano, 1997). In m-SHEL, the management (m) factor is defined 
as "the corporate organisation, administration and system, and the efforts to develop a 
desirable atmosphere at job site and safety culture, " when it cooperates with the original 
SHEL model. Subsequently, a few studies (Itoh et al., 2002; Hiroaki, 2004) published in 
Japan have referred this (m) factor when the m-SHEL model is applied for human 
factors analysis. However, in these papers, there is no further definition being given as 
to how the (m) factor interacts with, or influences, the other components (i. e. Software, 
Hardware, Environment and peripheral and central Liveware). 
(a) m-SHEL model (b) multiple m-SHEL model 
Figure 6-9 The illustration of m-SHEL model (from Itoh et al., 2002) 
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Although there is no specific definition associated with management factors in 
IMO guidelines A. 884(21), Appendix 3 of the guideline (i. e. the section of "definitions 
common human element terms") has specified that the management factor involves the 
following situations. 
  Failure to maintain discipline 
  Failure of command 
  Inadequate supervision 
  Inadequate communication 
  Inadequate physical resources 
  Inadequate manning 
  Poor job design 
  Poor regulations or practices 
  Misapplication of policies, procedures or practices 
In addition, in the section of "process for investigating human factors" (i. e. 
Appendix 1) of the guidelines, the underlying factors are described as the causes behind 
the act or decision of an individual or group which may have facilitated the expression 
of the given failure mode in the work system. These factors can be found by examining 
the work system information collected and organised using the SHEL model or 
Reason's Swiss Cheese Model. In other words, they are the latent condition of the 
factors identified in the Preconditions or Unsafe Acts level of the proposed framework. 
Hence the identification of potential safety problem is based extensively on what factors 
were identified in the lower level of the framework. 
In this sense, if the management factors are deemed as the factors in 
Organisational Influences and/or Unsafe Supervision of the IIFACS-MA framework 
(see Figure 6-1), it can explain how the management factor interacts with or influences 
the other factors in the m-SHEL model and also complies with the requirements of the 
IMO guidelines. In other words, the consideration of including management factors in 
the HFACS-MA has the merit to implement the notion of m-SHEL whilst complying 
with the IMO guidelines and being in line with Reason's Swiss Cheese Model. In this 
fashion, the Management Factors can therefore be deemed as a factor in a mishap if 
adverse supervision and/or organisational influences result in poor management or 
creates an unsafe precondition situation. 
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6.3 The applications of HFACS-MA during the investigation stage 
Once the HFACS-MA framework is in place, it offers the analyst a clearer vision 
with respect to the definitions of human factors and the structure of the HOFs hierarchy. 
This framework can assist investigators in categorising the human factors identified and 
also in spurring on further investigation of the latent conditions regarding the identified 
factors during the investigation period. 
This framework would help the investigators in two aspects. 
Firstly, a clearer definition for the HOFs hierarchy and human factors can help the 
investigators to more clearly classify the identified human factors involved in the 
accident. Such as the framework that has been established by U. S. DoD (2005), it 
organises all the human factors which have been identified from the investigated 
accidents and details the typical characteristics of them. Additionally, it has also 
repeatedly been applied to numerous U. S. military and civil aviation accident 
investigations. It is obvious that an official HOFs definition can dramatically improve 
the classification of the factors identified by avoiding individual investigators use the 
same terminology in different ways. The definitions of factor and category for every 
level of the HOFs framework also improve the precision of the framework by 
specifying what should be classified as a human factor and by indicating exactly what 
should be categorised at which level. Meanwhile, the framework provides a well 
defined basis to facilitate quantification of the identified human factors involved in 
accident investigations. This also has the benefit of providing a platform for, data 
exchange. If data from separate accident investigations can be quantified using the same 
criteria, it will be easier for further statistical analyses to be made thus broadening the 
view of human factor issues. For instance, several studies (Wiegmann and Shappell 
2001; Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003a; Shappell et al., 2007) are able to carry out a 
broader statistical analysis regarding the analysed accidents-since they are achieved by 
following the same framework to gain the benefit of clear classifications and 
specifications of the identified factors. 
Secondly, a HOFs hierarchy associated with causality can offer the investigators a 
clearer view to track back through the causal sequence amongst the factors identified. 
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For example, if a preconditions factor has been identified, the framework will encourage 
the investigators to consider whether any Unsafe Supervision or Organisational 
Influences factors, as the latent conditions of the identified factors, is overlooked. In 
other words, it can clearly point out the deficiency of the information or evidence 
associated with the identified factors in the lower level (i. e. Unsafe Acts or 
Preconditions level) when no related factor in the higher level is discovered. This 
mechanism will help the investigators to decide if any underlying factor needs to be 
explored in greater depth. Besides, this framework can also helps the investigators to 
figure out the causalities (or trajectories) amongst identified factors from the higher 
level to the lower level. With the clearer hierarchy of HOFs and the classification of 
factors, the causal sequences between factors are no longer vague since their categories 
are determined. It implies that the factor in the lower level is always provoked by the 
factor in the higher level, and the reverse direction is very unusual. This is because the 
relationship between factors should be in line with the principle of the framework (i. e. 
Reason's Swiss Cheese Model), otherwise either some evidence is still missing or the 
supposed connections amongst the factors are incorrect. 
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6.4 The integration of HFACS-MA with the Fault Tree - Bayesian 
Network (FT-BN) analysis results 
As noted previously, the proposed HFACS-MA framework can not only be used at 
the investigation stage, but also be a very useful auxiliary tool for the subsequent 
analysis. By projecting the HFACS-MA framework, as a mask, onto the FT-BN 
analysis results, a comprehensive picture associated with the causalities amongst these 
identified human factors at different levels of the framework can be acquired. 
Furthermore, the factors located in the lower levels (i. e. Unsafe Acts or Preconditions 
level) without provoking factors in the higher levels also give the investigators an 
unambiguous indication that further investigation associated with these lower level 
factors should be considered. The example shown in Figure 6-10 illustrates the FT-13N 
analysis results of the Herald of Free Enterprise (HoFE) analysis, which is the 
integrated outcome with respect to the case study described in Chapter 5, with the mask 
of HFACS-MA framework. In this illustration all of the identified factors are placed in 
the levels according to their characteristics referring to the definitions of HFACS-MA 
framework. Each node includes indications showing the marginalised probabilities in 
terms of events occurrence likelihood in percentage manner. From the figure, the 
following features emerge in a comprehensive way: 
1. The illustrations of the Window of Opportunity (WoO) of Reason's Swiss 
Cheese Model and the trajectories to penetrate the WoO. For example, the path 
starts from Node L8 through Nodes P., K!, F1 and Al, and finally reach Node 
MCS1 or MCS2 is one of the instances of the trajectories whilst the 
combination of the factors of MCSI or MCS2 represents one of the WoOs. 
2. The influences of the factors from the higher level to the lower level. It 
portrays the principle of HFACS-MA framework (i. e. Reason's Swiss Cheese 
Model) that the causal sequence moves from fallible decisions, through the 
intervening planes to an accident. 
3. The deficiencies of information or evidence regarding some of the identified 
factors in the lower levels. This is highlighted by the lack of connections 
between underlying factors. For instance, there is no factor in the higher levels 
influencing Node HI in the FT-BN analysis result shown in Figure 6-10. 
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However, there should be some reasons (i. e. unsafe acts) to specify why the 
ship's speed was over 18 knots at the time, but no such explanation has been 
given. 
4. The numerical or statistical indications pin point which part of the system is 
more vulnerable. It is obvious, from Figure 6-10, that there are many potential 
factors for consideration at the Preconditions level, although they are now 
deemed as consequences instead of causes. In addition, if a series of accidents 
are reviewed and compared under the same framework, it can conveniently 
provide a chance to analyse these accidents statistically and offer a broader 
view which can highlight the weak point(s) of the system. For example, if some 
Unsafe Supervision factors are repeatedly identified as the critical factors in a 
series of incidents or accidents, these analysis results can subsequently be 
compared, organised and aggregated as an statistically figure. This figure can 
help the authorities to pin point the critical part(s) of the system before another 
serious accident occurs. 
6.4.1 The procedure to integrate the FT-BN analysis results with IHFACS-11MA 
framework 
Having accomplished the FT-BN analysis results according to the method 
proposed in Chapter 4, the results should be able to map onto the HHFACS-MA 
framework since the definition of the Minimal Cut Sets of the results is in line with the 
principle of HFACS-MA (i. e. Reason's Swiss Cheese Model). By following the 
definitions of each level of HFACS-MA framework, each node in the Bayesian 
Network should be able to find a location in one of the levels. Having organised each 
node to the levels which it belongs to, these factors should be able to divide into six 
groups; they are accidents, incidents (or events), unsafe acts, preconditions, unsafe 
supervision, and organisational influence levels respectively, from the top to the 
bottom. The nodes allocated in the incidents level are the Intermediate Events which are 
the consequence of unsafe acts or preconditions, and the accidents arc provoked or 
triggered by the combinations of these incidents. As noted previously, the accident is 
represented by several nodes named MCS# (#E N, e. g. 3) in the Baycsian Network 
model, and is no longer a single object as it is in FTA. Hence, in the accidents level, 
each node represents one of the Minimal Cut Sets of the accident and can be seen as one 
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of the WoO with a numerical figure to indicate its likelihood. In summary, the 
integration process can be achieved by the following steps: 
1. Drawing lines in the Bayesian Network model of the accident to separate the 
area and to indicate the different levels of the HFACS-MA framework. 
2. Organising each node to the levels to which it belongs according to its 
characteristic and the definitions of each category in the HFACS-MA 
framework. 
3. Rechecking the allocation of each node to ensure that every influencing 
direction is from the higher level to the lower level. If not, either the relative 
nodes have been placed to the wrong level or, even worse, the Bayesian 
Network model might be invalid. This is because it is very rare that the factors 
in the higher lever can be influenced by the factor in the lower level. 
6.4.2 Some considerations of the combination 
One may ask why the FT-BN analysis result and the HFACS-MA framework can 
be integrated together. Can any framework integrate into the FT-BN analysis result? 
The answer is Reason's Swiss Cheese Model. As long as the framework is based on the 
Swiss Cheese Model, it can be integrated with the FT-BN analysis result, though the 
items or categories for each level will vary. In other words, an individual can vary the 
framework and work with the FTA-BN methods providing that the levels of the 
framework still coincide with the principle of Reason's Swiss Cheese Model. This is 
because the principles of both HFACS-MA and FTA-BN method arc in line with 
Reason's Swiss Cheese Model. In FT-BN, each Minimal Cut Set is one of the instances 
of a WoO, and the WoO is the core of the Swiss Cheese Model. Meanwhile, the 
HFACS-MA, which is transformed from HFACS, is an instance of the Swiss Cheese 
Model with more specific definitions relating to items and categories involved at each 
level. Both FTA-BN and HFACS-MA are derived from the same principle but arc 
expressed differently, therefore they are compatible. They simply interpret the same 
thing from a different aspect. 
In the integrated outcome, the FTA delivers the qualitatively analysed results 
whilst the Bayesian Network performs the quantitative analysis with the HHOFs 
framework of HFACS-MA. Having integrated the framework with the FT BN analysis 
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result (see Figure 6-10 as an example), it clearly depicts which levels of the framework 
the factors belong to, as well as the occurrence likelihood of them. It can also highlight 
which part of the system in the lower levels is more vulnerable due to the defects in the 
higher level. Each path in the figure, from the higher level through the intervening 
planes and eventually leading to the nodes representing the Minimal Cut Sets, is the 
route map of influences (or causality) between levels. The paths also illustrate how the 
trajectories penetrate the multiple defences of the system. Each node in the various 
paths shows the quantified figure regarding the degree of influences, whilst the 
likelihood of each Minimal Cut Set indicates how big the "window" is. Predictably, the 
levels (or layers) of the framework can make the causality appear less disordered and 
ambiguous and even highlight the defects or deficiencies of the system explicitly and 
distinctly. This combination of information can provide the analyst with a crystal clear 
indication of causative links between identified factors. In summary, there are at least 
three advantages can be obtained from the combination. 
Firstly, It can reveal the likelihoods of every factor and the causality of the 
accidents with an overview of HOFs framework as a whole, in which the vulnerable 
part of the system is under the spotlight immediately. For instance, the example in 
Figure 6-10 shows that there are more human factors identified in the Preconditions and 
Unsafe Acts level. Undoubtedly, this outcome will attract the attention of the analyst. 
However the operatives at this level can now be seen as the victims rather than the 
pathogen. The outcome clearly illustrates that a few defects at the decision level can 
cause lots of problem in the operation level. The influences not only affect on the 
factors in the lower level, but also the combinations of these factors (i. e. Minimal Cut 
Sets), and the effectiveness on them are different from one to another. 
Secondly, it can help the investigators to decide if any factor in the higher level is 
still missing. In other words, if there is any lack of explanation to support the 
occurrence of an identified factor in the lower level. If so, a further investigation should 
be carried out. For instance, in Figure 6-10 there is no factor in the higher level 
connecting to event "L6 (time pressure for an early sailing from Zeebrugge)" and "E2 
(Deficiency of harbour ramp)" whilst these two factors are categorised as Preconditions. 
Although these two factors in this example have not affected the Top Event (i. e. the 
Minimal Cut Sets) significantly. They just reduce the likelihood value of the Top Event 
by 0.004 and 0.05 respectively if these two factors were not considered (or did not exist). 
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However, there is still something missing regarding the defects of the higher level from 
the point of view of HOFs framework. In other words, the framework clearly points out 
that further work is needed in order to figure out if there is any latent condition existing 
at the Unsafe Supervision and Organisational Influences levels to make events L6 and 
E2 likely to happen. 
Thirdly, the hierarchy of the framework can also help the analyst to validate the 
FT-BN analysis results. Theoretically, the factors in the higher level cannot be 
influenced by the factors in the lower level. It means that if all the nodes of the FT-BN 
results are placed in the correct levels according to the HFACS-MA framework, the 
influence arcs between the nodes should be always from the higher level (e. g. 
Organisational Influences) to the lower level (e. g. Unsafe Acts). If it is not the case, 
something must have gone wrong and the FT-BN analysis result should be re-examined. 
This is because the direction of influence within the HOF framework should always be 
from the higher levels to the lower levels. Thus, it provides a mechanism to validate the 
FT-BN analysis results. 
6.4.3 Further work regarding the framework 
The proposed HOFs framework in this chapter is a preliminary attempt using this 
approach. The present study has no intention to prove that the proposed framework is 
practically applicable. Yet, it points out the benefits of having a HOFs framework for 
the maritime industry and illustrates its possible applications. In other words, there are 
many refinements needed before the framework can be utilised in practical. Since these 
topics are either beyond the scope of the research, or more expertise is required, the 
study only highlights these considerations without further discussion. They arc: 
1. A consensus HOFs framework with detailed items defined for the maritime 
industry. A further study, to define the items and categories of the framework 
for the maritime industry, such as that done by U. S. DoD (2005), would be 
helpful for the investigators to follow in order to identify and depict the human 
factors. Furthermore, this definition also provides a basis to set up a platform 
for data exchange in order to share the information regarding the identified 
causal factors involved in variant accidents. 
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2. A protocol for data exchanging amongst authorities or organisations. If a data 
exchange protocol based on the consensus (or similar) HOFs framework is in 
place in the maritime industry, it would help authorities to gather and exchange 
the causal data of the analysed accidents with regard to HOFs. Individual 
enterprises in the industry could also benefit by following the same framework 
when investigating and analysing their own incidents; hence broadened 
applications of the quantified accident analysis data can be acquired. Therefore 
more comprehensive and efficient countermeasures can be introduced faster if 
the analysed accident data can be quantified, based on the same HOFs 
framework, and exchanged within the industry. 
3. The consideration of an additional Administration and legislation level. If an 
addition level is defined and added above the Organisational Influences level, 
the framework can extend the application scope to examine the deficiencies or 
defects associated with regulations or legislations, or even the authorities. This 
means that the method and the framework can also be helpful in identifying the 
deficiencies or defects occurring at the government level. This would be useful 
to deal with the issues beyond the organisational level. 
6.5 Discussion 
Although the IMO has realised the crucial role that the human factor plays in an 
accident and have specified numerous guidelines distributed in various documents (sec 
section 4.2.1), a dedicated HOFs framework still remains to be established. The 
proposed HOFs framework - HFACS-MA - outlined in this chapter is an illustration to 
point out the benefits which would follow from such a dedicated approach. 
Once established, a dedicated framework for the maritime industry could assist an 
investigation by identifying the human factors involved, and by combining the proposed 
FTA-BN method to provide a more comprehensive insight into the analysed accident. In 
other words, it should be of benefit to the investigators in carrying out their 
investigations and in analysing the results. 
The HFACS-MA framework proposed in this chapter incorporates key aspects of 
four major models which are prominent in the Human Factors' literature - Reason's 
Generic Error Modelling System, Reason's Swiss Cheese Model, Hawkins's STIEL 
-187- 
Ch. 6: HFACS-MA 
model and Itoh's m-SHEL model. Most importantly, it complies with the IMO 
guidelines for the investigation of human factors involvement in marine casualties and 
incidents. 
In the previous sections, the advantages of integrating the FT-BN outcomes and the 
HFACS-MA have been shown - in which, the HOFs framework is imposed onto the 
accident analysis results as a mask. This combination can not only indicate the 
causation amongst factors, but also reveal the influences between levels. This enables a 
comprehensive picture that has qualitative and quantitative information associated with 
the human factors involved in an accident to be gained. In short, from the view of 
Reason's Swiss Cheese Model, each Minimal Cut Set reveals the Window of 
Opportunity, and the likelihood of each Minimal Cut Set indicates the width (or extent) 
of the window (see Figure 6-10 as an example). This Minimal Cut Set explicitly 
instantiates that "disasters are very rarely the product of a single monumental blunder; 
usually they involve the concatenation of several, often quite minor, errors committed 
either by one person or, more often, by a number of people" (Reason, 1990). 
In summary, this combination provides a systematic method to perform the 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of an accident with a clearer causality overview 
over HOFs as a whole. At the analysis stage, the framework can provide a clear 
indication to show which part of the system is more vulnerable. This is because it 
highlights the following information. 
1. The perspectives of WoOs of the accident. It shows how the identified factors 
located in different levels comprise each one of the windows with the 
likelihood values for every factor and an overview of HOFs framework as a 
whole. 
2. The influences of the factors from the higher level to the lower level. 'T'his 
portrays the principle of the HFACS-MA framework that the causal sequence 
moves from fallible decisions, through the intervening planes to an accident. 
3. The deficiencies of information or evidence. The framework can facilitate the 
investigators to spotlight the factors identified in the lower levels without 
further explanation or underlying factors connected. It can help the 
investigators to check if any factor in the higher level is overlooked and 
warrants further investigation. 
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4. The vulnerable parts of the system. The numerical or statistical data can easily 
be acquired from the analysed accidents if they are under the same HOFs 
framework. This is the base to carry out a broadened analysis in order to 
highlight the weak points of the system. 
It has also been demonstrated in sections 6.3 that the proposed framework can 
provide a HOFs hierarchy to investigate the human factors involved in an accident. In 
other words, it can provide, for the investigators during the investigation stage, a 
definite taxonomy to classify the identified human factors involved in an accident and a 
clearer aspect to gather the evidence or information regarding those factors discovered. 
This is because: 
1. It provides a clear framework and definition which help the investigators to 
identify the human factors involved in an accident and to classify the categories 
of the factors. 
2. It offers a clearer causality hierarchy associated with HOFs for the 
investigators to track the causal sequence amongst the factors identified. 
Since human factors still dominate almost 80% of the accidents in maritime 
industry (Akten, 2004; Harati-Mokhtari et. al., 2007), the researcher would like to 
address the main benefits of the proposed HOFs framework. It provides: 
1. A dedicated HOFs framework with detailed levels and categories which is 
specifically suitable for the maritime industry. 
2. A platform for data exchanging amongst authorities or organisations. It is 
based on the dedicated HOFs framework for every entity in the maritime 
industry to share their analysed accident data. 
3. The consideration of an additional Administration and legislation lcvcl. This 
would be useful to examine the defects or deficiencies at the governmental 
level. 
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Chapter Seven - 
Similarity Aggregation Method (SAM) 
for group consensus of uncertainty 
Summary 
Group consensus is always a difficult issue to cope with. Unfortunately, historical 
statistical data will not be always available for some of the entries of the Conditional 
Probability Table regarding the established Bayesian Network model of an accident. 
The main feasible alternative is to use the judgement of a number of experts. However, 
the difficulty of obtaining a group consensus emerges. In order to overcome this 
problem, the present study proposes a method which provides a systematic and 
objective procedure to aggregate the experts' estimates. In addition, this method has 
also considered the uncertainty of the judgements and the experts' contentment about 
the consensus outcome. The method adopted applies the Positive Trapezoidal Fuzzy 
Number (PTFN) and the Similarity Aggregation Method to deal with the estimates 
aggregation and the f-weighted valuation functions to obtain the crisp value of the 
PTFN. Occasionally, the Delphi method has to be utilised in order to reach a common 
ground associated with those PTFNs given by the experts if their estimates differ 
significantly. Eventually, the group consensus is achieved, through the proposed 
aggregation method, and the outcome of the consensus takes into consideration the 
importance of the opinions given by individual experts involved. 
7.1 Introduction 
When historical statistical data is not available, it is a common practise to use 
experts' judgements to evaluate the likelihood of the events of the accident. However, a 
question is frequently encountered as to whether or not their estimates should be 
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aggregated when the views of the experts do not coincide. From the viewpoint of 
decision makers, it is preferred to have a group consensus, rather than several individual 
figures, to depict the accident analysis results. 
Traditionally, the aggregated result of the experts' estimates for the likelihood of 
the events can be the mean (or median) of the figures given. However, this simple 
practice may not be practicable all the time. Firstly, there may be a significant 
disagreement among experts with regard to some particular events. For example, two 
individual experts award 10% and 90% to a particular event respectively as the 
likelihood of the occurrence. It would be unrealistic for both of them to accept the 
average of 50% as the final consensus. Secondly, there will be doubt as to whether the 
single crisp value is of a suitable form to express the experts' opinion or not. 
Having considered these concerns (above) when solving the group consensus 
problem, an aggregation method is proposed in this chapter. The PTFN (see section 7.2) 
has the advantage to handle the uncertainty of the judgements considering randomness 
and fuzziness. Furthermore, it can also facilitate the common ground of the judgements 
to be reached when the Delphi method, which is a communication tool developed by 
Dalkey (1969), is applied (see section 7.5). Subsequently, the Similarity Aggregation 
Method (SAM), which is proposed by Hsu and Chen (1996), is utilised to aggregate 
these PTFNs when the common ground of the estimates is reached (see section 7.3). 
Eventually, the crisp value regarding a corresponding entry of the Conditional 
Probability Table of the Bayesian Network model, is acquired when the consensus 
PTFN is attained. This crisp value is obtained by transforming (or defuzzifying) the 
PTFN into a single figure value via the f-weighted valuation functions (see section 7.4), 
which is a defuzzification function proposed by Yager (1981). 
In summary, the flowchart shown on the right hand side of Figure 7-1 is the 
proposed procedure for dealing with a group of experts in order to obtain the group 
consensus. Furthermore, this method can also be used by a single expert to express 
his/her estimate if uncertainty is the problem to cope with. If this is the case, the 
flowchart shown on the left hand side of the figure is more suitable to be followed (as 
the Delphi method can be omitted). In the following sections, the PTFN, SAM, f- 
weighted valuation function and the Delphi method, which form the proposed 
aggregation method, will be introduced in turn. 
-191- 
Ch. 7: SAM 
Single 
expert 
Group of 
experts 
Estimates 
-pressing 
Estimates 
expressing j PTFN forming 
Delphi 
method 
PTFN forming 
Wasection No 
Yes 
SAM & 
f-weighted S` M& 
functions f-weighted functions 
Crisp value 
acquired 
/1s the No 
crisp value 
riss rr 
Yes 
'up Consensus 
achieved j 
Figure 7-1 The flowchart of the aggregation method 
7.2 Positive Trapezoidal Fuzzy Number (PTFN) 
A PTFN consists of two intervals which are the most likely interval (by, ci ] (i. c. 
the core) and the largest interval [ a;, d; ] (i. e. the support) where aj S bi S c15 di (scc 
Figure 7-2 for the illustration). It means that "a; " represents the lower least likely value, 
"b; " and "ci" the most likely value, and "d; " the upper least likely value. In the proposed 
methodology, each expert E, (i =1,2, ..., n) can construct a PTFN (R i) with member 
functions µR, (x) e [0,1], xE [0,1] to represent his subjective estimate regarding a given 
entry of the Conditional Probability Table of a Bayesian Network node. A trapezoidal 
fuzzy set is undoubtedly a better choice to represent the experts' estimates. 
Nevertheless, a triangular fuzzy set is also practicable, as a substitute, since it is a 
special trapezoidal fuzzy set. "A triangular fuzzy set can be seen as a special trapezoidal 
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fuzzy set when the core set (i. e. the most likely interval [b;, c; ]) of the trapezoidal fuzzy 
set takes the form of a single point" (Ren et al., 2008). 
1, (x) 
z 
a, bi 4r di 
Figure 7-2 The illustration of Positive Trapezoidal Fuzzy Number (PTFN) 
Since the Bayesian Network software `Netica' cannot accept fuzzy sets as the data 
for the entries of the Conditional Probability Table, the PTFN which represent the 
experts' estimates have to be defuzzified before introducing them to the corresponding 
entries. As the defuzzification function in the method, the f-weighted valuation function 
is applied and specified in section 7.4. Theoretically, this function is capable of 
defuzzifying trapezoidal or triangular fuzzy sets. Conversely, other defuzzifcation 
functions are also applicable provided that the outcome is able to cooperate with the 
proposed methodology. 
7.2.1 Considerations of applying PTFN 
The reason why the present study does not consider a linguistic format for the 
estimate rating of the experts' judgements is that it has no value to the Bayesian 
Network model in presenting the outcomes of likelihood. Therefore, only the numerical 
forms are considered to represent the experts' judgements. However, this numerical 
form has to be intuitive and of a form that uncertainty and aggregation can be dealt with 
in order to reflect the consensus opinion. Hence, the PTFN is selected as the way 
forward with the following considerations:. 
b Fuzzy theory provides a means to qualify subjective opinion. Mukaidono (2004) 
has asserted that "The goal of fuzzy theory is to establish a mathematical thcory to 
deal with subjectivity, given any membership values. ... It is a mathematical 
theory to deal with ambiguities using quantified descriptions in exact method". 
This means that fuzzy sets (or numbers) can provide a suitable form to quantify an 
expert's subjective opinion. 
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b The uncertainties of the estimate can be represented by the membership functions 
of the fuzzy number according to the intuitive feelingrudgement of individual. 
The uncertainty of the estimate (i. e. fuzziness) is represented by the area under the 
membership function of the fuzzy number. In other words, the larger the area, the 
higher the uncertainty. Furthermore, the membership function can be manipulated 
by a method defined in fuzzy theory (Mukaidono, 2004). This means that fuzzy 
sets are also a suitable form to depict the uncertainty of the estimate as well as to 
aggregate the group's opinions. 
b Zadeh expands fuzzy theory to the possibility theory, where membership values 
are interpreted as a possibility (i. e. randomness) of events. Mukaidono (2004) has 
specified this viewpoint as such "Probability is based on set theory. Fuzzy theory 
is based on fuzzy set theory. Since the (crisp) set of labels of a fuzzy set is a crisp 
set, we can consider the probabilities of them. This means that both theories can 
work together". This means fuzzy sets can be a form of interpreting the possibility 
of events. 
U Ren and the co-authors (2008) have shown that the fuzzy number can cooperate 
with Bayesian Network to analyse the collision risk for Floating Production, 
Storage and Offloading (FPSO) units. 
Therefore the practicability of applying a fuzzy number to represent the subjective 
estimates regarding the nodes of the Bayesian Network model indeed has merit. 
According to the, considerations denoted above, the PTFN is therefore chosen as the 
form representing the experts' judgement whilst the proposed methodology is applied. 
7.2.2 PTFN and Uncertainty 
This section provides an example of how the PTFN works within the proposed 
methodology for estimation. The example deals with two cxpcrts who provide cstimatcs 
as the judgements. Both of the experts assign a PTIFN, instead of a crisp value, to a 
given entry of the Conditional Probability Table representing their estimates. Expert A 
expresses a vague estimate whilst expert B offers a more precise estimation; the details 
are as follows. 
With reference to expert A's opinion, the lower least likely value (i. e. ti, ) of the 
PTFN is 10% which means that the likelihood of the occurrence must be higher than 
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10% according to his/her judgement. In a similar fashion, the most likely values (i. e. 
b;, c; ) that the expert assigns are 60% and 80% respectively. This means that between 
this interval the event is most likely to happen. Finally, the upper least likely value (i. e. 
d; ) is given as 90% which depicts that he would not believe the likelihood of the 
occurrence to be beyond this value. Therefore the fuzzy number representing expert A's 
opinion is denoted as R8 = (10,60,80,90) which results in 60% as the crisp value when 
the f-weighted function is applied for defuzzification (see Figure 7-3). In the same way, 
expert B assigns another PTFN Rb= (50,55,65,70) to represent his estimate, and 60% 
is the crisp value as well. 
It is clear to see that, from the equivalency of the crisp values, PTFN has the merit 
to assistant the experts to express their estimates even though their judgements arc 
vague, but the outcomes can be the same as any definite one. Furthermore, the format of 
PTFN has another advantage that it can facilitate the achievement of the aggregation 
amongst experts for obtaining a common ground. Section 7.6 provides two examples 
which show that the features of PTFN would not only help the experts to express their 
judgement, but also facilitate the achievement of a group consensus. 
PTFN example 
1.5 
0.5 
:T 
0 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
I -+- A -+- Crisp Vaix -A--_ 
A 
Figure 7-3 An PTFN example 
7.3 The Similarity Aggregation Method (SAM) 
Having acquired each estimate derived from every expert's judgemcnt regarding an 
entry of the Conditional Probability Table required in the IIayesian Network model, the 
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next problem is how to obtain the group consensus estimate of that entry. In this section, 
SAM is proposed as the solution to this problem. The SAM, which is proposed by Hsu 
and Chen (1996), is a method to achieve the aggregation of a group consensus opinion 
from several individual opinions through a systematic procedure. Here, the individual 
opinion is represented by a PTFN, denoted as (i=1,2, ..., n), and the group 
consensus opinion, denoted ask =f 
(f 
, 
R2, 
..., Ro 
), is the outcome of the aggregation 
function which aggregates these experts' estimates. 
73.1 The main features of the SAM 
The functionality of the SAM is to aggregate several PTFNs into a consensus 
PTFN according to three indexes: the similarities between PTFNs, the importance of the 
expert and the bias preference (i. e. towards objective or subjective). The aggregation 
function has embedded two coefficients that allow users to regulate the aggregation 
process whether the consensus PTFN is bias toward objectivity or subjectivity. This 
method also has an advantage to implement a computer program due to the systematic 
characteristic of the procedure. Thus a prototype program has been implemented in the 
present study and has been applied in section 7.6 as the tool for the experiments. 
Another outstanding feature of the SAM is that the aggregation function has 
considered the "importance of the experts" and the "similarity of the estimates" 
simultaneously when deciding the degree of influence (or contribution) of an expert's 
judgement into the group consensus. In other words, this method can regulate the 
overall consensus outcomes biased to the degree of importance of the experts or the 
agreement degree (or similarity) of each estimate. The "importance of the experts" 
subjectively decides the weight for each expert's judgement whilst the "similarity of the 
estimates" objectively judges the weight for one's estimate according to the relative 
similarity when these estimates are compared with each other in turn. In other words, 
the "importance of the experts" offers a flexibility of allowing one's opinion to be more 
important than the others. However the "similarity of the estimates" firmly adheres to 
the results of similarity measure function. This means that, in the aggregation function 
of the SAM, there are two regulators affecting the outcome of group consensus opinion. 
One regulators can control the overall consensus outcome to bias to either subjective 
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"importance of the expert" or objective "similarity of the estimates", meanwhile the 
other fine-tunes the degree of importance for each expert's judgement. 
One may appreciate the features mentioned above from the details of the procedure 
depicted in the next section. 
7.3.2 The procedure of the SAM 
According to the suggestions made by Hsu and Chen (1996), the SAM can be 
achieved by following the eight steps outlined below. 
Step 1: 
_ Each expert E, (i =1,2, ..., n) constructs a 
PTFN R, representing his/her 
subjective estimate to a given circumstance and has to ensure a demanded common 
intersection among these estimates exists. The given circumstance associated with 
the proposed FTA-BN method is the entries of the Conditional Probability Table of 
Bayesian Network. Therefore the subjective estimates are the figures given to the 
entries. Precisely speaking, the experts, based on their own judgments, assign a 
PTFN to each entry of the Conditional Probability Table relating to the established 
Bayesian Network model in order to depict the likelihood of the events involved in 
the accident. In other words, every estimate derived from the experts' subjective 
judgments is represented by a PTFN to a given entry of the Conditional Probability 
Table of the nodes in the Bayesian Network model. It is highly likely that the 
initial estimates given by some experts have no common intersection at first. 
Hence the Delphi method is applied to modify the values of (a , b,, c,, d, ) of these 
PTTNs in order to obtain a common intersection at a fixed a-level cut. The details 
of the Delphi method are covered in section 7.5. It should be noted that the 
intersection between each pair of PTFNs is a prerequisite to perform this SAM. 
This means that the assumption of R, * nR *j * O, V i, j r: {1,2, "-", n} must stand for 
each PTFN in a set before continuing the following steps. 
Step 2: 
The aim of this step is to calculate the agreement degree S(i, Rj) of the opinions 
between each pair of estimates. This can be determined by the proportion of the 
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consensus area (i. e. R; nR j) to the total area (i. e. R; ui). The S(R,, Rj is also 
known as the similarity measure function and is defined by Equation (7.1) by 
Zwick, Carlstein and Budescu (1987). If both of the experts have the same opinion 
then S( 1, R j) =1, and if the opinions of two experts are completely different then 
S(9,;, K j) =0. This means 05 S(R j, R 
J51 
, and the higher the percentage of 
consensus area, the higher the agreement degree. 
S(R_;, R_j)= 
min 
1, 
pi, (xl uR, (x) 
Idx 
jmaxIpR. (x), uj (x) dx 
(7.1) 
Step 3: 
In this step, the work is to construct an agreement matrix (AM). Once all of the 
agreement degrees between each pair of experts have been measured, an 
agreement matrix can be constructed. This matrix gives an insight into the 
similarities among these experts' opinion. 
1 S12 """ SIj """ Sip 
AM = Sil Sa ... S4 ... Sin 
Sol S2 ... Sftj ... 1 
where Sd = S(R1, Rý) for iýj 
So=l fori=j 
Step 4: 
Once the agreement matrix has been sorted out, the average agreement degree 
A(E; ) for each expert E, (t =1,2, ..., n) is able to be acquired. The A(E, ) for each 
expert is achieved by Equation (7.2). Here, Sd gives the agreement degree (i. e. the 
similarity of the estimates) of expert E, when comparing with one of the other 
experts. 
n 
A(E; )= 
n 
tSy 
-1ý. ý (7.2) 
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Step 5: 
Calculate the relative agreement degree (i. e. RAD1 ) for each expcrt 
Et (i =1,2, ..., n). The RAD; 
is computed by using Equation (7.3). It represents the 
similarity of the opinion of an expert in contrast with the other experts of the 
group. It also implies a certain weight regarding the expert's opinion for further 
calculation. 
A(Ei) 
RAD _ (7.3) 
Step 6: 
Define the degree of importance TV, for each expert E, (i =1,2, ..., n). Sometimes, 
the relative importance of experts, such as team leader or head of department, is 
wildly different from the other experts and the different weight for different 
experts' opinion must be considered. Hence, the Tv, is defined as Equation (7.4). 
r; Wi =D , i=1,2, """, n (7.4) 
where r; is the importance weight of the expert and is acquired by the following 
procedure. First select the most important expert among the group and assign him 
the weight as one (i. e. r; =1). Then the Ah expert is compared with the most 
important expert to obtain the weight rr, 1 6 
[0, Ili =1,2, ". ", n. If the importance of 
each expert is equal then w, = w2 = ... = wo = 
Yn 
" 
Step 7: 
Calculate the consensus degree coefficient (i. e. CDC ) for each expert 
E, (i =1,2, ..., n). After the relative agreement degree (i. e. RADS) and the degree 
of importance (i. e. TJ') have been acquired, the CDC, for each expert E, can be 
derived from Equation (7.5). 
CDCi =ß" wi + (1-ß) " RAD 
where 0 5pS1 (7. S) 
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ß can regulate the weight between agreement degree (i. e. RAD; ) and the degree 
of importance (i. e. W ). If the degree of importance of each expert is not 
considered, then ß is assigned zero (i. e. P=0). The CDC; of each expert is an 
efficient measurement to evaluate the relative worthiness of each expert's opinion. 
Step 8: 
Aggregate the consensus opinions according to the consensus degree coefficient 
(i. e. CDC; ) of expert Er (i =1,2, ..., n). Let 
R be the consensus fuzzy number of 
the group experts' opinion. The aggregated result of R is defined in Equation (7.6). 
n 
R= (CDC; (") R) (7.6) 
where (") is the fuzzy multiplication operation. 
7.3.3 The properties of the SAM 
Hsu and Chen (1996) suggest that the SAM holds some properties that should be 
noted when this method is applied. For rapidly referring, these properties are briefly 
summarised, without further discussion, as follows. 
1. Agreement preservation: if R! = Rj for all 1, j, then R= Rj . This means that if 
all the estimates of the experts are identical, the aggregated result should be 
equivalent to any of their estimates. 
2. Order independence: if is a permutation of (1,2,..., n), then 
N 
R=f (Rl, R2, ..., Rn =f R{lý, 
R(2), ..., R(oý). This means that the result of the 
SAM does not depend on the order in which the estimates are taken. 
3. Let the uncertainty measure H(R) of individual estimate R, be defined as the 
area under its member function (i. e. H(R, )= f p(x)dv). The uncertainty 
after the aggregation made by the SAM is the `mean' of the uncertainties of 
every estimate. 
4. If an expert's estimate is far from the others, then his estimate is less 
important. 
- 200 - 
Ch. 7: SAM 
5. If a crisp value is considered to be possible for the aggregated result, then it 
should also be accepted by at least one estimate. 
6. The common intersection area of all estimates is included in the aggregated 
result (i. e. n i, R, cR 
7. If every expert's opinion can be represented by a PTFN, the aggregated result 
is also a PTFN. 
7.4 f-weighted valuation function for defuzzification 
It is said that the problem of comparing and ordering fuzzy numbers is the reason 
why the defuzzification methods are introduced. A general idea to this problem is to 
find a single scalar value (i. e. the crisp value) to represent the associated fuzzy number, 
and then the fuzzy numbers are compared via these represented scalar values (Yager 
and Filev, 1999). An approach to this method was introduced by Yager (1981), in which 
the expected value type of the valuations is based upon the transformation of a fuzzy 
subset into an associated probability distribution. 
Having acquired the aggregated PTFN as the group consensus opinion, the 
following process aims to obtain the crisp (or scalar) value of the fuzzy number. This is 
because the applied Bayesian Network software is not able to handle the fuzzy numbers 
generated so far, thus the PTFN has to be transformed into crisp values before being 
further utilised. The associated valuation process is also known as defuzzification 
process, in which a corresponding computation process is performed in order to acquire 
a represented scalar value. More precisely, the defuzzification process involves a 
process in which a fuzzy subset is used to generate a probability distribution. This 
probability distribution is then used to obtain an expected value, which can be used as 
the evaluation of the fuzzy subset (Yager and Filev, 1999). Therefore, the present study 
follows the same idea of transforming a crisp value from a PTFN which represents the 
experts' judgement acquired for the Conditional Probability Table of the Bayesian 
Network model. In this way, all the PTFNs applied in this method will be defuzzified 
according to the following process to obtain the corresponding crisp value before being 
used as the likelihood data of the nodes. 
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In order to obtain a crisp value, Val(F), as the proxy of a fuzzy subset F, Yager 
suggests using 
i 
Val(F) = 
(Average (Fa )" da 
0 
(7.7) 
Here FQ = {x I F(x) >_ a) is the a -level set of the fuzzy subset F and Average (Fa 
is the average of the elements in the a -level set. In order to associate probability 
distribution, Yager and Filev (1999) extended this formulation and developed a 
generalised formulation for a class of valuation functions. 
1 JAverage(Fa) 
" f(a) " da (7.8) 
Val(F) =, 
ff(a) 
- da 
0 
As shown in Equation (7.8), f(a) is a mapping from [0,1] to [0,1] (i. e. f. [0,1]-º 
[0,1]). If f(a) is monotone, it tends to put additional emphasis on the element with high 
cardinality, the core set (i. e. [b;, c; ]), while f(a) anti-monotone puts more emphasis on 
the support set (i. e. [a;, d; ]) (Yager and Filev, 1999). If a PTFN, F(a, b, c, d), is set by :F 
(left support, left core, right core, right support), it will have the membership functions 
shown below. 
0 for x<a 
x-a for a5x5b b-a 
F(x) =1 for b: 5 x :! g c (7.9) 
d-x 
d-c 
for c5x5d 
0 for x>d 
By following the notion of Equation (7.8), the Average (Fa) of a trapezoidal fuzzy 
number can be computed according to Equation (7.10) (Detyniecki and Yager, 2000) 
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uý +v Average (Fý a) =2 
(7.10) 
Therefore ua and va can be obtained with the help of the membership functions. 
Ua =(b-a). a+a and Va =d-(d-c)"a 
Then the valuation formula (i. e. Equation (7.8)) becomes: 
J[(b+c)"a +(1-a)"(a+d)]"f(a) "da 
Val(F) _°, (7.11) Jf(a). da 
0 
This equation can be put into the following form: 
Val(F(a, b, c, d)) 
b2c"w 
+ a2d. (1-w) (7.12) 
where `w' is computed by: 
1 
Ja"f(a)"da 
w=°, 
ff(a) 
- da 
0 
(7.13) 
One evident result obtained is that, according to Equation (7.12), the valuation of 
the equation will be a weighted-mean between the average of the core and the average 
of the support. In other words, the valuation for any function f will be between the 
middle point (or average) of the core and the middle point (or average) of the support 
(because we [0,1]) (Detyniecki and Yager, 2000). Figure 7-4 gives an example 
illustrating the middle point of the core, the middle point of support, and the middle 
point of the average of core and support. In this example, the fuzzy set denoted in the 
figure is: F (1,6,8,9), and the crisp value of the trapezoidal fuzzy set depends on thef- 
weighted valuation function f(a) . 
For the increasing (or monotone) case (i. e. 
f(a) = aQ; q z0), the valuation of the defuzzification is between 6 and 7. For the 
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decreasing (or anti-monotone) case (i. e. f(a) = (1-a)'; q >- 0 ), the valuation of the 
defuzzification is between 5 and 6. 
Figure 7-4 Variability of the valuation for Yager and Filev's 
f- weighted function (from Detyniecki and Yager, 2000) 
For generality, letf-weighted valuation function f(a) =1 in Equation (7.11) and/or 
w =1/2 in Equation (7.13). The Val (F(a, b, c, d) ) becomes: 
Cb+c a+d Val(F(a, b, c, d))= 2+2 2 (7.14) 
This means that the transformed crisp value of the PTFN is the mean of the 
average of the core and the average of the support if Equation (7.14) is applied. 
However, iff-weighted valuation function (i. e. Equation (7.13)) is utilised, experts are 
able to fine-tune the crisp values, to either bias to core or bias to support of the PTFN, 
in order to represent their judgements (Ren et al., 2008). Therefore the defuzzification 
method utilised in the proposed methodology applies Equation (7.12) as the valuation 
function. Thus, by using w (w E [0,1]) as the regulator, the valuation function for 
defuzzifying a PTFN can place emphasis on the core or the support, or the somewhere 
between the average of the core and the support. 
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7.5 Delphi method 
The Delphi method is originally derived from a project named "RAND" (an 
acronym for Research and Development), which was funded by the U. S. Air Force in 
order to establish and propose a procedure to elicit and refine group judgement (Dalkey, 
1969). In the mid-1960s, this method was utilised to deal with a large amount of 
experiments with regard to technological forecasting (Fowles, 1978). In short, Delphi is 
"a procedure to obtain the most reliable consensus of opinion of a group of experts ... 
by a series of intensive questionnaires interspersed with controlled opinion feedback" 
(Dalkey and Helmer, 1963 cited in Fowles, 1978). From the view of Dalkey - one of the 
major researchers of the project, this method has three major features; they are: (1) 
anonymous response, (2) iteration and controlled feedback, and (3) statistical group 
response (Dalkey, 1969). Additionally, Linstone and Turoff (2002) in their book define 
that "Delphi may be characterized as a method for structuring a group communication 
process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to 
deal with a complex problem". In other words, according to the initial suggestion that 
has been made, the Delphi method is "a set of procedures for formulating a group 
judgement for subject matter where precise information is lacking" (Dalkey et al., 
1969). In general, the procedures mainly consist of three parts. They are (1) obtaining 
individual answers to pre-formulated questions either by questionnaire or some other 
formal communication technique; (2) iterating the questionnaire one or more times, 
where the information feedback between rounds is carefully controlled by the exercise 
manager; and (3) taking as the group response a statistical aggregate of final answers 
(Dalkey et al., 1969). 
7.5.1 The original Delphi process 
To undertake the Delphi method, Fowles (1978) suggests the following ten steps: 
1. Formation of a Delphi team to undertake and to monitor the project. 
2. Selection of one or more panels to participate in the exercise. Customarily, the 
participants are experts in the investigation area. 
3. Development of the first round Delphi questionnaire. 
4. Testing the questionnaire for proper wording (e. g., ambiguities, vagueness). 
5. Transmission of the first questionnaires to the panellists. 
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6. Analysis of the first round responses. 
7. Preparation of the second round questionnaires (and possible testing). 
8.. Transmission of the second round questionnaires to the panellists. 
9. Analysis of the second round responses. (Steps 7 to 9 are reiterated as long as 
desired or necessary to achieve stability in the results. ) 
10. Preparation of a report by the analysis team to present the conclusions of the 
exercise. 
Several experiments made by Brockhoff (1983) suggest that under ideal 
circumstances, groups as small as four can perform well, even though Dalkey found that 
a suitable minimum panel size is seven. Other studies (Erffmeyer et al., 1986; Fischer, 
1978) indicate that up to four times of the iteration of the rounds is sufficient to extract a 
consensus result. In practice, these conclusions are valuable to be followed when the 
Delphi method is applied. 
7.5.2 The critiques of the Delphi method 
Although there are advantages of using the Delphi method, it is not always 
supported. Woudenberg (1991) argued that "Delphi is extremely efficient in obtaining 
consensus, but this consensus is not based on genuine agreement; rather, it is the result 
of strong group pressure to conformity". Coates (1975) underlines the fact that "Delphi 
is a method of last resort in dealing with extremely complex problems for which there 
are no adequate models". The most extensive critique of the Delphi method was made 
by Sackman (1975 cited in Twiss, 1976) who criticizes the method as being unscientific. 
Martino (1970) asserts that the results of the method are bias on one's intuition about 
the behaviour of a Delphi panel. However, he still admits that improvements in the 
methodology for combining the panel members' estimates will enhance the utility of 
Delphi (Martino, 2003). In other words, "the Delphi method is useful in answering one, 
specific, single-dimension question. There is less support for its use to determine 
complex forecasts concerning multiple factors. Such complex model building is more 
appropriate for quantitative models with Delphi results serving as inputs". This view 
point is proposed by Gordon and Hayward (1968). They further state that a shortcoming 
of the Delphi method to be that "potential relationships between the forecasted events 
may be ignored and the forecasts might well contain mutually reinforcing or mutually 
exclusive items". Hence, a method - Cross Impact Analysis - has been developed by 
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them as an extension of Delphi techniques in order to remedy the deficiency of the 
method. Gordon and Hayward (1968) have stated that "the probabilities of an item in a 
forecasted set can be adjusted in view of judgment relating to potential interactions of 
the forecast items". 
7.5.3 The proposed process whilst applying Delphi 
By considering the pros and cons of the Delphi method, the proposed method 
decides to only apply Delphi as a tool to reach a common ground among those PTFNs 
given by the experts instead of obtaining the consensus PTFN of the group directly. In 
other words, the Delphi method is merely applied for ensuring that each set of PTFNs 
have a common intersection at certain a-level cut, rather than trying to acquire a 
consensus PTFN as the group opinion. Instead, every consensus PTFN for each set of 
PTFNs is computed using the SAM. Each set of PTFNs represents the estimated 
probability distributions, derived from the experts, regarding a Conditional Probability 
Table entry of the Bayesian Network nodes. This application is also in line with the 
suggestions made by Gordon and Hayward mentioned in the last section. By following 
the recommendations mentioned above, the Cross Impact Analysis should have been 
integrated with Delphi for acquiring the common intersection of the PTFNs. However, 
the proposed methodology does not need to do so since the Conditional Probability 
Table of Bayesian Network has already contained the functionality of conditional 
probability that the Cross Impact Analysis implies. To incorporate the Delphi method 
into the proposed methodology, the applied Delphi procedure is modified as follows: 
1. Formation of a Delphi team to undertake and to monitor the process. 
2. Selection of one or more panels (4 to 7 panels is preferable) to participate in the 
exercise. Customarily, the participants are the experts who are involved in the 
analysis task. 
3. Development of the first round of the Delphi questionnaire regarding the 
analysed Conditional Probability Table entries, in which the corresponding set 
of PTFNs have difficulties to reach the common intersection at certain a-level 
cut at first. 
4. Testing the questionnaire for proper wording (e. g., ambiguities, vagueness). 
5. Distribution of the first questionnaires to the panellists. 
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6. Aggregating the first round responses following the SAM. If the group 
consensus of the set is reached, then jump to Step 10, otherwise carry on the 
next step. 
7. Preparation of the second round questionnaires (and possible testing). 
8. Distribution of the second round questionnaires to the panellists. 
9. Aggregation of the second round responses. (Steps 7 to 9 are reiterated as long 
as desired or necessary to achieve stability in the results. ) 
10. Defuzzification of the consensus PTFN via the proposedf-weighted valuation 
function for the corresponding Conditional Probability Table entry. 
7.6 Experiments 
In this section, two examples are utilised to illustrate the process which aggregates 
a set of estimated PTFNs in order to acquire a consensus crisp value. These PTFNs are 
given by a group of experts and the consensus crisp value is acquired by using the 
proposed aggregation method depicted in the preceding sections. The crisp value 
represents the group consensus to a given entry of a Bayesian Network node. Both of 
the cases are under the condition that every expert is equally important and the overall 
aggregation outcome is decided by the "relative agreement degree of the estimate" 
rather than the "importance degree of the experts". This means that the weight for each 
expert's opinion depends on the similarity of the estimated PTFN when it is compared 
with others' (see section 7.3 for the detailed explanation). It is assumed that there are 
four experts involved in both cases and every expert has to construct a PTFN to express 
their judgements regarding the likelihood of the events before carrying out the 
aggregation process. If these estimates are not able to reach a common intersection at 
certain a -level, the Delphi method will be applied and iterated until this requirement is 
fulfilled. Once the consensus PTFN has been acquired via the SAM with a common 
intersection standing amongst these estimates, the f-weighted valuation function is 
applied to compute the crisp value according to the consensus PTFN for the target entry 
of the Bayesian Network nodes. The crisp value is the figure representing the 
probability distribution of an event associated with a given condition shown in the 
Bayesian Network node. . 
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In the following cases, the first case presumes that only one expert's estimate is 
distant from the others. In contrast, in the second case, more than two experts' opinions 
are significantly apart. Each case simulates different scenarios and many other scenarios 
are still possible. However, while applying the aggregation process with unmentioned 
situations, the execution approach may be slightly different but the principle of the 
process should remain the same. This principle is that a common intersection of the 
estimated PTFNs has to be obtained before carrying out the aggregation process. 
7.6.1 Case 1: only one expert's opinion is distant 
In this example, it is assumed that only one of the experts' estimates is distant from 
the judgement of the others. Under this circumstance, a quicker way to achieve the 
group consensus is to ask the most distinct expert to modify his estimate alone by 
following the Delphi procedure proposed in the preceding sections. The rest of the 
estimates should remain unchanged. Table 7-1 tabulates the assumed estimates given by 
each expert; here, the column "After Delphi" lists the estimates when a common 
intersection among these estimated PTFNs is reached after the Delphi process is applied. 
In contrast, the column "Before Delphi" depicts the estimates given before carrying out 
the Delphi process. 
In this example, the most distant estimate is made by expert A; this is (20,25,35, 
40) having 30 as the crisp value (i. e. the result after defuzzification) of the estimate. 
Therefore, expert A is the only expert who will be asked to modify his estimate 
following the Delphi process with a sub-consensus PTFN as the modification reference 
provided. The sub-consensus PTFN is the consensus PTFN without taking expert A's 
estimate into account and R. b =(1.4,6.4,16.4,21.4) with a crisp value of 11.42 as the 
result. The data entries for experts B, C and D in column "Before Delphi" of the table 
are the same as in column "After Delphi". This is because their estimates are unchanged 
during the Delphi process. Eventually, a common intersection amongst these PTFNs is 
reached when R, = (15,25,35,40) representing expert A's opinion is given after the 
Delphi process. This compromise results in the consensus PTFN R= (4,9,19,24) 
being obtained with 13.88 as the crisp value. 
Figure 7-5 illustrates the PTFNs representing the estimates given by every expert 
before and after the Delphi process, and the group consensus if there is one. On the left 
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of the figure, the estimated PTFNs for each expert are shown, in which no common 
ground of the PTFNs has been reached. In addition, the group consensus PTFN with a 
crisp value derived from the updated estimates after performing the Delphi process are 
drawn on the right of the figure. It is evident that the common intersection of these 
PTFNs is located in the range between 15 and 20, which is the common ground among 
these PTFNs. However, although the consensus PTFN is achieved, the crisp value - 
13.88 - is difficult to be accepted by expert 
A, as the group consensus, due to being 
outside the range of his estimate. Under this circumstance, all the involved experts may 
have to comprise their judgements, so that an acceptable outcome can be obtained. 
Table 7-1 The estimates made by each expert in Case 1 
Before Del hi After Delphi 
PTA 
Crisp 
value 
PTA Crisp 
value 
Expert A 20,25,35,40 30 15,25,35,40 28.75 
Expert B (0,5,15,20) 10 (0,5,15,20) 10 
Expert C (0,5,15,20) 10 (0,5,15,20) 10 
Expert D (10,15,25,30) 20 (10,15,25,30) 20 
consensus 4,9,19,24) 13.88 
Case 1 before Delphi without consensus 
1.5 
......... .. ý ------- 
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Figure 7-5 The illustration of the PTFNs for case 1 
7.6.2 Case 2: more than two experts are apart 
In this example, it is presumed that disagreement among these experts still remains 
unsolved in the first run (e. g. the situation shown in the preceding case). This situation 
could be caused by either the most distant expert refuses to modify his/her estimate 
further or more than one expert's opinions are apart from one another. This difficulty 
results in no group consensus being obtained unless all the experts are willing to 
compromise their judgements together. Under this situation, there is no other alternative 
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but to ask every expert to participate the Delphi process in order to reach a common 
intersection. 
Table 7-2, as in Case 1, shows the PTFNs of the estimates made by four experts 
before and after the Delphi process. Before updating their judgements, a median value 
(i. e. 72.19) of their initial estimations is given as the reference value for re-estimation. It 
is assumed that these experts are willing to modify their estimates and that the larger the 
difference, the larger the compromise. Therefore the consensus PTFN is obtained 
following the Delphi and the SAM aggregation method when the common intersection 
amongst these updated estimates is reached. These updated estimates and the consensus 
PTFN are shown on the right hand side (i. e. the column "After Delphi") of the table. 
Thus the consensus PTFN R= (62,77,87,94) and the crisp value of the PTFN (i. e. 
79.82) are acquired. 
Eventually, after the Delphi process, the crisp value of the consensus PTFN is 
inside the common intersection of every expert's estimates (see the figures shown on 
the right hand side of Figure 7-6). This outcome should be accepted by all the experts as 
the group consensus. This assumption is made by assuming that every expert will be 
content with the outcome as long as the crisp value is inside their estimates although the 
value may locate in the margin of the estimations. In this example, none of the expert's 
opinion has been ignored despite the crisp value is in the margin of one of the 
estimations. 
Table 7-2 The estimates made by each expert in Case 2 
Before Delph i After Del hi 
PTFN Crisp 
value 
PTFN Crisp 
value 
Expert #A (85,90,100,100 93.75 65,80,90,100) 83.75 
Expert #B 30,35,5,50) 40 50,55,65,80) 62.5 
Expert #C 55,60,0,75) 65 65,75,85,90) 78.75 
Exert #D 80,85,95,100 90 60,80,90,95 81.25 
consensus 62,77,87,94) 79.82 
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Figure 7-6 The illustration of the PTFNs for case 2 
It should be noted that the key point of the aggregation of group opinions is not an 
issue of computation, but an issue of human satisfaction. Any expert can disagree with 
the aggregation outcome by all means. It is unlikely that there is an aggregation function 
or procedure which can satisfy every expert regarding the aggregation outcome and 
solve all the problem of group consensus. The aggregation function is just a tool to 
facilitate the goal (i. e. group consensus). Although the proposed aggregation method 
and procedure are not able to solve all the problems, it is still practical to deal with the 
most of the cases. Other solutions are possible but the present study has no intention of 
discussing this further since the satisfaction of human beings involves psychological 
issues which are beyond the scope of the present study. 
7.7 Discussion 
It is highly likely that the required historical statistical data is not always available 
for the established Bayesian Network model associated with the analysed accident. 
Therefore, experts' judgements usually become the alternative to solve the problem of 
lacking of data. However, the group consensus issue arises when a group of experts are 
involved in providing their estimates for the Conditional Probability Table data of the 
Bayesian Network model. Hence, an aggregation method and/or procedure are needed 
in order to overcome this problem. Furthermore, the systematisation and objectivity of 
the method and the contentment of the experts have to be considered as well. 
The proposed aggregation method for the group consensus is based on the SAM as 
the core to deal with the numerical computation of a set of PTFNs. In addition, it needs 
to cooperate with the f-weighted valuation function for defuzzification as well as the 
-212- 
Ch. 7: SAM 
Delphi method for the common ground of the estimates. The aim of the proposed 
aggregation method is to seek a systematic and objective way to carry out a process that 
can help a group of experts to reach their group consensus for the estimated values 
regarding the entries of the Conditional Probability Table of Bayesian Network nodes. 
These Bayesian Network nodes are the events associated with an analysed accident 
which is depicted in the preceding chapters. 
It is obvious that, from the view of a decision maker, it would be easier for him/her 
to make a decision if a group consensus derived from a group of experts is reached. For 
example, the judge of the court will find it difficult to make a verdict if the members of 
the jury are not able to reach a group consensus. Theoretically, the SAM and f-weighted 
valuation function can handle the aggregation computation if the PTFNs given are close 
to each other. However, this would not be always the case since the experts' opinions 
might be significantly apart. Thus, compromise amongst the experts becomes essential, 
and the Delphi method is the communication tool to resort to in order to facilitate a 
common ground to be reached. 
It has been shown, in the preceding sections, the proposed aggregation method can 
assist with the proposed methodology to fulfil the requirements of obtaining a group 
consensus with the following features: 
The form of PTFN has the advantages to intuitively express an expert's 
estimate as well as the uncertainty of the estimate. The larger the uncertainty, 
the larger the area of the PTFN covered. Furthermore, this form can not only 
fulfil the aggregation of the estimates in the SAM process, but also facilitate 
the common intersection of the estimates (i. e. the common ground) to be 
reached within the Delphi process. 
The consensus PTFN can only be achieved if and only if the common 
intersection of the estimates exists. Since the common intersection is always 
under the coverage of the consensus PTFN, it can be deemed as the consensus 
PTFN is constructed based on the common ground of the group opinion 
although not all the experts may be content with the crisp value of the PTFN 
at first. 
b The SAM aggregation function considers the "importance of the experts" 
when deciding the degree of influence (or contribution) for each estimate to 
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the group consensus. Moreover, this method can also regulate the overall 
consensus outcomes bias to the "degree of importance of the experts" or the 
"agreement degree (or similarity) of the estimates". 
U The outcome of the f-weighted valuation function can be regulated to the 
range between the average of the core and the average of the support of the 
PTFN when defuzzifying the PTFN for the crisp value. 
b The Delphi method can ensure a common intersection of the estimates to be 
reached, and the crisp value of the consensus PTFN to be accepted by all the 
experts involved. 
The SAM and f-weighted valuation function can still be applied even though 
only one expert's estimate is utilised. This is because the form of PTFN has 
the advantage to deal with the uncertainty of randomness and fuzziness. 
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Chapter Eight - 
Conclusions 
Summary 
This chapter summarises, in section 8.1, the features and the contributions of the 
proposed methodology which can be utilised in qualitatively and quantitatively 
analysing human errors in maritime accidents. The improvements of the methodology 
and ideas for the future work of the research are also given in section 8.2. Finally in 
section 8.3 the study concludes that the methodology would be of benefit in assisting 
the investigator to find the real causes of the accident, and it is the start, rather than the 
end, of the research in this topic area. 
8.1 Summary of Research Findings 
In Chapter 1, it was shown that Human factors (or elements) are gradually being 
recognised as the primary causal contributors to the accidents in maritime transportation 
sector, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has taken the conscious 
decision to concentrate its efforts on the human element. A methodology which can 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively analyse the Human and Organisational Factors 
(HOFs) involved in an accident is desperately needed by the investigator in order to find 
the real causes of the accidents and to respond to the public enquiry and lesson learning. 
This is because a sufficiently thorough and comprehensive accident/incident 
investigation procedure to clarify the significance, frequency and impact of the factors 
involved is of vital importance. Therefore, the present study (see Figure 8-1, which has 
also been shown in Chapter 1) proposes a methodology which implements the notion of 
Reason's Swiss Cheese Model with the set theory and the probability theory in 
conjunction with several well-defined Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) techniques, e. g. 
Why-Because Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Bayesian Network and Influence 
Diagrams, etc., to form a systematic procedure that possesses the following features. 
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Figure 8-1 The structure of the thesis 
  The analysis outcomes covered in Chapters 4 and 5 show the Bayesian Network 
can not only display the causation of the factors involved, but also explore the 
significance, frequency and impact of the factors where the qualitative results 
represent the instances of the Window of Opportunities (WoOs) identified in an 
accident, and the quantitative results reveal the width or extent of the WoOs. 
  The proposed HOFs framework developed in Chapter 6- HFACS-MA - is a 
modification derived from the original Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS) and has taken Reason's GEMS and Hawkin's SHEL models into 
account in order to fulfil the requirements of the maritime industry. The framework 
is an application of the Swiss Cheese Model, from which the identified human 
factors can be classified into different levels and categories. Hence, a 
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comprehensive insight into the causation, of the accident analysed can be obtained 
by integrating the qualitative and quantitative analysis results with the HOFs 
framework. 
  The applied Similarity Aggregation Method (SAM) and the Positive Trapezoidal 
Fuzzy Number (PTFN) are developed in Chapter 7 using fuzzy set theory in order 
to handle the group consensus problem. This can help solve the problem 
encountered when experts' judgements are used to calibrate the Bayesian Network 
due to a lack of historical statistic data during the quantitative analysis period. Both 
the randomness and fuzziness of the uncertainty have been considered in the 
aggregation method to handle the issue of subjective probability. This feature 
makes the methodology more resilient. 
  The systematic procedure is another important feature of the methodology. This 
feature can make the methodology more feasible and practical by reducing the 
unnecessary speculations of the analysts and diminishing the influences of 
individual bias. This is achieved by ensuring that the analyst only concentrate on 
every limited scope of questions and infer their rational answers to the questions at 
each stage and step, without having to concern the whole picture of the accident. 
All analysis outcomes are therefore accumulated and integrated together to obtain 
the final results. 
The challenges in analysing an accident/incident thoroughly and comprehensively 
to clarify the significance, frequency and impact of the factors involved can be fulfilled, 
although in certain cases, it could be overly time consuming to conduct the analysis 
using the proposed methodology for some minor incidents. It is believed that some of 
the developed methods possess valuable potential as useful aids and effective 
alternatives to assist the decision makers in safety planning, and will gain increased 
usage in other safety related operations and management. It is also believed that these 
methods can be tailored to the applications of dealing with the safety problems in the 
other industries. The major contributions of the novel methods or notions proposed are 
as follows: 
  The implementation of Swiss Cheese Model with the set theory and the 
probability theory opens another possibility way to view the Swiss Cheese 
Model. It shows that the Swiss Cheese Model is not only suitable as an 
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abstract notion of human errors, but also capable of substantiating with 
physical figures to quantitify the factors behind these holes and/or WoOs. 
  The proposed HOFs framework - HFACS-MA - clearly classifies the human 
factors which can cause an accident to occur in different levels of the system. 
It can also be applied during the investigation stage to assist the investigator in 
avoiding overlooking those latent conditions in the shadow. When it is 
integrated with the qualitative and quantitative analysis results produced by 
the proposed methodology, a comprehensive insight into the causation of the 
causal factors reveals the interactions between those active failures and latent 
conditions. 
  The innovation of Backtracking process and its validation mechanism can 
transform a fault tree into a Bayesian Network in a form of Minimal Cut Set, 
in which the Top Event is no longer represented by a signal object, but several 
nodes as Minimal Cut Sets. This formation can facilitate the diagnosis and 
prediction of the network to be performed, offering more valuable details 
about an accident that the Top Event format can provide 
  The introduction of K-CPT and Approximate Simplification Law provides a 
method to find the minimum sum-of-product Boolean expression depicting the 
deterministic correlation between a node and its parent nodes in a Bayesian 
Network regarding an accident. This method can simplify a Bayesian Network 
of the accident into a simplified fault tree. It cannot only broaden the usage of 
Bayesian Network, but also extends the application of FTA. 
  The notion of the List Statement utilised in Fact Finding process provides a 
data format and index mechanism which can facilitate the logical organisation 
of information and evidence in the proposed analysis procedure. 
8.2 The improvements of the methodology and future work 
The hypothesis is fulfilled through a rather sophisticated combination of FSA 
techniques and methods. However, the mission has yet been accomplished since the 
novel methodology is still at preliminary stage. Improvements in the methodology and 
the potential application of the method are still expecting. Although it has been shown 
that the proposed methodology has potential for the analysis, due to the time and 
-218- 
Ch8: Conclusions 
research constraints, the present study has not been able to explore all aspects of what 
may be concerned and desirable in accident analysis. They can be identified as follows: 
1. The applicability and limitation of the methodology: it would be useful if more 
test cases are applied in order to further clarify the details of the issues. Then 
the deficiencies of the methodology will be revealed, and the direction of 
future improvement will be emerged. 
2. The detailed classification and definition of the proposed HOFs framework: 
the proposed HFACS-MA is only developed without specifying the detailed 
items and their definition in each category and/or level. A profound study to 
establish a dedicated HOFs framework which can fulfill the requirements of 
the maritime industry is urgently needed. 
3. The solution to the simplification of K-CPT if the variables are more than six: 
due to the limitation of Karnaugh-map, the simplification of K-CPT can only 
be carried out provided that the number of the variables is less than six. An 
alternative is needed to cope with this issue when it is encountered. 
4. A proper procedure to perform the diagnosis and prediction of the analysis 
results: the analysis results are formed in a Bayesian Network and/or Influence 
Diagrams model, which can be used to diagnose its causes and predict possible 
consequences based on observable evidence. A sufficient and thorough 
procedure to execute those functionalities is yet uncertain, and needs to be 
clarified. 
5. An achievable process to establish a Temporal Bayesian Network model for 
accidents: this would allow modelling an accident in light of its evolution over 
time. In other words, a Bayesian Network model is generated according to a 
specific time of the occurrence, and then the same structure of the model 
denoting different period of time of interest is repeated. Thus, the proposed 
methodology can be extended to deal with the time sequence issue of accidents. 
6. Different type of Influence Diagrams models for variant requirements of 
countermeasures: the proposed Influence Diagrams model is only suitable for 
considering cost-benefit as the criteria of the Risk Control Options. Different 
types of Influence Diagrams model should be introduced when the 
requirements of the countermeasures are changed. 
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7. Other methods for subjective estimation and/or group consensus: although the 
applied method (i. e. SAM + PTFN) is capable of handling this issue, it still has 
deficiencies for pragmatic utilisation due to the bothersome requirements of 
PTFN. For example, each estimate needs four numbers to compose a PTFN. In 
contrast, linguistic expressions may be a friendlier way for the experts to 
express their estimations and worthy of investigation. 
The proposed methodology can therefore be improved and its applicability can be 
extended to other safety related fields in other transport sectors and indeed virtually any 
other industry. 
8.3 Final Conclusion 
Hybrid methods are recognized as an effective way to deal with the 
multidisciplinary nature of organisational safety and corresponding assessment 
frameworks (Lin and Wang, 1997). The proposed methodology follows this idea by 
composing a hybrid technique integrating qualitative and quantitative analysing 
perspectives, and offers a flexible risk-informed decision-making tool. It can be used as 
an approach for accident analysis to particularly carry out the analysis in those 
situations where probabilistic distributions of the events or factors, involved in the 
accident, are difficult or impossible to obtain. 
The proposed methodology is still in an early stage of development, it needs time 
and more case studies to find out the best way of using it as well as ways of improving 
it. The detailed items and categories, even the levels, of the HFACS-MA also necd a 
profound study to finalise a dedicated HOFs framework which can fulfil the needs of 
the maritime industry in investigating and analysing HOFs involved in an organisational 
accident. One thing that can be assured is that this study shall not be the end but the start 
of the research in this topic. Further work regarding the proposed methodology is still 
required. 
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Appendix A- The Conditional Probability Tables for 
Top Event model 
Source of the data used in the Conditional Probability Tables 
Historical Statistic Experts Judgement Author's Assumption 
TE x 
A x 
B x 
C x 
D x 
El x 
E2 
E3 x 
F 
G 
Hi x 
H2 
J x 
K 
L3 x 
L4 
L5 x 
L6 x 
L7 x 
L8 x 
M x 
N x 
O x 
P x 
x 
R x 
T x 
U x 
V x 
w x 
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Netica (CoGF) 4.08 Win, (C) 1992-2008 Norsys Software Corp. 
Command Line: HeraldFE-TE. neta 
Compiled to 20 cliques, with total table size (including sepsets) of 332. 
TE: 
capsized safe A C B 
0.1 0.9 no water reach CP no Anti FSE 
0.1 0.9 no water reach CP Anti FSE existed 
0.01 0.99 no water under CP no Anti FSE 
0.01 0.99 no water under CP Anti FSE existed 
0.99 0.01 flooding reach CP no Anti FSE 
0.2 0.8 flooding reach CP Anti FSE existed 
0.1 0.9 flooding under CP no Anti FSE 
0.05 0.95 flooding under CP Anti FSE existed 
A: 
no water flooding HI F 
0.05 0.95 over 18Kts Bow opened 
0.99 0.01 over 18Kts Bow closed 
0.9 0.1 under 18Kts Bow opened 
0.99 0.01 under 18Kts Bow closed 
B: 
no Anti FSE Anti FSE existed 
0.99 0.01 
C: 
reach CP under CP G 
0.8 0.2 unstable 
0.2 0.8 stable 
D: 
TBH 80cm non TBH E2 E3 El J 
0.05 0.95 deficient ED loading high empty in 2 hrs 
0.9 0.1 deficient ED loading high more than 2 hrs 
0.05 0.95 deficient ED loading low empty in 2 hrs 
0.9 0.1 deficient ED loading low more than 2 hrs 
0.01 0.99 deficient no ED OP high empty in 2 hrs 
0.1 0.9 deficient no ED OP high more than 2 hrs 
0.01 0.99 deficient no ED OP low empty in 2 hrs 
0.1 0.9 deficient no ED OP low more than 2 hrs 
0.05 0.95 sufficient ED loading high empty in 2 hrs 
0.1 0.9 sufficient ED loading high more than 2 hrs 
0.05 0.95 sufficient ED loading low empty in 2 lus 
0.1 0.9 sufficient ED loading low more than 2 hrs 
0.01 0.99 sufficient no ED OP high empty in 2 hrs 
0.01 0.99 sufficient no ED OP high more than 2 his 
0.01 0.99 sufficient no ED OP low empty in 2 his 
0.01 0.99 sufficient no ED OP low more than 2 hrs 
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R1- 
low high 
0.25 0.75 
E2: 
deficient sufficient 
0.9 0.1 
E3: 
ED loading no ED OP 
0.8 0.2 
T. 
Bow opened Bow closed K M 
0.01 0.99 No D Check AssB presented 
0.99 0.01 No D Check AssB absented 
0.001 0.999 recheck AssB presented 
0.1 0.9 recheck AssB absented 
r- 
unstable stable N D 
0.95 0.05 overloaded TBH 80cm 
0.2 0.8 overloaded non TBH 
0.1 0.9 not overloaded TBH 80cm 
0.05 0.95 not overloaded non TBH 
H1: 
over 18Kts under 18Kts 
0.9 0.1 
H2: 
no DI fitted DI fitted 
0.99 0.01 
T" 
empty in 2 hrs more than 2 hrs 0 
0.1 0.9 no BHCP 
0.9 0.1 BHCP installed 
K: 
No D Check recheck p R 
0.05 0.95 BD indicator M aware NR is FTG 
0.01 0.99 BD indicator M aware NR is STOP 
0.9 0.1 BD indicator M unknow NR is FTG 
0.01 0.99 BD indicator M unknow NR is STOP 
0.8 0.2 no indicator M aware NR is FTG 
0.6 0.4 no indicator M aware NR is STOP 
0.99 0.01 no indicator M unknow NR is FTG 
0.7 0.3 no indicator M unknow NR is STOP 
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L3: 
Short Of MP MP sufficient 
0.9 0.1 
L4: 
not account accounted 
0.9 0.1 
L5: 
safe unsafe 
0.75 0.25 
L6: 
TP Yes TP No 
0.9 0.1 
L7: 
_ satisfy conce 
0.8 0.2 
rned 
T. R- 
good mngmt poor mngmt 
0.2 0.8 
Mý 
AssB presented AssB absented T 
0.2 0.8 CO left early 
0.99 0.01 stayAt BD 
N: 
overloaded not 
overloaded 
H2 L4 L5 
0.8 0.2 no DI fitted not account safe 
0.95 0.05 no DI fitted not account unsafe 
0.1 0.9 no DI fitted accounted safe 
0.8 0.2 no DI fitted accounted unsafe 
0.1 0.9 DI fitted not account safe 
0.2 0.8 DI fitted not account unsafe 
0.05 0.95 DI fitted accounted safe 
0.2 0.8 DI fitted accounted unsafe 
o: 
no BHCP BHCP 
installed 
L8 
0.1 0.9 good =gmt 
0.99 0.01 poor mngmt 
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P: 
BD indicator no indicator L8 
0.95 0.05 good mngmt 
0.05 0.95 poor mngmt 
o: 
M aware M unknow L8 
0.99 0.01 good mngmt 
0.01 0.99 poor mngmt 
R: 
NR is FTG NR is STOP U 
0.99 0.01 poor SSO 
0.1 0.9 good SSO 
T: 
CO left early Stay At BD L3 U V 
0.99 0.01 shortOf MP poor SSO earlier HSO 
0.95 0.05 shortOf MP poor SSO normal 
0.9 0.1 shortOf MP good SSO earlier HSO 
0.8 0.2 shortOf MP good SSO normal 
0.9 0.1 MP sufficient poor SSO earlier HSO 
0.1 0.9 MP sufficient poor SSO normal 
0.1 0.9 MP sufficient good SSO earlier HSO 
0.05 0.95 MP sufficient good SSO normal 
U: 
poor SSO good SSO W L7 
0.1 0.9 clear satisfy 
0.05 0.95 clear concerned 
0.95 0.05 vague satisfy 
0.2 0.8 vague concerned 
V: 
earlier HSO normal L6 
0.9 0.1 TP Yes 
0.1 0.9 TP No 
W: 
clear vague L8 
0.95 0.05 good mngmt 
0.05 0.95 poor mngmt 
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Appendix B- The Conditional Probability Tables for 
Minimal Cut Sets model 
Source of the data used in the Conditional Probability Tables 
Historical Statistic Experts Judgement Author's Assumption 
MCS 1 
MCS2 x 
MCS3 
MCS4 x 
Al x 
A2 x 
B x 
C1 x 
C2 x 
D 
E2 x 
E3 
Fl x 
F2 
G1 x 
G2 x 
H1 
H2 
J x 
K1 x 
K2 
L3 
L4 x 
L5 x 
L6 x 
L7 x 
L8 
M1 x 
M2 x 
Ni x 
N2 
O x 
P 
R x 
Ti 
T2 
U x 
V 
W 
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Netica (CoGF) 4.08 Win, (C) 1992-2008 Norsys Software Corp. 
Command Line: HeraldFE-MCS. neta" 
Compiled to 34 cliques, with total table size (including sepsets) of 654. 
MCS 1: 
capsized safe Al B Cl 
0.1 0.9 no water no Anti FSE reach CP 
0.1 0.9 no water Anti FSE existed reach CP 
0.01 0.99 no water no Anti FSE under CP 
0.01 0.99 no water Anti FSE existed under CP 
0.99 0.01 flooding no Anti FSE reach CP 
0.2 0.8 flooding Anti FSE existed reach CP 
0.1 0.9 flooding no Anti FSE under CP 
0.05 0.95 flooding Anti FSE existed under CP 
MCS2: 
capsized safe Al B C2 
0.1 0.9 no water no Anti FSE reach CP 
0.01 0.99 no water no Anti FSE under CP 
0.1 0.9 no water Anti FSE existed reach CP 
0.01 0.99 no water Anti FSE existed under CP 
0.99 0.01 flooding no Anti FSE reach CP 
0.1 0.9 flooding no Anti FSE under CP 
0.2 0.8 flooding Anti FSE existed reach CP 
0.05 0.95 flooding Anti FSE existed under CP 
MCS3: 
capsized safe A2 B Cl 
0.2 0.8 no water no Anti FSE reach CP 
0.01 0.99 no water no Anti FSE under CP 
0.2 0.8 no water Anti FSE existed reach CP 
0.01 0.99 no water Anti FSE existed under CP 
0.99 0.01 flooding no Anti FSE reach CP 
0.1 0.9 flooding no Anti FSE under CP 
0.2 0.8 flooding Anti FSE existed reach CP 
0.05 0.95 flooding Anti FSE existed under CP 
MCS4: 
capsized safe A2 B C2 
0.2 0.8 no water no Anti FSE reach CP 
0.01 0.99 no water no Anti FSE under CP 
0.2 0.8 no water Anti FSE existed reach CP 
0.01 0.99 no water Anti FSE existed under CP 
0.99 0.01 flooding no Anti FSE reach CP 
0.1 0.9 flooding no Anti FSE under CP 
0.2 0.8 flooding 
- 
Anti FSE existed reach CP 0.05 0.95 flooding Anti FSE existed under CP 
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Al, 
no water flooding HI Fl 
0.05 0.95 over 18Kts Bow opened 
0.99 0.01 over 18Kts Bow closed 
0.7 0.3 under 18Kts Bow opened 
0.99 0.01 under 18Kts Bow closed 
A9. 
no water flooding HI F2 
0.05 0.95 over 18Kts Bow opened 
0.99 0.01 over 18Kts Bow closed 
0.7 0.3 under 18Kts Bow opened 10.99 0.01 under 18Kts Bow closed 
B: 
no Anti FSE Anti FSE existed 
0.99 0.01 
c1. 
reach CP under CP GI 
0.8 0.2 unstable 
0.2 0.8 stable 
C2: 
reach CP under CP G2 
0.8 0.2 stable 
0.2 0.8 unstable 
D: 
TBH 80cm non TBH E2 E3 J 
0.05 0.95 deficient ED loading 
_. 
empty in 2 hrs 
0.9 0.1 deficient ED loading more than 2 hrs 
0.01 0.99 deficient no ED OP empty in 2 hrs 
0.1 0.9 deficient no ED OP more than 2 hrs 
0.05 0.95 sufficient ED loading empty in 2 hrs 
0.1 0.9 sufficient ED loading more than 2 hrs 
0.01 0.99 sufficient no ED OP empty in 2 hrs 
0.01 0.99 sufficient no ED OP more than 2 hrs 
E2: 
deficient sufficient 
0.9 0.1 
E3: 
ED loading no ED OP 
0.8 0.2 
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Fl: 
Bow opened Bow closed K1 Ml 
0.01 0.99 No D Check AssB presented 
0.99 0.01 No D Check AssB absented 
0.001 0.999 recheck AssB presented 
0.1 0.9 recheck AssB absented 
F2: 
Bow opened Bow closed K2 M2 
0.01 0.99 No D Check AssB presented 
0.99 0.01 No D Check AssB absented 
0.001 0.999 recheck AssB presented 
0.1 0.9 recheck AssB absented 
G1: 
unstable stable Ni D 
0.95 0.05 overloaded TBH 80cm 
0.2 0.8 overloaded non TBH 
0.1 0.9 not overloaded TBH 80cm 
0.05 0.95 not overloaded non TBH 
G2: 
stable unstable N2 D 
0.95 0.05 overloaded TBH 80cm 
0.2 0.8 overloaded non TBH 
0.1 0.9 not overloaded TBH 80cm 
0.05 0.95 not overloaded non TBH 
HI: 
over 18Kts under 18Kts 
0.9 0.1 
H2: 
no DI fitted DI fitted 
0.99 0.01 
J: 
empty in 2 hrs more than 2 hrs 0 
0.1 0.9 no BHCP 
0.9 0.1 BHCP installed 
K1: 
No D Check recheck p 
0.05 0.95 BD indicator 
0.9 0.1 no indicator 
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K2- 
No D Check recheck R 
0.1 0.9 M aware NR is FTG 
0.5 0.5 M aware NR is STOP 
0.99 0.01 M unknow NR is FTG 
0.5 0.5 M unknow NR is STOP 
L3: 
shortOf MP MP sufficient 
0.9 0.1 
L4: 
I not account accounted 
0.9 0.1 
L5: 
safe unsafe 
0.75 0.25 
L6: 
TP Yes TP No 
0.9 0.1 
L7: 
satisfy concerned 
0.8 0.2 
L8: 
good mngmt poor mngmt 
0.2 0.8 
M1: 
AssB presented AssB absented Ti 
0.2 0.8 CO left early 
0.99 0.01 stayAt BD 
M2: 
AssB presented AssB absented T2 
0.2 0.8 CO left early 
0.99 0.01 stayAt BD 
Ni: 
overloaded not overloaded H2 L4 
0.9 0.1 no DI fitted not account 
0.1 0.9 no DI fitted accounted 
0.2 0.8 DI fitted not account 
0.05 0.95 DI fitted accounted 
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N2: 
overloaded not overloaded H2 L5 
0.1 0.9 no DI fitted safe 
0.9 0.1 no DI fitted unsafe 
0.05 0.95 DI fitted safe 
0.2 0.8 DI fitted unsafe 
0: 
no BHCP BHCP installed L8 
0.1 0.9 good mngmt 
0.99 0.01 poor mngmt 
P: 
BD indicator no indicator L8 
0.95 0.05 good mngmt 
0.05 0.95 poor mit t 
o: 
M aware M unknow L8 
0.99 0.01 good mngmt 
0.01 0.99 poor mngmt 
R: 
NR is FTG NR is STOP U 
0.99 0.01 poor SSO 
0.1 0.9 good SSO 
Tl: 
CO left early stayAt BD L3 
0.95 0.05 shortOf MP 
0.1 0.9 MP sufficient 
T2: 
CO left early stayAt BD V U 
0.95 0.05 earlier HSO poor SSO 
0.1 0.9 earlier HSO good SSO 
0.1 0.9 normal poor SSO 
0.05 0.95 normal good SSO 
U: 
poor SSO good SSO W L7 
0.1 0.9 clear satisfy 
0.05 0.95 clear concerned 
0.95 0.05 vague satisfy 
0.2 0.8 vague concerned 
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V: 
earlier HSO normal L6 
0.9 0.1 TP Yes 
0.1 0.9 TP No 
W: 
clear vague L8 
0.95 0.05 good mngmt 
0.05 0.95 poor mngmt 
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Appendix C- The specifications of sensitivity finding reports 
in Netica 
SENSITIVITY TO FINDINGS 
A report will be displayed to show how much the beliefs, mean value, etc. of the 
target node could be influenced by a single finding at each of the other nodes in the 
net (each is called a' indings node'). The first part of the report has a section for 
each findings node, showing how much it can effect the target node using several 
different sensitivity measures. The second part is a summary table which compares 
the sensitivities for each of the findings nodes. ... Use the summary list of sensitivities 
at the end of the report generated to identify possible findings nodes which will 
provide the most information about the target node. If you want more detailed 
information of how these findings nodes can effect the target node, look up each of 
them in the first part of the report. 
Below are descriptions of each of the utility-free sensitivity measures that Netica 
calculates. First are some notes for interpreting the descriptions. 
Key / Notes 
Definition: In the definitions, "belief' means posterior probability (i. e. conditioned 
on all findings currently entered). In the names of the various measures 
"real" refers to the expected value of continuous nodes or discrete , 
nodes which have a real numeric value associated with each state. 
"expected value" means to take the expectation over a quantit (as y 
described in the onscreen help). 
Range: The minimum and maximum values that this measure can take on. 
Compare: A quantity which is useful to compare the value of this measure against 
(perhaps to express this measure as a percentage). 
Equation: Note that all the conditionals should include all findings already entered 
into the network, so P(q) is really PE, P is really P f, E , etc. 
Notation: 
is the query variable 
F is the varying variable 
q is a state of the query variable 
f is a state of the varying variable 
Xq is the numeric real value corresponding to state 
SUM-q means the sum over all states q of Q. It applies to the whole expression following. 
MIN-q 
MAX-q 
are similar to SUM-q 
E(Q) is the expected real value of Q before any findings 
EQ is the expected real value of Q after new finding f for node F V(Q) is the variance of the real value of before any findings 
H(Q) is the entropy of Q before any findings 
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RMS is "root mean square", which is the square root of the average of the 
values squared. 
%S" " Tl_v_r 
1Y11111 LILULI LVll 
Definition: 
vl 
Minimum belief that each state q of Q can take due to a finding at F. 
This provides a value for each state. 
Range: [0, P)P (q) if is independent of F 
Compare: P(q) 
Equation: Pmin(q) = MIN-f P 
Maximum Belief 
Definition: Maximum belief that each state q of Q can take due to a finding at F. 
This provides a value for each state. 
Range: [P(a). 11 P(a) if 0 is independent of F 
Rnuatinn- I Pmax(al = MAX-f P(alfl I 
TYKAQ r1knticri- of Relief 
Definition: The square root of the expected change squared of the belief of state q 
of Q, due to a finding at F. This provides a value for each state. This is 
the standard deviation of P(gjf) about P(q) due to a finding at F, with 
the finding at F distributed by P. 
Reference: Spiegelhalter89 & Neapolitan90, p394. They call the square of this 
quantity simply "variance". 
Range: [0,1] 0 if is independent of F 
Compare: P(q) 
Equation: sp(q) = sqrt (Vp(q)) 
Vp(q) =SUM-fP P- PA2 
Rtrnnv Recdnctinn (Mutual Information) 
Definition: The mutual information between Q and F (measured in bits). 
The expected reduction in entropy of Q (measured in bits) due to a 
finding at F. 
Range: [0, H0 if is independent of F 
Reference: Pearl88, p321. He has sign of I(T, X) backwards. 
Var mapping: T-> Q, X->F, I ->I 
Compare: H(Q) 
Equation: I= H(Q) - H(QIF) 
= SUM-q SUM-f P log /PP 
Note that the log is base 2, which is traditional for entropy and mutual information, 
so that the units of the results will be "bits". 
More complete documentation will be available at Norsys website: 
www. norsys. com 
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